COURT FILE NO.: 8323/20
DATE: 2021-02-23
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
David Kirk, Counsel for the Respondent
Respondent
- and -
HOUSSEIN HASSAN
Hussein Aly, Counsel for the Applicant
Applicant
HEARD: February 18, 2021
gareau j.
reasons for decision on judicial interim release application
[1] The applicant, Houssein Hassan, has applied for interim judicial release. Mr. Hassan has been in custody since September 10, 2019. Mr. Hassan has been charged with first degree murder, contrary to section 522 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
[2] It is alleged that Houssein Hassan is a high-level drug dealer. It is also alleged that Mr. Hassan used Devin Collin to traffic drugs for the benefit of Mr. Hassan. A trip was taken by automobile from Toronto to Timmins where Mr. Collin was to sell drugs on Mr. Hassan’s behalf. Present on this trip, in the car with Mr. Hassan and Mr. Collin, was Amy McClaskin, another passenger, and Demitri Fortomaris, who was driving the vehicle. It is alleged that the Timmins trip did not garner the drug sales expected by Mr. Hassan and as a result, he was angry with Mr. Collin. It is alleged that on Highway 17 North, just outside Wawa, the vehicle in which these four people were travelling, pulled over to the side of the road and Mr. Hassan went into the bush, just at the tree line, where Mr. Hassan shot and killed Devin Collin. After this event, the three travelled to Sault Ste. Marie, Sudbury and eventually Mr. Hassan and Mr. Fortomaris made their way back to Toronto.
[3] Mr. Hassan proposes that he be released from custody on essentially a house arrest arrangement. He proposes that he reside in the home of a cousin, Moussa Wais Awaleh, who resides at 1867 Sedgefield Road, London, Ontario. Mr. Awaleh proposes to act as a surety and pledge the equity of his home, which is substantial. The applicant’s father, Nour Hassan, is also proposed as a surety and he is prepared to pledge his total life savings, the sum of $10,000, to secure the release of his son. Mr. Hassan resides in Toronto but is prepared to go to London to live in Mr. Awaleh’s home, if required. The plan of release proposes that Houssein Hassan be in the presence of his sureties and not be outside of Mr. Awaleh’s residence except to attend court, when he would be accompanied by one of his sureties. Electronic monitoring through the Recovery Science Corporation is also proposed and in this regard the court heard evidence from Stephen Tan. In summary, Houssein Hassan proposes that he be subject to strict house arrest if released from custody.
[4] The Crown is opposed to the release of Mr. Hassan from custody on the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds, although in its submissions, the Crown concentrated on the secondary and tertiary grounds. The court can find no evidence that Mr. Hassan will flee or not attend court if released from custody, especially on the plan of release proposed, and will therefore focus on the secondary and tertiary grounds.
[5] It is a fundamental principle of Canadian law that an accused is not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause. As stated by Wagner J. (as he then was) in R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 509,
The right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause is an essential element of an enlightened criminal justice system. It entrenches the effect of the presumption of innocence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal trial process and safeguards the liberty of accused persons.
[6] Before the court is a reverse onus situation, in that, on a charge of first degree murder, the accused must show, on a balance of probabilities, that detention is not justified.
[7] Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code of Canada sets out the grounds to be considered by the court when deciding whether an accused should be detained in custody or released from custody on a judicial interim release hearing.
[8] Section 515(10) reads as follows:
(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;
(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and
(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including
(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case;
(ii) the gravity of the offence;
(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was use, and
(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
[9] Essentially, the aforementioned three grounds contemplate the following questions:
(a) Section 515(10)(a): Will the accused attend court?
(b) Section 515(10)(b): Will the accused person offend while on bail?
(c) Section 515(10)(c): Is detention necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice?
[10] As I indicated earlier in my reasons, the court is not concerned with the primary grounds in the case of Mr. Hassan.
[11] The secondary ground, in that it considers public safety, is focused on whether the accused is “substantially likely” to commit another crime or interfere with the administration of justice while out on bail. This essentially creates two points of focus, public safety and interference with the administration of justice, which are both concerned with risk. In R. v. Young, 2010 ONSC 4194, 89 W.C.B. (2d) 329, Clarke J. considered the term “substantially likely” at paras. 20-21:
20 The word “substantial” is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964], in part, as follows: “having substance, actually existing, not illusory”. The word “likelihood” is defined in the same source, in part, as “being likely”. The word “likely” is defined, in part, as “such as might well happen”. Therefore, so long as the prosecutor demonstrates that the applicant might well commit another offence if admitted to bail, such that the risk is real or tangible, and not simply fanciful or imaginary, she has met her burden.
