Janet M. Simmons

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and assault arising from a real estate transaction where he allegedly misappropriated funds from the complainant.

The trial judge based her decision entirely on a credibility contest, finding the complainant credible and the appellant not credible.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding reasonable doubt and credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident after deliberately driving his car into a pedestrian who had previously assaulted him.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on his mental state and automatism defence.

He also appealed his sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition, arguing the trial judge improperly considered his intentional conduct as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and upheld the custodial sentence, finding that a sentencing judge may consider intentional conduct as an aggravating factor even for an offence based on objective fault.

However, the court reduced the driving prohibition from five years to one year.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action by the trial judge.

The trial judge had dismissed the action due to a pattern of non-compliance with two different court orders over more than a year, which prevented the scheduled trial from proceeding.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed an order regarding whether he was acting qua councillor in a suit brought against him by electors concerning his election expenses, and whether a City Council resolution to pay his legal fees was ultra vires.

The Court of Appeal agreed entirely with the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment which found that money received from the deceased was not a gift and that the storage of property at an abandoned school did not constitute a bailment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-supported by the record, and awarded costs of $7,000 to the respondents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual touching of his teenage stepdaughters and appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence was inappropriate due to the appellant's lack of sincere remorse and failure to take responsibility.

The court held the sentence was within the appropriate range given the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing their claim that the respondent's mortgage amounted to a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidentiary foundation capable of supporting an inference of fraud.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of s. 267(1) of the Railways Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's determination that maintenance is a necessary part of the operation of a subway system.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug and sexual offences, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant argued the Authority to Proceed was insufficient for lacking particulars, and that there was no evidence he held out the substance he supplied as a controlled drug.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sufficiency argument but allowed the appeal regarding the ecstasy charge, finding no evidence that "ecstasy" corresponded to the specific chemical listed in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court dismissed the judicial review application regarding the Minister's jurisdiction and consideration of the appellant's statelessness, but remitted the surrender order to the Minister for reconsideration in light of the quashed committal on the ecstasy charge.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a medium secure hospital unit.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety and that detention was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's risk assessment and disposition were reasonable given the appellant's untreated schizoaffective disorder and history of threatening behaviour.

The Court also rejected arguments that the participation of amicus curiae rendered the hearing unfair.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of stolen property and possession of cocaine, as well as the associated sentences and a forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on Counts 1 and 2 and the cocaine charge, finding ample evidence of wilful blindness and possession.

However, the court set aside the conviction on Count 3 (home theatre/DVD equipment) due to insufficient evidence.

The forfeiture order was upheld under s. 490.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a two-year sentence, conceding that the sentence was fit but arguing it was improperly imposed.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the case from R. v. Luther, noting the sentence was fit and exactly what the appellant had requested at trial.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for theft, arguing that Crown counsel's pre-arrival reference was prejudicial, he was misled by lawyers not to testify, the trial judge misapplied the definition of theft, and there was inadequate disclosure of video tapes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Crown's reference innocuous, the reliance on legal advice not rendering the trial unfair, the trial judge's reasons full and fair, and noting the appellant explicitly agreed to the admission of the video tapes at trial.

The respondent constructed a dock without a building permit and was charged under s. 8(1) of the Building Code Act thirteen months after completion.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the charge, finding it was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 36(8).

The Crown appealed, arguing the limitation period should run from the date of discovery and that the offence was a continuing one.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the discoverability principle did not apply to this specific statutory limitation period and that the offence was complete upon the conclusion of construction, not a continuing offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the appellant's defence of lack of intent due to intoxication regarding the attempted murder charge.

The conviction for attempted murder was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for aggravated assault against a second victim was upheld, but the sentence was reduced from eight years to four years on a joint submission.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that the respondent insureds were entitled to full coverage of over $20 million for a property loss.

At the time of the loss, the insureds had entered into a conditional Agreement of Purchase and Sale for the property but had not yet obtained court approval.

The Court of Appeal found that the insureds had bargained away their beneficial ownership interest under the agreement and were therefore not entitled to full coverage.

However, the Court held that the insureds were entitled to limited coverage of $2.5 million under the policy's 'Acquired Locations' clause, as the term 'purchased' was sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the contra proferentem doctrine in their favour.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and misapplied the W.(D.) framework by approaching the case on an 'either/or' basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all the evidence, rejected the appellant's testimony, and accepted the evidence of the two young complainants who described similar incidents without collusion.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether the Crown proved lack of consent and knowledge of lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the issues of consent or mistaken belief in consent, as the complainant was intoxicated and repeatedly said 'no'.

The sentence of 40 months' imprisonment, in addition to 16 months' pre-sentence custody, was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an offence involving a machete.

The trial judge made several errors regarding self-defence, including reversing the burden of proof.

However, the Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso, finding that the errors did not affect the verdict because the trial judge accepted the Crown's version of events, under which self-defence did not arise.

The appeal from conviction and disposition was dismissed.