Janet Simmons

The appellant, an overnight attendant at a group home, was convicted of criminal negligence causing the death of a resident with developmental disabilities who drowned in a bathtub.

The appellant had left the resident unsupervised, contrary to an "eyes-on" protocol.

On appeal, the court found the verdict unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of causation.

The forensic pathologist's opinion on drowning was based on information not fully supported by the record, and he could not eliminate other potential causes like a sudden cardiac event.

The court noted a risk of the jury reasoning backward from the death to infer causation without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant, Myriam Michail, moved to review a case management order that required her motion challenging the constitutionality of s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act to be treated as a motion for leave to introduce a new issue on appeal and heard concurrently with her appeal, with a 30-day perfection deadline for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court noted that the appellant had other available remedies to obtain access to audio recordings or transcripts of the proceeding below, apart from a constitutional challenge, and had not availed herself of those remedies.

The constitutional challenge was deemed properly dealt with on the appeal itself.

Costs were awarded to the London District Catholic School Board.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a summary judgment motion.

The appellant, an insurer, sought to dismiss a long-term disability claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was not discovered until the insurer unequivocally denied it.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, holding that a clear and unequivocal denial is not required to trigger the limitation period.

The court found the claim was statute-barred as the plaintiff ought to have known of the loss and the appropriateness of litigation much earlier, specifically when benefits were due, or when the insurer closed the file, or when lawyers received notice of the closure.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of several sexual offences.

During his trial, he was briefly excluded from the courtroom while counsel discussed the admissibility of questions about his prior sexual history.

The trial judge ruled in the appellant's favour, prohibiting the questions.

On appeal, the appellant argued this exclusion violated his right to be present at trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code and ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found a breach of s. 650(1) but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, concluding the appellant suffered no prejudice due to the brevity of the exclusion and the favourable ruling.

The court declined to apply a Charter analysis, finding the Criminal Code framework sufficient for non-egregious breaches.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application under s. 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001, seeking to enforce a municipal fence by-law against the respondents.

The application judge had declined to intervene, finding the Municipality had articulable reasons for not enforcing the by-law.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the application judge erred in requiring proof of municipal unreasonableness or bad faith for a taxpayer to succeed under s. 440.

However, the appeal was dismissed because the appellants failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a clear breach of the Fence By-law, particularly regarding how the by-law's definitions, which are tied to "street," applied to the respondents' property, which abuts private roads.

The appellant, Qiangli Cao, appealed a summary judgment that dismissed his action for defamation, racial discrimination, and dereliction of duty against the City of Markham and Markham Public Library.

The motion judge had found the action barred by issue estoppel, as the claims largely impugned evidence previously determined in a prior action by the appellant's company (CPCL) against the same respondents.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasoning, confirming that the validity of the evidence had been finally determined and that the appellant was a privy to the prior proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a peace officer, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and drug possession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in determining the moment of the appellant's detention under the Charter.

The Court held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the police cruiser blocked his vehicle, and that this detention was arbitrary, leading to a breach of his s. 9 Charter rights.

Furthermore, the police failed to immediately advise him of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the evidence obtained as a result of these breaches must be excluded, as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of sexual assault and one count of assault against his wife.

The appeal argued errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant, rejection of the appellant's evidence, and use of cross-count similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on credibility and the admissibility of similar act evidence to show a pattern of abusive conduct.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for outstanding amounts under a construction contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that summary judgment was appropriate, that the respondent had not waived its right to rely on the contract's strict notice requirements, and that equitable claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment were precluded by the existence of a valid contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal concerning the discharge of mortgages.

The appellant, Rick Goodman, challenged two findings of the application judge: that a $60,000 promissory note was statute-barred and that certain legal fees could not be added to the mortgage balance.

The court upheld the application judge's findings, confirming that the promissory note's limitation period ran from its maturity date and that the legal fees, despite being incurred pre-mediation, were not properly claimed six-and-a-half years later.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The motion judge had found a binding agreement existed despite the absence of formally executed minutes of settlement and rejected the appellant's claim of no intent to be bound.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the communications objectively reflected an enforceable agreement not conditional on signed minutes, and no error in declining to exercise discretion to not enforce the settlement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical beliefs, misapprehended evidence, and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to the competing narratives.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) test, gave thorough reasons for disbelieving the appellant, and correctly accepted the complainant's evidence, which was partially corroborated by photographs.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a failed residential real estate transaction where the appellant refused to close, alleging an undisclosed basement defect.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondents (sellers), finding the defect was readily apparent and applying the principle of *caveat emptor*.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision, finding no material error in the analysis, despite acknowledging a minor error in relying on hearsay evidence.

The court emphasized the appellant's delay in raising the issue and his financial difficulties as factors supporting the motion judge's findings.

The appellant, A.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication and that the appellant did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

On appeal, A.B. argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to apply the W.(D.) principle, and did not properly consider the possibility of consensual sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge correctly applied legal principles, including the assessment of consent and honest but mistaken belief.

The appellant, N.T., appealed convictions for sexual interference and assault related to his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, failing to explain the resolution of inconsistent evidence, rejection of his testimony, application of *W.(D.)*, or addressing the s. 43 Criminal Code defence.

He also claimed the sentencing reasons indicated an intent to convict for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, with a clear path to conviction based on accepted Crown evidence.

The court clarified that the trial judge's reference to "sexual assault" in sentencing was shorthand for sexual interference and that the acquittal on sexual assault was a patent error in law, not rendering verdicts inconsistent.

The appellant abandoned its appeal, and the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant challenged the court's jurisdiction to award costs for an abandoned appeal and proposed a lower partial indemnity amount.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Rule 61.14 did not displace this discretion.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, finding substantial indemnity was not justified.

This addendum to an appeal decision addresses the Court of Appeal's inherent jurisdiction to permit publication of its reasons, which contain information subject to a statutory publication ban under s. 278.95 of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that despite the ban, and the trial judge not having lifted it, it possessed inherent jurisdiction to publish its reasons unredacted, provided the complainant's privacy (protected by a separate s. 486.4 ban) and the interests of justice were considered.

The court found that the complainant was comfortable with publication and that the development of jurisprudence on s. 276 applications would benefit.

The appellant, Odain Gardner, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He was tried jointly with Erick Reid, who was convicted of manslaughter.

Gardner argued the trial judge erred by failing to properly relate material evidence to the issues for the jury and by giving an erroneous after-the-fact conduct instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's instructions were not perfect, they were adequate in conveying the central issues of identity and credibility to the jury.

The court also found no reversible error in the after-the-fact conduct instruction, noting it was not circular or prejudicial.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for firearm offences, which arose from an incident where he intended to commit suicide with a sawed-off shotgun.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence without adequately considering the appellant's suicidal intent and the attenuated danger to the public.

The court also found an error in failing to consider the causal link between the appellant's mental health issues and addiction and his criminal conduct.

Given the appellant's significant rehabilitation efforts, the court substituted the custodial sentence with a conditional sentence.