21 Moreover, in my view the likelihood of a particular risk materializing cannot be looked at in the abstract. Rather, it must be weighed against the gravity of the harm that will ensue if the risk comes to pass. For example, even a very grave risk that an incorrigible petty thief will shoplift again if granted bail is one that the court might be willing to take when balanced against the accused’s constitutional right to reasonable bail. On the other hand, where the anticipated harm is very grave, a more remote risk may be sufficient meet the test of substantial likelihood. That is of import in this case, where the applicant, for no apparent reason, suddenly engaged in an act of extreme violence, leaving his victim grievously injured and possibly permanently disabled. In the absence of any adequate explanation for this behaviour, of which I will say more when I come to discuss Dr. Sirman’s report, in my opinion the risk is not illusory, but, rather, quite real, that the applicant might well do something similar again if admitted to bail.
[12] As outlined by Trotter J.A. in The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017), some considerations under this ground include:
(i) The criminal record of the accused and compliance with court orders;
(ii) The accused is already on bail or on probation;
(iii) The nature of the offence and strength of the evidence; and
(iv) The stability of the accused person.
The stability of the accused person takes on added weight in circumstances of violent crimes, when the accused has a history of violent or unpredictable behaviour: see R. v. Squires (1996), 1996 11544 (NL SC), 497 A.P.R. 17 (Nfld. T.D.) and R. v. Herbert, [1994] O.J. No. 2184 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
[13] On the evidence before me, I am not persuaded that Mr. Hassan’s detention in custody on the secondary ground is justified. Mr. Hassan has no criminal record. He has no history of noncompliance with court orders or restrictions imposed on him. When he was previously released on bail, although admittedly a short period from the time he was arrested on drug charges to the murder charge, he committed no other offences. There is no evidence before the court that Mr. Hassan has a history of violent or unpredictable behaviour.
[14] When examining the purpose of the secondary ground, that is whether the accused is “substantially likely” to commit another crime or interfere with the administration of justice while out on bail, there is no evidence before the court that this would occur if Mr. Hassan is released on bail. There is no basis to detain Houssein Hassan in custody on the secondary ground as set out in section 515(10)(b) of the Criminal Code, and the accused has met his onus in that regard.
[15] With respect to the tertiary ground of detention, the detention of the accused is necessary on this ground if it is required to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all of the circumstances.
[16] The leading authority on the tertiary grounds of detention is R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 328. All cases that preceded St-Cloud must be carefully scrutinized and considered in light of the comments in St-Cloud. The rationale for the tertiary ground of detention is set out in paragraph 33 of St-Cloud in which Wagner J. (as he then was) stated:
33 McLachlin C.J., writing for the majority of the Court, explained that in some circumstances it may be necessary to deny an accused bail, even where there is no risk he or she will not attend trial or may reoffend or interfere with the administration of justice: Hall, at para. 25. According to the Chief Justice, “[w]here justice is not seen to be done by the public, confidence in the bail system and, more generally, the entire justice system may falter”: para. 26. Yet, she wrote, “[p]ublic confidence is essential to the proper functioning of the bail system and the justice system as a whole”: para. 27, citing Valente v. The Queen, 1985 25 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, at p. 689.
[17] The tertiary ground is considered on an objective standard, namely, “a reasonable member of the public”. As Wagner J. stated at paragraph 80 in St-Cloud:
80 In short, the person in question in s. 515(10)(c) Cr. C. is a thoughtful person, not one who is prone to emotional reactions, whose knowledge of the circumstances of a case is inaccurate or who disagrees with our society’s fundamental values. But he or she is not a legal expert familiar with all the basic principles of the criminal justice system, the elements of criminal offences or the subtleties of criminal intent and of the defences that are available to accused persons.
[18] This objective standard of a reasonable member of the public was considered post St-Cloud in R. v. Papasotiriou-Lanteigne, [2018] O.J. No. 4475. In that case, Trotter J.A., speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal stated at paragraph 45:
45 Public confidence is to be measured by the standard of a reasonable member of the public. As Moldaver J. said in Oland, at para. 47: “This person is someone who is thoughtful, dispassionate, informed of the circumstances of the case and respectful of society’s fundamental values.”
[19] At paragraphs 87 to 99 in St-Cloud, and in particular at paragraph 87, Wagner J. provided a summary of the principles to be applied in considering the tertiary ground of detention. At paragraph 87 Wagner J. states:
87 I would summarize the essential principles that must guide justices in applying s. 515(10)(c) Cr. C. as follows:
• Section 515(10)(c) Cr. C. does not create a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds for detention ((a) and (b)) are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of an accused.
