Jason Gorda

The applicant, charged with fraud and breach of trust, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an unreasonable strip search following her arrest.

The court found that the police conducted the strip search without reasonable and probable grounds and in an unreasonable manner, failing to adhere to the principles established in R. v. Golden.

The search was deemed routine, degrading, lacked proper documentation, and was conducted without adequate privacy, exacerbated by a s. 10(b) Charter breach during questioning.

Given the systemic nature of the violations and the severe impact on the applicant, a stay of proceedings was granted as the only adequate remedy.

The accused, Zaid Mohammed, sought a bail review after being denied bail by a lower court.

He was facing charges related to three incidents, including attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple drug possession, and breaches of recognizance.

The review court found a material change in circumstances due to the withdrawal of several serious federal drug trafficking and proceeds of crime charges.

Considering the accused's minimal criminal record, youth, and a stringent proposed release plan involving house arrest, a substantial surety pledge, and electronic monitoring, the court found that detention was not necessary on secondary or tertiary grounds to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was granted.

Adrian Foster was charged with willfully killing a dog and causing it unnecessary suffering, contrary to sections 445(1) and 445.1 of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from an incident where his dog fell from his seventh-floor balcony.

The Crown alleged Foster deliberately threw the dog, while Foster claimed it was an accident.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence, found Foster's testimony unbelievable due to inconsistencies and his unusual reaction to the dog's injury.

The physical impossibility of an accidental fall from the balcony, combined with Foster's statements and lack of remorse, led the court to conclude that guilt was the only reasonable inference.

Foster was found guilty on both counts.

The offender was convicted by a jury of armed robbery following a planned home invasion where the victims were held at gunpoint and one was shot twice.

The offender acted as the getaway driver and planner, recruiting younger individuals to carry out the robbery.

The court applied the 4 to 13 year sentencing range for home invasions, noting the severe physical and psychological impact on the victims and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

The offender was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment, less 6 months credit for time spent on house arrest, resulting in an effective sentence of 8.5 years.

A young person, age 15 at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to robbery and aggravated assault arising from a home invasion on June 25, 2015.

The accused was part of a group of six individuals (including two adults) who invaded a residence in east Toronto armed with two handguns and a crowbar.

While the accused did not directly inflict violence, he participated in the criminal enterprise.

One victim was shot twice in the abdomen and pelvis, sustaining serious injuries including permanent nerve damage.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months custody (3 months 25 days closed, 4 months open, 4 months community supervision) followed by 12 months probation, with credit for 18 months of restrictive bail conditions and 3 days pre-trial custody.

A DNA order and 10-year weapons prohibition were also imposed.

The accused was charged with threatening bodily harm to a transit bus driver, assaulting police officers while resisting arrest, attempting to take a weapon from a peace officer, and failing to comply with probation by not making full restitution.

The Crown proved that the accused threatened the bus driver with violence after becoming frustrated about being late for work.

The court found the accused guilty of threatening bodily harm, assault while resisting arrest, and failing to comply with probation.

However, the court acquitted on the charge of attempting to take the officer's weapon, finding reasonable doubt as to whether the accused acted with the necessary intent to disarm the officer during the struggle.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepsister and sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility, evaluating the reliability of the complainant's evidence, and treating the evidence of the complainant's mother.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's credibility and reliability assessments.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that despite the conduct being at the lower end of the range, the blatant breach of trust and multiple assaults justified the sentence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant continues to pose a significant risk due to her lack of insight into her mental illness, history of non-compliance with medication, and the violent nature of the index offence.

The court concluded the detention order was the least restrictive measure to manage the risk.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Because the underlying finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) had already been set aside on a separate appeal, the Court of Appeal quashed this appeal from the ORB decision for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a suitable breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge’s extensive questioning of witnesses compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the judge erred in assessing the elements of the offence, particularly regarding voluntariness and reasonable excuse.

The court acknowledged that the trial judge improperly assumed part of the Crown’s role during examinations-in-chief but found that the interventions did not undermine the overall fairness of the trial.

