Kristianne C. Anor

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce a video chronology prepared by police.

The chronology compiled still shots from extensive surveillance video, adding identifying information, circles, arrows, and short neutral descriptions.

The defence objected, arguing the video itself is the only admissible evidence and the chronology amounted to Crown advocacy.

The court ruled the video chronology admissible as a demonstrative aid to assist the jury in comprehending voluminous and complex video evidence.

The court held that such summaries are permissible if they are neutral, introduced through a witness who can be cross-examined, and accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to adduce a post-arrest statement made by the accused to the police.

The accused brought a cross-application to exclude the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated because he did not understand the legal advice he received from duty counsel and his own lawyer.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the accused was advised of his rights multiple times, spoke to counsel three times, and clearly understood the advice.

The court also ruled the statement was admissible in the Crown's case-in-chief, as there was independent evidence of fabrication to support its use as after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The three accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

One of the accused gave a post-arrest video statement to the police implicating himself and his co-accused.

The accused brought pre-trial applications to redact portions of the statement, and two of the accused alternatively sought to sever their trials.

The court granted the redactions consented to by the Crown but refused further redactions, finding the contested portions highly probative of the maker's involvement and credibility.

The court dismissed the application for severance, holding that the strong policy preference for joint trials applied and that a mid-trial and final jury instruction would adequately cure any reasoning prejudice to the co-accused.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their jury trial.

The court balanced fair trial considerations against courtroom security.

Given that the accused were detained in custody, had histories of institutional misconduct, and there was hostility between the co-accused, the court found that security concerns outweighed the potential prejudice of sitting in the dock.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a first-degree murder trial to admit six utterances made by the deceased shortly after being shot.

The court analyzed the admissibility of the statements under the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception, and the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that while only the statements made to police qualified as dying declarations, all six utterances were admissible as spontaneous utterances and under the principled approach to hearsay, as the pressure of the shooting excluded the possibility of concoction or distortion.