• Section 515(10)(c) Cr. C. must not be interpreted narrowly (or applied sparingly) and should not be applied only in rare cases or exceptional circumstances or only to certain types of crimes.
• The four circumstances listed in s. 515(10)(c) Cr. C. are not exhaustive.
• A court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result.
• The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances.
• The question whether a crime is “unexplainable” or “unexplained” is not a criterion that should guide the analysis.
• No single circumstance is determinative. The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case to determine whether detention is justified.
• This involves balancing all the relevant circumstances. At the end of this balancing exercise, the ultimate question to be asked by the court is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. This is the test to be met under s. 515(10)(c).
• To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the “public”, that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. However, this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused.
• This reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to order detention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is not justified.
[20] At paragraph 88, Wagner J. goes on to state that, “In conclusion, if the crime is serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence against the accused and if the victim or victims were vulnerable, pre-trial detention will usually be ordered”.
[21] Although the case of R. v. E.W.M., 2006 31720 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3654 pre-dates the St-Cloud decision, the comments of the Ontario Court of Appeal are helpful in considering the tertiary ground in section 515(c). At paragraph 25 of that decision the court stated that it must consider the effect the release of the respondent would have more broadly on public confidence in the administration of justice. At paragraph 31 of that decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal indicated that “No one factor is determinative. The four factors should be analysed together, not separately. Consideration of their combined effect in the context of all the circumstances enables the court to determine whether it is necessary to deny bail in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.”
[22] At this point it is helpful for the court to remind itself of the four factors for specific consideration in determining whether detention is necessary on the tertiary ground. They are:
(d) The apparent strength of the prosecution’s case;
(e) The gravity of the offence;
(f) The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and
(g) The fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves or whose subject matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.
[23] In conducting an analysis of all the factors under section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, bearing in mind the principles in R. v. St-Cloud, this court is left with the inescapable conclusion that all four factors are met on the facts before the court. This justifies the detention of the accused in custody on the tertiary ground.
[24] In the case of first degree murder, the second and fourth factor of the four-part test are always met. In my view, the third factor involving the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, is also met on the facts of this case. A firearm was used in the commission of the offence. This was a planned and deliberate execution-style murder of an individual. The victim lost his life as a result of the alleged actions of the accused.
[25] The real consideration that the court has to struggle with in the application of section 515(10)(c)(i), namely, the apparent strength of the Crown’s case. Chief Justice Wagner provided courts with some guidance in the application of this test and the consideration of factors in this test in his comments at paragraph 57 to 59 in St-Cloud, which reads as follows:
57 An interim release hearing is a summary proceeding in which more flexible rules of evidence apply. As a result, some of the evidence admitted at this hearing may later be excluded at trial. As Justice Trotter notes, it may be difficult to assess the strength of the prosecution’s case at such a hearing: “The expeditious and sometimes informal nature of a bail hearing may reflect an unrealistically strong case for the Crown” (p. 3-7).
58 Despite these difficulties inherent in the release process, the justice must determine the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case. On the one hand, the prosecutor is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence, and the justice must be careful not to play the role of trial judge or jury: matters such as the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of scientific evidence must be analyzed at trial, not at the release hearing. However, the justice who presides at that hearing must consider the quality of the evidence tendered by the prosecutor in order to determine the weight to be given to this factor in his or her balancing exercise. For example, physical evidence may be more reliable than a mere statement made by a witness, and circumstantial evidence may be less reliable than direct evidence. The existence of ample evidence may also reinforce the apparent strength of the case.
59 On the other hand, the justice must also consider any defence raised by the accused. Rather than raising a defence at the initial hearing, the latter will most likely not do so before the release hearing held upon completion of the preliminary inquiry, and may not even raise one before trial. If the accused does raise a defence, however, this becomes one of the factors the justice must assess, and if there appears to be some basis for the defence, the justice must take this into account in analyzing the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case. As the Quebec Court of Appeal noted in a relatively recent decision, [translation] “it would be unfair to allow the prosecution to state its case if the justice is not in a position to consider not only the weaknesses of that case, but also the defences it suggests”: R. v. Coates, 2010 QCCA 919, at para. 19.
