Jane E. Kelly

The offender, Matthew Cosmo Deiaco, pleaded guilty to several human trafficking and related offences, including trafficking in persons, receiving material benefit from an offence, confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and using an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 9 years, while the defence proposed 6 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 4 years, 4.5 months.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, the extensive control exercised by the offender, the violence used during the victim's escape, and the offender's significant criminal record and lack of insight.

Mitigating factors included a difficult upbringing, sexual abuse, and a guilty plea that saved court time and spared victims from testifying.

However, enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions was denied due to a lack of evidence regarding negative impact and the offender's record of misconduct while incarcerated.

A lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order for life were also imposed.

The accused, Eric Coplin-Duran, was charged with multiple firearms and marijuana possession offences following a R.I.D.E. stop.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coplin-Duran had knowledge of the two loaded firearms and marijuana found hidden in his vehicle's centre console and driver's side door.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence, rejected the defence's alternative inference that the passenger secreted the items, finding it illogical given the passenger's injured hand and the manner of concealment.

The court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused had knowledge of the items, leading to convictions on all counts.

The appellant, Jungmin Lee, appealed his convictions and sentence for careless driving and failing to comply with a recognizance, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and did not seek a conditional discharge.

The court found that while counsel's omissions regarding immigration consequences constituted ineffective assistance, no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The original conviction and suspended sentence were deemed warranted, and a conditional discharge would have been contrary to public interest given the serious nature of the breach of recognizance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 75 individually packaged bags of cocaine were found in a BlackBerry box in the freezer of an apartment she had recently rented.

The Crown conceded identity, the nature of the substance, and the trafficking quantity, but the accused denied knowledge and control of the drugs.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court found the accused’s testimony to be forthright and consistent with surrounding circumstances, including ongoing repairs to the unit, instructions not to use appliances, and the fact that multiple individuals had access to the apartment before the discovery.

The absence of trafficking paraphernalia and the accused’s conduct when giving the superintendent access to the unit further supported her denial of knowledge.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with indecent assault alleged to have occurred between 1969 and 1971 involving a child relative.

The complainant testified to a childhood incident of sexual touching while the accused denied the allegations and testified in his own defence.

Applying the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.), the court assessed the complainant’s testimony alongside inconsistencies and the absence of corroborating evidence from other available witnesses.

The court found aspects of the complainant’s evidence raised concerns and concluded the accused’s testimony was credible and raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sentencing decision involving two offenders who pleaded guilty to charging a criminal interest rate and extortion arising from a long‑running loan‑sharking operation.

The offenders charged borrowers an effective annual interest rate of approximately 520% and used threats and violence to collect payments.

The court considered denunciation and deterrence under s. 718 of the Criminal Code but found that conditional sentences remained legally available due to the timing of the offences.

Despite significant aggravating factors, including exploitation of vulnerable borrowers and organized criminal activity, the court imposed conditional sentences given the offenders’ guilty pleas, lack of prior criminal records, restitution, and other mitigating circumstances.

Conditional sentence orders, restitution, forfeiture, fines, probation, and ancillary orders were imposed.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following a conviction for assault with a weapon.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of the offender’s criminal history, including 89 prior convictions and numerous violent offences demonstrating a persistent pattern of aggressive and repetitive violent behaviour.

Psychological assessments placed the offender in high‑risk categories for violent recidivism but indicated potential manageability through intensive supervision and treatment in the community.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation under ss. 752 and 753 of the Criminal Code were met.

However, satisfied that long‑term supervision could adequately protect the public, the court imposed a two‑year sentence (time served) together with a ten‑year long‑term supervision order rather than an indeterminate sentence.

Two accused were jointly tried for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession, with one accused also charged with possession of proceeds of crime.

Crack cocaine was discovered during an inventory search of a vehicle following a traffic stop and planned tow for lack of insurance.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including proximity to the drugs, possession of cash and cell phones, and suspicious movements in the vehicle.

The court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either accused had knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle.

Given the limited visibility of the bag, lack of direct evidence, and several reasonable alternative inferences, the circumstantial evidence did not establish knowing possession.

The offender was convicted after trial of attempted murder and related firearms offences arising from a point‑blank shooting in Toronto.

The victim was shot three times, leaving him a quadriplegic and permanently confined to a wheelchair.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness of the offence, the offender’s criminal history, and the extreme harm caused.

Despite the offender’s youth and family support, numerous aggravating factors including prior violent offences, breach of bail conditions, and the senseless nature of the shooting justified the maximum sentence.

The court imposed life imprisonment for attempted murder, with concurrent sentences on related firearm and breach offences.

A media organization applied for access to and copies of exhibits filed at a criminal trial and sentencing hearing.

The accused did not oppose disclosure except for personal identifying information contained in a pre‑sentence report, a position supported by the Crown.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck framework, the court held that no evidence justified restricting access to the exhibits.

The court ordered disclosure of all exhibits but required that identifying information of third parties in the pre‑sentence report be redacted pending notice to those individuals and an opportunity for them to respond regarding potential disclosure.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm, and breaching a recognizance prohibiting possession of weapons.

