Herman J. Wilton-Siegel

The appellant Minister appealed a motion judge's order regarding the interpretation of a previous costs order made by a deceased judge.

The previous order required the respondent to pay costs to the Minister from proceeds received from her insurer.

The motion judge interpreted this to mean costs were only payable if the matter proceeded to trial, not if it settled.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding no logical basis for the motion judge's interpretation, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs from her settlement proceeds.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Chief Coroner's decision not to hold a discretionary inquest into the death of his son, who died by suicide while on constant watch in a hospital psychiatric department.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and that the Chief Coroner's remarks about the efficacy of lay juries raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Chief Coroner reasonably concluded that the hospital had already addressed the specific contributors to the death and there was no evidence of systemic failure.

The court also held the Chief Coroner's remarks represented professional judgment and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant parents appealed a summary judgment order making their child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The parents argued that the motion judge erred by failing to recognize a gap in the children's aid society's case regarding available support programs, failing to provide adequate reasons, and improperly admitting a parenting capacity assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the parents failed to present a comprehensive plan of care to address their need for 24-hour supervision.

The court held that the motion judge's reasons adequately explained why the child would not be safe in the parents' care and why access should be terminated, and that the assessment was properly admitted.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board granting the respondent landlord an above-guideline rent increase based on capital expenditures for balcony repairs.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law by failing to properly determine if the expenditures were necessary to restore physical integrity, failing to provide adequate analysis, and failing to apply issue estoppel based on a previous 2012 application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, as it properly applied the legal test, made factual findings that the work was different from the previous application, and adequately supported its conclusion that the repairs were necessary eligible capital expenditures.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board refusing to grant an extension of time to request a review of an earlier order.

The earlier order awarded the respondent tenant compensation for lost property and rent abatement following an eviction without notice.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice because he did not receive notice of the hearing, as the documents were served on his paralegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that service on the legal representative was proper under the Board's Rules and the Board's refusal to extend time was reasonable.

The self-represented plaintiff appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her various claims against the defendants, which included compensation for a lost diamond ring, a stolen outfit, unreplaced locks, car damage, and legal expenses arising from alleged false statements to the Children's Aid Society.

The Divisional Court applied the Housen standard of review and found no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's conclusions that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove her claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a costs order of $30,000 awarded against them following their unsuccessful motion to vary a Mareva injunction.

They argued that the motion judge erred by not providing written reasons for the costs award, particularly after receiving their late submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions requiring written reasons for costs awards under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, as the record disclosed a proper basis for the judge's exercise of discretion.

The applicant, a Chartered Professional Accountant, sought judicial review to quash the respondent's decisions to investigate him and issue allegations of professional misconduct for failing to cooperate.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction and breached natural justice by refusing to identify the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature to intervene before the administrative process concluded and holding that the applicant had a duty to cooperate with the investigation.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order upholding a Master's decision that denied relief from the deemed undertaking rule.

The moving party wished to disclose discovery documents to regulatory authorities regarding alleged securities infractions and to police regarding alleged perjury by a defendant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's application of the Supreme Court's framework.

The court emphasized that bald allegations without documentary evidence are insufficient to establish the exceptional circumstances required to override the deemed undertaking rule.

The Regional Municipality of Halton sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision that overturned two provisions of its Development Charges By-law.

The Board had excluded capital costs incurred by Conservation Halton and reinstated six categories of residential development instead of the four adopted by the Region.

The Superior Court denied leave to appeal regarding the Conservation Halton costs, finding the Board's interpretation of s. 5(3) of the Development Charges Act was not open to serious debate.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal regarding the development categories, finding serious debate over whether the Board had the authority to impose its view of fairness and reasonableness without finding non-compliance with the Act.

The applicant, a former NHL referee, sought judicial review of an OLRB decision dismissing his unfair labour practice complaint for undue delay.

The applicant had previously challenged his termination in 2008 without success.