[26] In the case before me we have a constellation of evidence which suggests that Houssein Hassan was the shooter who killed Devin Collin. There is the evidence of Amy McClaskin who described the activities of the people in the vehicle and details about the shooting of Mr. Collin, although Ms. McClaskin does not identify Mr. Hassan as the shooter. There is the evidence of Demitri Fortomaris who confirms much of the evidence of Ms. McClaskin as to the activities of the individuals in the vehicle and where they travelled to. Mr. Fortomaris also provides details as to how Mr. Collin was killed which are consistent with the details provided by Ms. McClaskin, although Mr. Fortomaris goes further in identifying Mr. Hassan as the person who killed Mr. Collin with the hand pistol Mr. Hassan was in the possession of. There is also evidence from GPS tracking, cellphone towers and cellphone activity, which places Mr. Collin and Mr. Hassan together, tracks their activity and indicates that it was Mr. Hassan who was looking for Mr. Collin and tracking his activity. In addition, there is the evidence of Heather Rivers who described the gun that was in Mr. Hassan’s possession and indicates that she was told by Mr. Hassan that he was a serious guy who just killed a guy and left him in the ditch on the side of the highway.
[27] The defence takes the position that it is Mr. Fortomaris who is the shooter, not Mr. Hassan, and that Fortomaris is trying to save himself by pointing the finger at Hassan. The defence also points out that these witnesses are of unsavory character, Vetrovic witnesses, whose evidence must be approached cautiously and not relied upon.
[28] In assessing the strength of the Crown’s case, I must take these matters raised by the defence into account as well as the defence to be advanced by the accused. Having said this, the court on an application for interim judicial release must be careful not to play the role of trial judge. This means that the application judge should not assess the reliability of the evidence at a bail hearing. Although, ultimately there may be questions raised and flaws in the evidence against Mr. Hassan, at this stage I must take the evidence before the court in its best light. The evidence against Houssein Hassan at this stage is very strong. Looking at the evidence in its totality, in assessing the first factor to be considered in the overall assessment under section 515(10)(c)(i), namely, the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case, my view is that the Crown has a very strong case bordering on the overwhelming, given the constellation of evidence against Mr. Hassan, from various sources.
[29] The defence raised the issue of COVID-19 in the application for bail, but this issue was not pursued or argued at any great length on the application. The Ontario Court of Appeal has determined that the COVID-19 pandemic is a relevant consideration when it comes to assessing the public interest factor, in other words, the tertiary ground for detention (R. v. Kazman 2020 ONCA 251). In considering COVID-19 there is no evidence that the COVID-19 is running unchecked or that a health crisis exists where Mr. Hassan is currently being held in detention. There is also no evidence before the court that Mr. Hassan has any medical conditions which puts him in peril or makes him more susceptible to contact the COVID-19 virus. In order for the COVID-19 virus to be largely in play in the balancing and weighing of the factors to be considered on the tertiary ground, the applicant seeking judicial interim release must demonstrate why they are particularly vulnerable to contracting the virus. As noted by the court in R. v. Nelson, 2020 ONSC 1728, at paragraph 35,
It will be important that future applications proceed with the benefit of some rudimentary evidence that could suggest an accused is more susceptible to contact the virus due to underlying health issues.
[30] No such evidence exists in the case of Houssein Hassan. Although the COVID-19 virus is a factor in assessing the tertiary ground under section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code, the evidence before me indicates that it is at play minimally in the case of the applicant.
[31] The quality of any proposed surety and the nature of any release plan proposed by the accused must be considered by the court in the overall assessment as to whether the detention of the accused is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. In this regard, the court received evidence from the proposed sureties, Moussa Wais Awaleh and Nour Hassan, and the evidence of Stephen Tan from the Recovery Science Corporation.
[32] In his affidavit sworn on August 15, 2020, Mr. Awaleh describes himself as the “applicant’s uncle” but in is his evidence on the hearing it became apparent that he was a more distant relative, testifying that he was a third cousin to the applicant’s father, Nour Hassan. The accused has never before resided in Mr. Awaleh’s home in London, Ontario nor has he ever been under his direction or supervision. He testified that his home was worth $900,000, with $400,000 owing on the mortgage. Mr. Awaleh indicated in his evidence that he was prepared to pledge that equity, or in other words, $500,000 as a deposit to secure the release of Mr. Hassan. Interestingly, in paragraph 7 of Mr. Awaleh’s affidavit sworn on August 15, 2020, he represents his home having an equity of $125,000, a value of $550,000, and a mortgage owing of $425,000. It was apparent in the evidence given by Mr. Awaleh that he didn’t have much of a connection or relationship with Houssein Hassan. He struggled to describe past employment that Mr. Hassan has had, guessing in his evidence that Mr. Hassan worked as a line cook in a restaurant, not being sure how long Mr. Hassan had worked in this capacity. Mr. Awaleh was unable to describe how Mr. Hassan earned his money or whether Mr. Hassan had a difficulty with drugs. Mr. Awaleh expressed surprise to learn that Mr. Hassan was travelling throughout Northern Ontario. The impression that this court formed from the evidence of Mr. Awaleh is that his connection with Houssein Hassan was based on the fact that they were related and not based on being actively involved in his life. As Mr. Awaleh put it in his evidence, “when you are related to the family you are close to all the family”.
