Hussein Aly

The defendant, Enzo Dario De Jesus Carrasco, was charged with sexual assault, voyeurism, and transmitting an intimate image.

The court found the defendant's testimony to be untruthful and inconsistent with text messages.

The complainant's evidence, despite some inconsistencies, was found credible and consistent with corroborating text messages.

The court convicted the defendant of sexual assault and voyeurism, finding that the touching was sexual, non-consensual, and that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement office where she was filmed.

The defendant was acquitted of transmitting an intimate image due to reasonable doubt regarding criminal intent, based on a text message indicating the image was sent by mistake.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug offences following a police takedown of a taxi.

He brought pre-trial applications alleging that police used excessive force by striking him on the head with a firearm while he was compliant and face down on the ground, violating his rights under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court found serious credibility issues with the police officers' testimony and accepted the accused's version of events, supported by an independent witness.

Concluding that the police conduct contravened fundamental notions of justice and undermined the integrity of the judicial process, the court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other serious offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to trial delay.

The total delay was approximately 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court calculated the net delay for each accused by deducting defence delay, including periods of counsel unavailability and a change of counsel.

The court found that the delay caused by a trial adjournment requested by the defence due to late disclosure of a cell phone extraction report was not attributable to the defence.

The net delay for both accused remained above the 30-month ceiling, and the court granted the stay of proceedings.

This endorsement provides reasons for four trial rulings made during a jury trial for manslaughter, where the accused were ultimately found not guilty.

The rulings addressed: (1) whether jurors could ask witnesses questions (denied, emphasizing the adversarial nature of criminal trials); (2) the Crown's re-examination of a witness on prior consistent statements (allowed to clarify a one-sided picture created during cross-examination); (3) the Crown's request to introduce bad character evidence against one accused (denied, as the defence had not put character in issue); and (4) the Crown's request for a specific jury charge on aiding and abetting related to a push by one accused (declined as speculative and unduly complex given the Crown's primary theory of a group beating).

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL of blood (Over 80).

The Crown proved the reliability of breath test readings and the elements of the Over 80 offence.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the traffic stop, arrest, searches, and right to counsel advice under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found the initial traffic stop was lawful under the Highway Traffic Act based on the officer's observation of an unusual noise from the vehicle, its identification as a BMW with front-end damage, and the recent hit-and-run incident involving a similar vehicle in the area.

The arrest for driving while suspended was lawful and not arbitrary.

Searches incident to arrest were properly limited and authorized by law.

While minor breaches of section 10(b) rights occurred, they did not warrant exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The court found the accused guilty.

At the close of the Crown's case in a jury trial for conspiracy to commit murder and related firearms offences, the accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy count.

The accused argued there was no evidence they participated in a conspiracy to murder the complainant.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including a prior bank fraud involving the parties, cell phone communications, video surveillance of the accused acting in concert, and the coordinated ambush of the complainant.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer an agreement to murder the complainant.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

Four offenders with no prior criminal records were sentenced for their roles in a sophisticated commercial cocaine trafficking operation involving 43 kilograms of cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount principles for large-scale cocaine trafficking.

The directing mind received 12 years, a fully committed participant received 11 years, a trusted courier received 10 years (less pre-trial credit), and a minor participant whose vehicle was used received 6 years.

A forfeiture order was also made for the vehicle used in the offence.

Prior to the testimony of the complainant in a trial for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, the parties sought a ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the complainant's prior acts of misconduct.

The court ruled that defence counsel could cross-examine the complainant on the factual details underlying his prior convictions, withdrawn charges, and uncharged misconduct detailed in police occurrence reports, provided there was a good faith basis.

However, defence counsel could not cross-examine the complainant on the factual allegations underlying charges for which he was acquitted, as an acquittal represents a verdict of legal innocence, though they could question him on accompanying uncharged fraudulent activities.

This criminal trial concerned a large-scale drug trafficking operation, 'Project Odyssey,' which led to the seizure of significant quantities of cocaine, methamphetamine, and GHB.

Six defendants were arraigned, with one passing away during the trial.

The court addressed preliminary motions regarding confidential informant privilege and a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, both of which were dismissed.

The core issues at trial involved proving possession, knowledge, and intent for trafficking and importing charges, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied the principles of reasonable doubt and the Supreme Court's guidance on circumstantial evidence from *R. v. Villaroman*.

Ultimately, four defendants were convicted of trafficking, while one was fully acquitted.

Importing charges against two defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The applicant sought to exclude eyewitness identification evidence of a police officer in a criminal case involving drug possession and trafficking.

The officer identified the applicant as a passenger in a vehicle stop, initially based on a single MTO photograph and later confirmed upon arrest.

The court conducted a voir dire to assess the admissibility of this evidence, considering its reliability, the officer's flawed note-keeping, and the presence of confirmatory evidence from other sources, including the driver's testimony.

The application was dismissed, with the court ruling that the evidence was admissible, subject to proper jury instructions on its frailties and weight.

A preliminary inquiry into eight charges arising from the shooting of a victim in a Toronto parking lot on July 16, 2014.

Three co-accused were charged with attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, firearm offences, and assault with a weapon.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the victim's testimony and circumstantial evidence including phone records and security camera footage.

Defence counsel conceded the sufficiency of evidence identifying each accused's role at the scene.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence to commit all three accused to trial on all charges.

The accused was found in possession of a loaded handgun and marijuana while a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police.

He conceded the essential elements of the offences but sought exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) arising from an arbitrary vehicle stop and unlawful search.

The court assessed conflicting evidence from the accused and several police officers regarding the circumstances of the stop, including driving behaviour and the detection of marijuana odour.

The judge accepted the officers’ evidence that the vehicle was being driven in a careless or erratic manner contrary to the Highway Traffic Act, justifying the investigative stop.

The subsequent arrest and searches were also justified after officers detected the smell of marijuana.

Even if Charter breaches had occurred, the evidence would not have been excluded under the Grant framework.

The applicant was a passenger in a vehicle that fled the scene of a collision.

Police located the vehicle and shortly after stopped the applicant and the driver walking nearby.

An officer arrested the applicant for dangerous driving and subsequently searched him, finding cocaine.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude the evidence.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant, rendering the search unlawful and violating his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The court also found a breach of s. 10(b) due to a delay in advising the applicant of his right to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the Charter breaches were serious and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to admit statements allegedly made by the accused while detained at an airport under the Customs Act after officers suspected drug smuggling.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in oppressive circumstances.

The court held the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to the absence of reliable recordings, incomplete officer notes, and interrogation conditions including prolonged detention, lack of sleep, and uncomfortable conditions.

These factors undermined the reliability and context of the alleged admissions.

The impugned statements were ruled inadmissible.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

During the trial, the appellant was excluded from the courtroom twice: once briefly during his own cross-examination, and again for the entirety of the pre-charge conference held in the trial judge's chambers.

On appeal, the appellant argued these exclusions violated his right to be present under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the brief exclusion during cross-examination caused no prejudice and could be saved by the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv), the exclusion from the entire pre-charge conference was a serious breach of the open court principle that impaired the appearance of fairness.

The proviso could not save this breach.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.