Jennifer L. Hunter

This is an appeal from a medical malpractice judgment where the trial judge found the appellant physician negligent in treating a stroke victim, leading to permanent injuries.

The core issue on appeal was causation: whether the trial judge erred in finding that the physician's negligence caused the injuries, specifically by not requiring the plaintiff to establish precisely which treatment option would have prevented the unfavourable outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's robust and pragmatic application of the "but for" causation test, particularly in the context of an evidentiary gap created by the defendant's negligence.

The appellant, G.H., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a physician's finding of her incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan (CTP), and confirmed the renewal of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that G.H. was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her mental disorder, and that the CTO criteria were met.

The court also upheld the Board's dismissal of preliminary objections.

The plaintiff attended the emergency department with symptoms of dizziness, nausea, and facial weakness, and a referral note from his family doctor requesting to rule out a stroke.

The defendant emergency physician diagnosed peripheral vertigo and Bell's Palsy, and discharged the plaintiff without conducting a gait assessment or consulting a neurologist.

The plaintiff returned the next day with a severe basilar artery occlusion, resulting in catastrophic long-term disabilities.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care and that, but for this breach, the plaintiff would have received timely recanalization treatment with a successful outcome.

The defendant's request for a 25% discount on the agreed damages was dismissed.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by the respondent psychiatrist.

The appeal challenged the Consent and Capacity Board's finding of the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment and the validity of the CTO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze, and its assessment of the CTO's compliance with the Mental Health Act.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of not receiving treatment, despite his history of non-compliance and subsequent deterioration.

The plaintiffs in a complex medical malpractice action served a neuroradiology expert report late, breaching a case management order and necessitating a second adjournment of the trial.

The defendant doctors sought $30,000 in costs thrown away for wasted trial preparation time.

The court emphasized the importance of complying with case management orders and the court's inherent jurisdiction to award costs for abuse of process.

Taking into account the lack of detailed dockets, the court's knowledge of the file, the need for deterrence, and the plaintiff's physical limitations, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $20,000 in costs thrown away to the defendant doctors in any event of the cause.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication and a community treatment plan, and the validity of a community treatment order.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal standard for capacity and had ample evidence to determine the appellant's incapacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof.

The court also found that the Board had a sufficient basis to confirm that all statutory criteria for issuing the community treatment order were met.

The plaintiffs brought an action for negligent investigation and defamation against various police defendants following a search warrant execution and a press conference.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court upheld the search warrant, finding ample evidence for its issuance, thereby dismissing the negligent investigation claim.

The court also dismissed the defamation claim, concluding that the statements made at the press conference were not defamatory in context, were substantially true (justification), and were protected by qualified privilege.

A claim for negligent misstatement was also dismissed as a "dressed up" defamation claim.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal from an order certifying a class action against Ontario.

The underlying class action alleges negligence and Charter breaches in the provision of services to adults with developmental disabilities.

On appeal, Ontario argues that the recently enacted Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 provides immunity from the negligence claims.

The CCLA sought to intervene to argue that Ontario's expansive interpretation of the Act's immunity provisions violates section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court granted the motion, finding that the CCLA would make a useful and distinct contribution to a matter of public importance without causing injustice or undue delay to the parties.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians and a hospital following the plaintiff's development of compartment syndrome after hand surgery.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to substitute the name of one anesthesiologist for another, claiming misnomer.

The proposed defendant anesthesiologist brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the separate action against him as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the plaintiffs made a strategic decision rather than a true naming error.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts to discover her claim against the anesthesiologist more than two years before commencing the action.

The plaintiffs brought an action under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act to recover insurance monies to satisfy a judgment arising from a settlement in a personal injury action.

The issue was which insurer—Gore Mutual (insurer of the vehicle owner) or Allstate (insurer of the injured passenger)—should satisfy the judgment.

The motion judge found Gore liable, concluding that the vehicle owner had not breached the insurance policy's cooperation clause and, alternatively, that relief from forfeiture was available.

Gore appealed, arguing the vehicle owner breached the policy by failing to cooperate and failing to provide updated contact information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the vehicle owner's conduct did not constitute substantial non-cooperation as required to breach the cooperation condition.