[33] Nour Hassan is the applicant’s father. He resides in Toronto and indicated in his evidence that he is prepared to move to Mr. Awaleh’s home in London to supervise his son, if necessary. He is also prepared to pledge the sum of $10,000, his life savings, to secure the release of his son from custody. Nour Hassan is presently not employed nor is his wife, Getadet Rar. He is the father of eight children, all of whom reside with him in Toronto. When describing what employment his son had at the time he was arrested on drug charges, his response was “some sort of construction, I think”. That was his “understanding” as he dropped his son off at a construction site on one occasion. When asked in cross-examination about the various locations throughout Ontario that his son would work, Nour Hassan could not answer this. He could not provide specifics about when or where his son worked, despite the fact that his son resided in his own home. Nour Hassan also indicated in his evidence that he was unaware that his son was travelling throughout Northern Ontario and that his son never discussed with him about going to Timmins, Sudbury, Wawa, or Sault Ste. Marie.
[34] Undoubtedly, Moussa Wais Awaleh and Nour Hassan are well-intentioned and trying to assist a relative, in the case of Hour Hassan, his son. It is clear on an overall assessment of the evidence that the closeness between the proposed surety Mr. Awaleh and the accused is suspect and Mr. Awaleh has not been a constant presence and influence in the life of Houssein Hassan. Although Nour Hassan is the accused’s father, his evidence and the manner in which he gave it, clearly demonstrated to this court that he does not have a close relationship with his son, is not aware of his activities, nor does he exercise any control of supervision over him. In the evidence before me, I am not confident that Moussa Wais Awaleh or Nour Hassan can adequately supervise the accused or exercise control over him or that Houssein Hassan will be amenable to any supervision that the proposed sureties wish to subject him to.
[35] These concerns are not allayed by the fact that Mr. Hassan will wear an electronic monitoring bracelet. As noted by Trotter J. in United States v. Khadr (2008), 2008 41310 (ON SC), 234 CCC (3d) 129, a monitoring device does not prevent an accused from abscondence. It merely alerts the authorities if the accused flees. Similarly, a monitoring device does not prevent criminal activity by the accused, it simply alerts the authorities as to the whereabouts of the accused.
[36] As noted by Trotter J. in The Law of Bail in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters 2017) at page 6-37:
When electronic monitoring is requested or ordered, it is important to remember its proper function. The responsibility for enforcement of the conditions of release, including house arrest, still resides with the sureties. Electronic monitoring is merely a form of technology that may augment the powers of human supervision.
[37] In balancing the factors to be considered, I have reached the conclusion that the Crown has a very strong, if not overwhelming case. The offence is the most serious in the Criminal Code. The circumstances surrounding the commission involved an extreme act of violence with a firearm being used. It was the planned and deliberate execution of another human being. The term of imprisonment for the offence of first degree murder is the most that the law can impose. I am satisfied that every factor to be considered under section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, on the facts of his case, leads to the conclusion that the detention of the accused is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.
[38] As Wagner J. stated at paragraph 88 in St-Cloud:
If the crime is serious or very violent, if there is overwhelming evidence against the accused and if the victims were vulnerable, pre-trial detention will usually be order.
[39] As noted by Moldaver J. in R. v. Oland, 2017 SCC 17, [2017] 1 SCR 250, at paragraph 37:
In assessing whether public confidence concerns support a pre-trial detention order under s. 515(10)(c), the seriousness of the crime plays an important role. The more serious the crime, the greater the risk that public confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined, if the accused is released on bail pending trial.
[40] I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the plan of release proposed by the accused, will assist in maintaining the public’s confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were released from custody prior to trial
[41] As stated by Chief Beverley McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, at paragraph 40:
Where, as here, the crime is horrific, inexplicable and strongly linked to the accused, a justice system that cannot detain the accused risks losing the public confidence upon which the bail system and the justice system as a whole repose.
[42] Accordingly, the application of Houssein Hassan for interim judicial release is dismissed and he is detained in custody on the tertiary ground.
Gareau J.
Released: February 23, 2021
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
HOUSSEIN HASSAN
REASONS FOR DECISION ON JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE APPLICATION
Gareau J.
Released: February 23, 2021