In 2013, he requested severance pay under the collective agreement, which the NHL denied on the basis that he had forfeited it by bringing the 2008 application.

The applicant then filed a new OLRB complaint alleging the denial was an unfair labour practice.

The OLRB dismissed the complaint, finding it crystallized in 2008.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB's decision unreasonable, as the applicant could not have known with certainty in 2008 that the NHL would deny his severance claim in a manner that potentially contravened the Labour Relations Act.

The decision was quashed and remitted to the Board.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of contract regarding the value of shares in a startup insurance brokerage.

The trial judge had determined the fair market value of the shares based on net earnings, relying on an unsworn affidavit submitted after trial, rather than reopening the trial for proper valuation evidence.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to reopen the trial to adduce objective evidence of fair market value, as the contractual provision relied upon did not apply to an early termination.

The appeal was granted and the quantification of damages was remitted to the trial judge.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge’s order dismissing their summary judgment motion that argued the plaintiff’s tort claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The underlying action arose from a motor vehicle accident and involved whether the plaintiff’s claim was discoverable before the two‑year limitation period expired.

The defendants argued the motion judge misapplied the discoverability test and overlooked medical evidence, including MRI findings and expert assessments, which they claimed demonstrated the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of a threshold injury earlier.

The court held that the motion judge properly applied the discoverability test from Peixeiro v. Haberman and reasonably concluded that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Leave to appeal was denied because there was no conflicting authority, no serious reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, and the proposed appeal raised no issue of broader importance.

The appellant appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Physiotherapists that revoked his certificate of registration on the basis of ungovernability.

The appellant, who was self-represented, argued he was denied procedural fairness when the Hearing Panel refused his request for an adjournment after he was served with new materials on the eve of the penalty hearing.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Panel failed to properly balance the public's interest against the serious prejudice to the appellant, and that he was entitled to a short adjournment to review the new materials.

The penalty order was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to post $30,000 as security for costs and pay $21,000 in costs.

The underlying dispute involved the applicant's claim to one-half of the matrimonial home based on a domestic contract.

The court applied the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on a full recovery basis.

The appellant, a real estate broker, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to revoke his registration.

The revocation was based on the appellant's criminal conviction for sexual assault against an employee and his failure to disclose his interest in a property management business on his renewal applications for over a decade.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's conclusions regarding the appellant's character and the necessity of revocation to protect the public were reasonable.

The landlord sought a review of a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside a Registrar's Order that dismissed his appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board for delay.

The landlord argued he was denied a fair hearing before the motion judge because he was not properly served with the tenants' responding materials.

The Divisional Court allowed the landlord to make all arguments he would have made originally, but ultimately dismissed the motion, finding no adequate explanation for the delay and no merit to the appeal.

The court also refused to admit fresh evidence that was discoverable at the time of the original hearing, which the landlord had chosen not to participate in after his adjournment request was denied.

The defendants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the plaintiff damages for wrongful dismissal, statutory holiday pay, and bad faith damages.

The defendants argued the plaintiff had abandoned her employment by failing to report to work after a heated dispute.

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that the plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed, as the employer's actions created legitimate uncertainty about her employment status and the employer failed to clarify it.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the reasonable notice period from 21.5 weeks to 13 weeks based on a proper application of the Bardal factors.

The appellants (defendants), an accounting firm, appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The respondents (plaintiffs) had previously settled a fee dispute with the appellants and signed a mutual release.

Years later, the respondents discovered that a 'butterfly transaction' structured by the appellants resulted in a massive tax liability, and they sued for professional negligence.

The appellants argued the mutual release barred the claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the negligence claim was unknown and not in the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, and therefore the release did not bar the action.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a requirement that he be cautioned in person regarding his advertising practices.

The complaints committee found that the applicant's advertisements for weight loss clinics did not constitute 'the member's medical services' under the regulations, as he had no therapeutic relationship with the patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the committee's interpretation of its own regulations to be reasonable and declining to address a newly raised Charter challenge due to the lack of an evidentiary record.