This costs endorsement followed two motions heard on August 29, 2016.

The defendant solicitors were successful in their motion for disclosure of a litigation file and in opposing the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike a limitation period defence.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant solicitors for both motions, totaling $12,607 for their motion and $2,700.12 plus HST for the plaintiffs' cross-motion.

The decision included deductions and offsets for costs related to the cross-examination of an affiant, as per Rule 39.02(4).

The plaintiffs brought an action for solicitor negligence against their former lawyers.

Two motions were heard: the defendants' motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and the plaintiffs' cross-motion to strike paragraphs from the statement of defence pleading a limitation period defence.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike, finding the limitation defence was not plain and obvious to fail.

The court granted the defendants' motion for disclosure, ordering the plaintiffs to produce the complete litigation file from their subsequent lawyers, subject to privilege claims for non-parties.

The defendant radiologist moved for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim against him, arguing the plaintiffs failed to tender expert opinion evidence on causation.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for leave to admit late-served expert reports from a gastroenterologist and a radiologist.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to admit the late reports, finding that their exclusion could cause a miscarriage of justice and the defendants would not suffer undue prejudice given the trial's adjournment.

Relying on the newly admitted expert evidence regarding standard of care and breach, the court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, concluding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed and that an inference of causation might be drawn at trial.

The issue of costs thrown away due to the trial's adjournment was reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant died after leave to appeal a $95 traffic ticket was granted.

The appellant's counsel moved to substitute a personal representative to continue the appeal, while the municipal prosecutor sought to abate the appeal due to mootness.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its jurisdiction to continue the appeal, noting that the matter had no practical consequences for the estate, was not evasive of review, and lacked a sufficient factual record to decide an issue with province-wide implications.

The appeal was abated and the judgment below was stayed.

The plaintiff brought an action against 39 defendants, including lawyers, police officers, and private investigators, seeking $20 million in damages for various torts including abuse of process, negligent investigation, and conspiracy.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on previous court orders finding the plaintiff in contempt of court.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively struck the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Substantial costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The Board had rescinded a certificate of involuntary admission but upheld the physician’s finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment due to inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing antipsychotic medication.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review and the test for capacity under s. 4 of the Act, the court found the Board reasonably concluded the appellant’s delusional beliefs and disorganized thinking prevented her from performing a risk–benefit analysis regarding treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the Board equated mental illness with incapacity or failed to ensure the appellant had been informed about treatment options.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a 21‑day personal injury trial concerning municipal liability for road conditions and signage, the successful plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $1,045,000.

The court considered the complexity of the litigation, the extensive expert evidence, and the reasonableness of the fees and disbursements claimed.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay rather than fully reflective of the successful party’s expenditures, the court concluded that the amounts claimed exceeded reasonable expectations.

Significant reductions were made to both fees and disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $406,000 in fees and $200,000 in disbursements, plus applicable taxes.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence action against a municipality arising from a single‑vehicle collision on a rural road curve that caused catastrophic injuries to a young driver.

The court considered whether the municipality breached its duty under s. 44 of the Municipal Act to keep the roadway in a reasonable state of repair, focusing primarily on inadequate warning signage and the absence of an advisory speed sign for a sharp curve.

Expert evidence established that proper signage, including a 40 km/h advisory speed tab and additional warning devices required by the Ontario Traffic Manual, should have been installed.

The municipality had not conducted any evaluation of the signage following amalgamation and allowed substandard signage to remain in place for years.

The court found the municipality liable for failing to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair, but also held the driver contributorily negligent for failing to sufficiently reduce speed in snowy conditions.

The appellant radiologist failed to detect a cancerous lesion on the respondent's liver following colon cancer surgery.

The respondent later died of metastatic colon cancer.

A jury found the appellant negligent and awarded substantial damages, concluding that the delayed diagnosis deprived the respondent of a greater than 50 percent chance of being cured.

The appellant appealed, arguing the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable, the trial judge erred in her charge regarding survival versus cure rates, and the jury failed to properly discount future income loss for adverse contingencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was supported by expert evidence, the jury charge was adequate, and the damages award was reasonable.