Janet M. Simmons

The municipality appealed a judicial review decision that quashed a by-law restricting the transfer of standard taxi licenses to individuals holding a taxi driver's license.

The application judge had found that the municipality failed to hold a public meeting on the specific text of the by-law as required by the Municipal Act, and that the by-law was enacted for economic restructuring rather than health, safety, or consumer protection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the extensive public consultations held five years prior satisfied the statutory requirement, and that the by-law was validly enacted to promote health, safety, and consumer protection by encouraging owner-operated taxis.

The municipality appealed a decision quashing a by-law that restricted the transfer of standard taxicab licences to licensed drivers.

The application judge had found that the municipality failed to comply with the public consultation requirements of the Municipal Act and that the by-law was not enacted for a permitted purpose.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the extensive public consultation conducted by a task force in 1998 satisfied the statutory requirements, and that the by-law was properly enacted for the purposes of health and safety and consumer protection.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that improper cross-examination, erroneous jury instructions regarding his criminal record, and limitations on cross-examining a Crown witness undermined his credibility and rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged several errors by the trial judge and Crown counsel, including improper suggestions during cross-examination and incorrect instructions on the use of the appellant's criminal record.

However, the Court concluded that these errors did not affect the fairness of the trial or cause a miscarriage of justice, given the overwhelming Crown case and the appellant's incredible testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter after abandoning her two-year-old child for several days, resulting in the child's death from dehydration.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of three years in the penitentiary.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly inadequate and failed to reflect the respondent's moral blameworthiness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the sentence was at the very bottom of the acceptable range, the trial judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not clearly unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break-ins following a jury trial.

During the trial, a police officer testified about unrecorded and ambiguous statements made by the appellant.

Although the trial judge and counsel agreed by the end of the case that the appellant had not admitted involvement, the trial judge failed to clarify this to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that because the Crown's case was not overwhelming, there was a real risk the jury interpreted the statements as an admission.

The appeal from conviction was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a young person, appealed the sentence imposed by the youth court judge.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard the appeal and reserved its decision.

The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, noting that the case raised important issues concerning the interpretation of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and stated that reasons for the decision would be delivered at a later date.

The appellant appealed a decision of the application judge finding no prejudice resulting from a lack of notice of a letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was ample evidence to support the application judge's conclusion that the appellant would not have acted differently had it received notice.

The appellant appealed his 36-month sentence, arguing it violated the principle of parity compared to his brother's 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity justified because the brother's sentence was based on a joint submission and the appellant had an additional conviction for dangerous driving arising from his flight from police.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for historical sexual and physical abuse of his children.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate and held that the trial judge erred in giving credit for delay in sentencing.

The appeal was allowed, and the total sentence was increased to nine years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $85,000 in damages for lost profits resulting from a one-month delay in the installation of a new printing press due to a breach of contract.

The appellant argued the damage award lacked evidentiary foundation and that the trial judge erred in admitting the respondent's accountant's evidence without qualifying him as an expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the loss of profits and concluding that the trial judge's assessment was not mere guesswork.

The Court also held that while it would have been preferable to qualify the accountant as an expert, admitting his evidence was not a reversible error.

Following an appeal, the appellants sought costs of the motion below on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal rejected the claim for substantial indemnity costs, noting the respondents' conduct was not unreasonable and the novel aspect of the claim.

However, as the appellants were partially successful in maintaining their right of action, the court awarded them partial indemnity costs of the motion below fixed at $10,000.

The appellants appealed a decision granting the respondent specific performance of a right of first refusal contained in a charge on a farm property.

The application judge had found that the right of first refusal survived the balance due date of the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred in interpreting the term of the charge.

The Court concluded that the right of first refusal expired on the balance due date and was not binding when the property was subsequently offered for sale.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting what was characterized as a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal found there was no joint submission and that the trial judge had ample basis to reject the Crown's submission to protect the community.

The sentence was not unfit, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for oral reasons and awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $3,000.

The appellant teachers' federation appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an arbitration award.

The grievance concerned a teacher returning from pregnancy leave who was assigned to teach a different subject than she taught before her leave.

The arbitration board held that under s. 43(1) of the Employment Standards Act, the teacher's 'position' meant a teaching position at the same school in a subject for which she was qualified, not necessarily the exact same subject.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's finding that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness, and that the arbitration board's interpretation was reasonable given the principal's statutory power to assign classes under the Education Act.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent over $4 million in damages for the lost opportunity to develop a shopping plaza after the appellant repudiated an oral agreement to be the anchor tenant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding an independent oral agreement, assessing damages, and failing to consider post-agreement conduct.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's 50% reduction of its disbursements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable or overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $90,000 in general damages for defamation arising from a newspaper article.

The article reported on a mistrial in a murder case, suggesting the respondent, a senior government official, had improperly pressured a forensic scientist to change his evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the article was defamatory and that the defence of absolute privilege under s. 4(1) of the Libel and Slander Act did not apply because the report was not a fair and accurate account of the proceedings.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal seeking increased and punitive damages, finding the damage award appropriate and no malice established.

The appellants appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding a motion to set aside a noting of default and default judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no evidence to support a defence for the conceded construction costs of $336,409.34, but found evidence capable of supporting a defence for the remainder of the respondent's claims.

The Court varied the principal amount of the default judgment from $2,536,789.00 to $336,409.34 and allowed the respondent's claim for the additional amounts to proceed, while maintaining the writs of seizure and sale and registered liens pending trial.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for the costs of correcting a stone embankment that was not erected in accordance with a site plan agreement, as well as costs of the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability and damages, noting the embankment was unstable and unsafe.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the trial judge erred in her discretion, and reduced the trial costs award from $102,981.64 to $60,000.

The appellants appealed an order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal amended its previous endorsement to permit the appellants to raise the issue of the appropriate interest rate when the respondent's claim for additional amounts proceeds.

The principal amount of the judgment was varied from $2,536,789.00 to $336,409.34, with writs of seizure and sale and registered liens remaining in place pending trial or settlement.