Jason Gorda

The applicant sought certiorari and mandamus to quash a justice of the peace’s refusal to issue process in a proposed private prosecution against the Chief Firearms Officer for allegedly disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offence arose from a dispute over whether a prior Ontario Court of Justice order directing issuance of a firearms transportation authorization was unconditional.

The Superior Court held that the justice of the peace did not commit jurisdictional error in declining to issue process under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code, as the evidence showed the officer intended to comply with the order subject to conditions clearly articulated in the issuing judge’s reasons.

The court found no prima facie evidence of the mens rea required for the offence of disobeying a court order and rejected additional contempt allegations against public officials.

The application for prerogative relief was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired operation and care or control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit following a collision.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant had been the driver or merely a passenger, with the defence asserting that another individual had been driving and raising non-insane automatism based on a head injury.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate because they failed to analyze key potentially exculpatory evidence, including seatbelt markings on the appellant’s shirt consistent with the passenger position, and failed to sufficiently address discrepancies in eyewitness testimony.

The appellate court found that the deficiencies prevented meaningful appellate review of whether the evidence had been properly considered.

The convictions and conditional stay were therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and relied on impermissible inferences regarding impairment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the circumstances, including driving conduct, admissions about alcohol consumption, and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected the argument that booking video evidence showing fewer visible signs of impairment required a different conclusion, holding that such evidence must be considered alongside all other evidence.

The inference that alcohol impaired the appellant’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentence for impaired driving, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and refusing to provide breath samples following a multi-vehicle collision on the Gardiner Expressway.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly relied on an out-of-court statement, and rendered unreasonable verdicts.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals for those offences, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by evidence, including the appellant's feigned attempts to provide breath samples.

The court allowed the appeal solely to enter an acquittal on a stayed dangerous driving charge.

The appeal against the sentence of four months' imprisonment and a $1,000 fine was dismissed as fit.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to multiple property offences and a breach of recognizance, arguing that the convictions created unforeseen adverse immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Relying on the principles in R. v. Pham, the appellant sought to replace the convictions with a conditional discharge.

The court accepted fresh evidence concerning potential immigration consequences but held that granting a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The offences involved multiple fraudulent transactions over an extended period, a breach of recognizance, and significant retail losses.

The court concluded that substituting a discharge solely to mitigate immigration consequences would produce an unfit sentence and improperly skew the sentencing process.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and that the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that there was some circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, such as the setting of multiple fires and the use of an accelerant.

The court also held that a failure to consider the whole of the evidence is not a jurisdictional error reviewable by certiorari when an accused is committed for trial under section 548(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

She argued the trial judge’s extensive interventions during the examination and cross‑examination of a key police witness compromised the appearance of trial fairness and that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge improperly usurped the role of Crown counsel by conducting most of the examination‑in‑chief, directing witnesses how to answer, and interfering with defence cross‑examination.

Considering the cumulative effect of these interventions, a reasonable observer would conclude that the accused did not receive a fair trial.

The conviction was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after a trial judge found a breach of s. 8 of the Charter and excluded breathalyzer evidence obtained following an Approved Screening Device (ASD) fail.

The trial judge concluded the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because he was unfamiliar with certain ASD error codes.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test by failing to properly assess the objective component of reasonable and probable grounds and by speculating about the reliability of the device without supporting evidence.

The court held that an officer may reasonably rely on an ASD fail where the officer reasonably believes the device is functioning properly and there is no evidence of unreliability.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the dismissal of a Charter motion alleging a s. 7 breach arising from police failure to videotape the Intoxilyzer machine and related quality assurance checks during breath testing.

The court held that Charter applications require an adequate evidentiary foundation and that the record contained insufficient evidence about the breath testing process, videotaping practices, or potential prejudice to the defence.

In the absence of such evidence, the claim that the police deliberately failed to record potentially exculpatory evidence was speculative.

The court concluded that the trial judge made no error in dismissing the Charter motion.

The appellant appealed convictions for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and in finding that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the allocation of delay, including institutional delay, defence-caused adjournments, and delays arising from disclosure issues related to a police officer’s Drug Recognition Expert training.

The court concluded the trial judge did not err in characterizing the delay or in determining that the overall delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The court also held that the police acted reasonably in obtaining breath samples approximately 1 hour and 37 minutes after arrest and that the trial judge properly inferred that the delay was explained by operational circumstances at the police station.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on the appellant’s silence at the scene as a factor in rejecting his testimony.

The appeal court held that using an accused’s failure to protest innocence at the scene as a credibility factor is impermissible.

Because the trial judge’s reasoning indicated that this improper factor formed part of the chain of reasoning leading to conviction, the court could not conclude that the verdict would inevitably have been the same without it.

The conviction was therefore set aside.

A new trial was ordered on both counts and the conditional stay on the failure to stop charge was lifted.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence for offences involving the killing and wounding of two dogs contrary to the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal alleged errors in credibility assessment and sought admission of extensive fresh evidence, including veterinary expert evidence suggesting vasculopathy, accidental injuries from falls, and revised dating of rib fractures.

Applying the Palmer test, the court held the proposed evidence failed the due diligence, credibility, and impact requirements and was not admissible.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

However, the court found an error in principle in sentencing where denunciation and deterrence were overemphasized relative to rehabilitation for a first offender, and reduced the custodial sentence while adjusting ancillary orders.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual interference involving a child under 16.

The trial judge had imposed the statutory minimum sentence of 14 days' imprisonment and probation.

The appeal court found multiple errors in principle, including misapprehension of a psychiatric report, failure to properly consider aggravating factors, and improper characterization of the offence as being at the low end of seriousness.

Although the appellate court concluded that the sentence was manifestly unfit and that a range of six to twelve months would ordinarily be appropriate, it declined to intervene due to significant delays and the respondent’s completion of the custodial portion of the sentence and substantial compliance with probation.

The Crown appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving and driving over 80, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to permit a late Charter application under s. 24(1) after an earlier s. 24(2) exclusion application had failed.

The proposed remedy sought to prevent the Crown from relying on the presumption of identity under the Criminal Code following a finding of a minor s. 8 breach.

The court held that trial judges possess broad discretion to control proceedings and enforce compliance with procedural notice rules governing Charter applications.

Given the late timing, non‑compliance with notice requirements, and minimal seriousness of the underlying breach, the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing to entertain the application.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed criminal harassment convictions arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court found that several periods of delay had been incorrectly characterized as neutral, including delay caused by late disclosure, the Crown’s failure to subpoena witnesses, and the Crown’s late filing of written submissions.

Properly characterized, a substantial portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown and institutional factors, exceeding the Morin guidelines.

The appellant had also demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from restrictive bail conditions that interfered with employment and personal life.

The court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in concluding that a defence witness had adopted a prior out‑of‑court statement made to police and treating that statement as substantive evidence.

The court reviewed the legal principles governing adoption of prior statements, including the requirement that the witness both acknowledge making the statement and affirm its truth based on present memory.

The appellate court found that although the witness admitted making the statement, he did not clearly adopt its contents as true.

Because the trial judge relied heavily on the supposed adoption in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction could not stand.