Ian Scott McCuaig

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The accused argued there was no evidence he caused his suitcase to clear customs or intended to import the drugs, as he was merely transiting through Canada to London.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the actus reus of importing commences when drugs cross the border into Canada, and the mens rea requires only an intention to bring the drugs into Canadian territory, not an intention to clear customs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the accused guilty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for sentencing after the defendant was found in civil contempt for breaching multiple court orders requiring him to remove defamatory internet postings and cease publishing further defamatory statements.

The defendant engaged in a years-long campaign of vilification and deliberately flouted the court's orders, only purging his contempt shortly before sentencing.

The court found that a fine or conditional sentence would be inadequate given the defendant's history of non-compliance and the need for deterrence.

The defendant was sentenced to four months of incarceration without remission.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual interference involving an 11-year-old complainant: one count for sexual touching and one count arising from two kissing incidents.

The court granted the Crown's cross-count similar fact application, holding the evidence on each count was probative of the other and provided context for the complainant's conduct.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and relying heavily on the complainant's immediate disclosure to her mother as a spontaneous utterance, the court rejected the accused's denial and found that inconsistencies in peripheral details did not undermine the core allegations.

The court also rejected the defence theory of fabrication based on family conflict and motive.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction and sentence for willfully promoting hatred against identifiable groups (Jews and women) and bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds, including challenges to the videoconference hearing, findings on the elements of the offences, and application of aggravating factors, did not raise questions of law alone or lacked sufficient merit/significance to the administration of justice.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants, the publisher and editor of Your Ward News, appealed their convictions and sentences for wilfully promoting hatred against Jews and women.

They argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in imposing consecutive six-month sentences.

One appellant also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the verdicts were reasonable based on the overwhelming message of hatred in the publication, trial counsel was competent, and the consecutive maximum sentences were fit given the separate legally protected interests of the two targeted groups.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, kidnapping, and other offences, sought a bail review after being detained for two years.

The court found that the prolonged pre-trial custody constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

The court concluded that the applicant was releasable on the secondary ground, as the proposed plan of 24/7 house arrest with two sureties was sufficient to mitigate the risk of re-offending.

Furthermore, balancing the tertiary ground factors, including the strength of the Crown's case and the gravity of the offences against the strict release plan and the applicant's lack of a criminal record, the court held that continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

The applicant, Phoenix Panton-Sawyers, sought a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus to quash an assessment order made under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code.

The assessment was ordered after her conviction for assault and breach of probation, to determine if she was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The applicant argued the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make the order due to insufficient evidence.

The court first addressed a preliminary procedural issue regarding virtual presence for habeas corpus applications during the COVID-19 pandemic, finding virtual presence sufficient under s. 774.1 of the Criminal Code.

On the merits, the court found that the trial judge had jurisdiction, as there was a significant body of evidence—including the irrational nature of the assault, the applicant's history of violent conduct, and her ongoing diagnosis of schizophrenia with non-compliance with medication—to reasonably doubt her criminal responsibility and necessitate an assessment.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing ammunition while prohibited, arguing the trial judge misapplied the principles of circumstantial evidence by failing to consider plausible alternative explanations for how bullets ended up in his jacket.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly rejected the appellant's alternative theories as speculative rather than reasonable possibilities based on the evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge reversed the onus of proof or provided insufficient reasons.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was approximately 32 months.

The central issue was whether a delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability following an adjournment necessitated by late Crown disclosure should be attributed to the defence.

The court held that the pre-Jordan principles in Godin no longer apply, and that periods where the court and Crown are ready but the defence is not must be deducted as defence delay.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

Both defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over three years, they published a community newspaper called Your Ward News that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorified Nazism, denied the Holocaust, and counselled violence against women.

The court imposed consecutive sentences: James Sears received one year incarceration (six months on each count, the procedural maximum for summary conviction); Leroy St. Germaine received a 12-month conditional sentence (six months on each count served consecutively, with house arrest conditions).

The court declined to impose probation on either defendant, finding such restrictions would unduly curtail Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The defendants were convicted of wilfully promoting hatred contrary to s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-year period, the defendants published and edited a community newspaper that promoted hate against Jews and women, glorifying Nazism, denying the Holocaust, and demonizing both groups.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate custodial sentence, the application of consecutive versus concurrent sentencing, aggravating and mitigating factors, community impact, and the scope of probation conditions.