The court further held that the trial judge reasonably concluded that the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and rejected the explanation that cold weather and nervousness made compliance impossible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused, who was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found that the accused's section 7 Charter rights were violated due to excessive force and mistreatment by police officers while in custody.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a Charter breach and correctly exercised his discretion under section 24(1) to grant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed in the Ontario Court of Justice after pleading guilty to stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The parties had made a joint submission proposing a $2,000 fine and probation without a driving suspension.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and instead imposed the fine together with a 12‑month driving suspension, concluding the proposed sentence was manifestly inadequate given the admitted conduct of driving approximately 190 km/h and weaving through traffic.

On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge properly recognized the high threshold for rejecting joint submissions and provided counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The court found no error of law and declined to interfere with the sentence.

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash a justice of the peace’s refusal to issue process in a proposed private prosecution against the Chief Firearms Officer for allegedly disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offence arose from a dispute over whether a prior Ontario Court of Justice order directing issuance of a firearms transportation authorization was unconditional.

The Superior Court held that the justice of the peace did not commit jurisdictional error in declining to issue process under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code, as the evidence showed the officer intended to comply with the order subject to conditions clearly articulated in the issuing judge’s reasons.

The court found no prima facie evidence of the mens rea required for the offence of disobeying a court order and rejected additional contempt allegations against public officials.

The application for prerogative relief was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and care or control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit following a collision.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had been the driver or merely a passenger, with the defence asserting that another individual had been driving and raising non-insane automatism based on a head injury.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate because they failed to analyze key potentially exculpatory evidence, including seatbelt markings on the appellant’s shirt consistent with the passenger position, and failed to sufficiently address discrepancies in eyewitness testimony.

The appellate court found that the deficiencies prevented meaningful appellate review of whether the evidence had been properly considered.

The convictions and conditional stay were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and relied on impermissible inferences regarding impairment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the circumstances, including driving conduct, admissions about alcohol consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected the argument that booking video evidence showing fewer visible signs of impairment required a different conclusion, holding that such evidence must be considered alongside all other evidence.

The inference that alcohol impaired the appellant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for impaired driving, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and refusing to provide breath samples following a multi-vehicle collision on the Gardiner Expressway.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on an out-of-court statement, and rendered unreasonable verdicts.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals for those offences, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by evidence, including the appellant's feigned attempts to provide breath samples.

The court allowed the appeal solely to enter an acquittal on a stayed dangerous driving charge.

The appeal against the sentence of four months' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine was dismissed as fit.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple property offences and a breach of recognizance, arguing that the convictions created unforeseen adverse immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Relying on the principles in R. v. Pham, the appellant sought to replace the convictions with a conditional discharge.

The court accepted fresh evidence concerning potential immigration consequences but held that granting a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The offences involved multiple fraudulent transactions over an extended period, a breach of recognizance, and significant retail losses.

The court concluded that substituting a discharge solely to mitigate immigration consequences would produce an unfit sentence and improperly skew the sentencing process.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and that the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that there was some circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, such as the setting of multiple fires and the use of an accelerant.

The court also held that a failure to consider the whole of the evidence is not a jurisdictional error reviewable by certiorari when an accused is committed for trial under section 548(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

She argued the trial judge’s extensive interventions during the examination and cross‑examination of a key police witness compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge improperly usurped the role of Crown counsel by conducting most of the examination‑in‑chief, directing witnesses how to answer, and interfering with defence cross‑examination.

Considering the cumulative effect of these interventions, a reasonable observer would conclude that the accused did not receive a fair trial.

The conviction was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter and excluded breathalyzer evidence obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) fail.

The trial judge concluded the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because he was unfamiliar with certain ASD error codes.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by failing to properly assess the objective component of reasonable and probable grounds and by speculating about the reliability of the device without supporting evidence.

The court held that an officer may reasonably rely on an ASD fail where the officer reasonably believes the device is functioning properly and there is no evidence of unreliability.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new trial.