The Crown’s case centered on recognition identification evidence from the victim, who had known the accused from prior encounters and observed him on a bus moments before being shot at close range.

The court carefully reviewed the inherent frailties of eyewitness identification but found the recognition evidence reliable when considered alongside corroborating testimony from a bus passenger and other circumstantial evidence.

The victim’s identification was supported by the sequence of events linking the accused from the bus to the shooting and by evidence placing him near the scene.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter and that firing a handgun at the victim’s head at point‑blank range established the intent required for attempted murder.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded firearm without authorization under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court considered aggravating factors including the accused’s criminal record, involvement in commercial drug trafficking, and the dangerous combination of drugs and a loaded firearm in a public setting.

Mitigating factors included a guilty plea, family support, parental responsibilities, and a gap in the criminal record.

The court also considered conditions of pre‑sentence custody and the loss of parole eligibility when determining credit.

A sentence of four years’ imprisonment was imposed for the firearm offence with eight months concurrent for the drug offence, along with enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre‑sentence custody.

The accused brought an application seeking production of police occurrence reports and related records concerning the complainant during the period covered by the indictment for multiple assault-related offences.

The defence argued the records could demonstrate that the complainant’s alleged injuries were caused by someone else and were relevant to credibility.

The court considered whether the records were governed by first-party disclosure under Stinchcombe or the third-party records regime under O’Connor and ss. 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that police occurrence reports created during police investigations do not attract the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the O’Connor regime.

The Crown was therefore required to disclose the records subject to standard screening, redactions, privilege claims, and relevance.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation involving repeated sexual acts against his granddaughter between approximately ages five and eleven.

The court applied the credibility framework in R. v. W. (D.) and assessed competing testimony from the complainant, the accused, and other family members.

The defence advanced theories of fabrication, lack of opportunity, mistaken identity, and motives related to family disputes and cultural issues.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence and found the complainant’s detailed and consistent testimony credible and reliable, including explanations for delayed disclosure and continued family contact.

The Crown proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal prosecution involving firearms offences, the accused brought a voir dire application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The court had previously found a breach of s. 8 because the search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura but police searched a green Honda Accord.

The Information to Obtain contained misleading information, relied on an untested confidential informant whose information was not corroborated, and resulted in a warrant that could not have properly issued.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court found the police conduct fell on the serious end of the spectrum despite the reliability of the evidence.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court concluded that admission of the firearms evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a s. 8 Charter voir dire in a firearms prosecution, the Crown sought to qualify a forensic document chemist as an expert in ink dating using the solvent loss ratio method to analyze a police officer’s note allegedly documenting information from a confidential informant.

The defence opposed the admission of the proposed expert evidence.

Applying the framework for novel scientific evidence, the court considered whether the technique had been tested, peer reviewed, subject to standards or known error rates, and generally accepted.

The court found the methodology lacked peer review, established standards, demonstrated testing, and general acceptance in the relevant forensic community.

The proposed evidence was therefore inadmissible and, in any event, had little probative value because the analysis could not determine the age of the ink.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from searches conducted pursuant to warrants for a residence and vehicle during a firearms investigation.

The reviewing court excised misleading portions of the Information to Obtain after finding that certain statements about a vehicle and police observations were inaccurate or reckless.

Applying the principles governing warrant review and the Debot criteria for confidential informant information, the court found that although the tip was detailed and compelling, the source was untested and the alleged criminal activity was not sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

After excision, the remaining record did not provide reasonable and probable grounds for the issuance of the search warrant.

The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s s. 8 Charter rights were infringed.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a young child relative.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and an inculpatory statement made by the accused during a police interview.

Although the court ruled the statement voluntary on a voir dire, it found the admission vague, lacking detail, and potentially influenced by the officer’s minimization of the alleged conduct.

The court also found the complainant’s evidence unreliable due to significant gaps in memory and a lack of detail regarding the alleged events.

Applying the principles in R. v. W. (D), the court concluded that the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt and that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal trial for sexual interference and sexual assault, the Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement made by the accused shortly after arrest.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused lacked an operating mind due to fatigue, stress, and an allegedly oppressive interview environment.

The court applied the confessions rule, assessing threats or promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

Finding no threats, inducements, or oppressive circumstances and concluding the accused understood the caution and the consequences of speaking, the court held the operating mind requirement was met.

The accused’s admissions were also found relevant to the allegations.

The statement was therefore ruled voluntary and admissible at trial.

During a voir dire on the voluntariness of a police statement in a prosecution for sexual offences against a child, the accused sought to adduce expert psychological opinion evidence to support a claim that he lacked an operating mind due to depression when he made the statement.

The Crown opposed the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence.

Applying the criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, the court focused on the necessity requirement.

The proposed expert could not provide a formal diagnosis and largely repeated the accused’s own description of his emotional state.

The court held that the opinion evidence was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining voluntariness and excluded the expert evidence.