The court imposed a one-year jail sentence (six months on each count served consecutively) and declined to impose probation restrictions on publishing activities, finding such restrictions would violate Charter-protected freedom of expression.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings arising after police used an undercover cross-border e-mail investigation to obtain a production order, search warrants, and child pornography evidence.

The appeal turned on whether the e-mail exchanges supplied reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence under s. 172.2 of the Criminal Code had been committed.

The court held that “making an arrangement” in s. 172.2 is broader than “agreeing” and captures communications for the purpose of planning the commission of a listed sexual offence against a child.

On that interpretation, the detailed discussions of age, price, sexual acts, timing, and travel amply supported the production order and warrants.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference following a trial before a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting without a jury.

The complainant testified about three separate incidents that allegedly occurred when she was nine or ten years old.

The appellant denied the allegations and challenged the Crown's timeline.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony and found the complainant's evidence, corroborated by other witnesses, proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for the uneven scrutiny claim and rejecting each of the appellant's specific arguments regarding the trial judge's treatment of the evidence.

The defendants, the editor and publisher of the community newspaper Your Ward News, were charged with two counts of wilful promotion of hatred against Jews and women under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown called expert witnesses to contextualize the anti-Semitic and misogynistic content of the publication.

The court found that the newspaper repeatedly and consistently dehumanized Jews and women, employing extreme vilification, Holocaust denial, and advocacy of violence.

The court rejected the defence that the content was merely satirical or anti-Marxist, concluding that both defendants were fully aware of the hate propaganda and intended to promote it.

Both defendants were found guilty on all counts.

The Crown brought a motion under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to permit three complainants (RF, GR, and RG) to testify by video link in a sexual abuse trial.

The accused, William Robert Metcalfe, consented to RF testifying by video link but opposed for GR and RG.

The court granted the application for RF and RG, but dismissed it for GR.

For GR, the court found that his willingness to travel and the relatively low cost did not justify video testimony.

For RG, the court balanced factors including his reluctance to attend, fear of job loss, and the limited value of in-person demeanour assessment, concluding that video link was appropriate to ensure the truth-seeking function of the trial without negatively impacting the accused's right to a fair trial.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for threats to cause death and bodily harm to his biological mother, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition requiring him to remain detained in the secure forensic unit of the Brockville Mental Health Centre with only supervised access to the hospital grounds.

The appellant accepted the detention requirement but objected to the supervised access restriction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it was within the range of reasonable outcomes based on the appellant's high risk to reoffend, anti-social behaviour, serious criminal record, high psychopathy score, and potentially unassessed sadistic paraphilia.

The applicant, facing historical sexual assault charges, brought a Rowbotham application for a stay of proceedings pending the provision of government-funded counsel.

Legal aid had been denied due to financial ineligibility.

The Crown conceded the applicant's right to a fair trial would be compromised without counsel but argued he had failed to prioritize saving funds for his defence.

The court reviewed the applicant's financial history, including the sale of his home and repayment of a significant loan to his son, and found his expenditures were not extravagant or a deliberate attempt to divest assets.

The court concluded the applicant established indigence and granted the stay.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to dismiss the mother's appeal for delay.

The mother had appealed a summary judgment order that granted custody of the children to the father and limited her to supervised access.

Applying the test for dismissing an appeal for delay, the court found that while the delay was not inordinate, the mother failed to demonstrate that her appeal had arguable merit.

The court also considered the children's best interests, emphasizing the need for stability and finality.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

He had been granted permission to travel to Egypt but failed to return, resulting in an arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's absence without leave deprived the court of the necessary record to properly consider the matter.

This is a costs decision following a child protection trial.

The respondent parents sought costs against the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto following a trial in which the court granted an order substantially in favour of the parents.

The father had a prior conviction for sexual assault and was diagnosed with pedohebephilia.

The Society sought an order removing the children from the home and restricting the father's contact to supervised access by someone other than the mother.

The parents sought an order permitting the father to remain in the home with supervised contact, based on expert evidence.

The court granted the parents' order with limited exceptions.

The parents claimed costs totalling approximately $24,700 each, arguing the Society acted unreasonably and unfairly in its conduct of the case.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that although the Society had made certain errors in judgment and failed to adequately reassess its position, the case involved complex expert evidence on which reasonable disagreement was possible, and the Society did not act in a manner that would be perceived as patently unfair or indefensible.