Gregory Ryan Skerkowski

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing it was an unreasonable verdict because the complainant's identification evidence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant was sufficiently well-acquainted with the appellant, having seen him daily at school and having an unobstructed view of him for 40 to 45 minutes during the offence.

The court held that the in-dock identification, supplemented by a photo line-up, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from sexual activity with a complainant under the age of consent and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that, given the significant age difference, the complainant's youth, and the circumstances of the first meeting, a reasonable person would have taken significant steps to ascertain age, and the appellant took none.

The conviction appeal was therefore dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the consecutive penitentiary sentences, including for possession of child pornography, were upheld under the totality principle.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of sexual offences and internet luring involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by focusing on evidence relevant to the accused's subjective belief about the complainant's age, rather than the objective steps taken to confirm that belief.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a police officer convicted of assault causing bodily harm, fabricating evidence, and obstructing justice, applied for bail pending appeal.

The convictions stemmed from an incident where the appellant violently assaulted a civilian, which was captured on video.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal to be frivolous given the overwhelming video evidence that contradicted the appellant's version of events.

The court also held that the public interest in maintaining confidence in the administration of justice strongly favoured enforceability of the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At trial, the defence called a psychiatrist who testified that the appellant's schizophrenia may have affected his appreciation of the risk of his driving.

On cross-examination, the Crown elicited hearsay evidence from the appellant's medical records regarding prior violent incidents to suggest the appellant had anger management issues.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of this bad character evidence and its hearsay nature.

The Crown also invited the jury to engage in prohibited propensity reasoning during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal found these non-directions fatal to the verdicts, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a 14-month conditional sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The respondent conceded that a conditional sentence was not legally available for this offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a sentence of incarceration was appropriate but, noting the respondent had already served 11 months of the sentence, his strong rehabilitative potential, and Gladue principles, varied the sentence to 11 months' time served plus 12 months' probation.

The appellants, two youthful first-time offenders, pleaded guilty to a variety store robbery involving planning and violence but no weapon.

They appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by dismissing the sentencing principles of specific deterrence and rehabilitation.

The Court allowed the appeal, substituting a global sentence of two years less a day for each appellant, which, after accounting for pre-trial custody, resulted in a sentence of 357 days.

The appellant, acting in person, appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider his third party suspect defence and in giving a mid-trial instruction that all evidence pointed to the accused and away from the third party suspect.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the third party suspect defence as there was no admissible evidence linking the third party to the murder.

The Court also held that the trial judge's mid-trial instruction, provoked by the appellant's defiance of court orders, did not amount to a directed verdict and occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The accused was convicted of indecent exposure based primarily on the non-expert recognition evidence of a transit officer who identified him from a surveillance video still.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without a voir dire.

The summary conviction appeal judge found a voir dire should have been held but applied the curative proviso, concluding the evidence would inevitably have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that while the 'prior acquaintance/better position' test applies, it was not inevitable that the evidence would have been admitted had a voir dire revealed the officer's familiarity was based on a single brief encounter two years prior.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an application for a dangerous offender assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adopting the interpretation of 'serious personal injury offence' from R. v. Goforth.

The court found that some of the respondent's offences met the definition and ordered an assessment, remitting the matter to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of driving 'over 80' causing bodily harm.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the van at the time of the collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge shifted the onus of proof, misapprehended evidence, and failed to disclose a proper basis for finding he was the driver based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge considered the evidence holistically and made no errors in concluding the appellant was the driver.

The appellant appealed his sentence finding him to be a dangerous offender and imposing an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by considering facts from a prior acquittal, applying the pre-July 2008 dangerous offender regime, and misapprehending evidence regarding his potential control through anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inclusion of the acquittal facts inconsequential, no practical distinction between the legislative regimes for this offender, and that the sentencing judge's findings on the speculative nature of anti-androgen control were supported by the record.

The appellant's private prosecution was stayed by the Attorney General prior to a pre-enquete hearing.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed based on binding precedent.

Seeking to challenge that precedent, the appellant requested a five-judge panel, which was denied by the Associate Chief Justice.

A motion to review that denial was dismissed by a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant then moved to review and set aside the single judge's order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that there is no statutory authority or rule permitting an appeal or review of a decision by the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice regarding the assignment of judicial duties, including the refusal to strike a five-judge panel.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Previously, the Court of Appeal had substituted a conditional discharge and remitted the matter to the Board solely to determine the appropriate conditions.

The Board, however, engaged in a broader inquiry and postponed the appellant's mandatory annual review.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board erred in interpreting the previous order, thereby denying the appellant procedural fairness and his right to an annual review under s. 672.81 of the Criminal Code.

The Court declined to grant an absolute discharge due to an insufficient record and remitted the matter to a differently constituted panel of the Board for an immediate full hearing.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample after she unequivocally refused a roadside demand.

She appealed, arguing the demand was invalid because the police officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) with him and there was no evidence one could be made available 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code is complete upon an outright refusal to a valid demand.

The Crown is not required to prove that an ASD was present or could have been made available forthwith when the accused has already categorically refused to comply.

The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident and made a statutorily compelled statement to a police officer under the Highway Traffic Act, admitting he was the driver and had been drinking.

The officer used this statement to make an approved screening device demand, which the accused failed, leading to a breath demand and an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge excluded the breath results under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding the admission of the compelled statement violated the accused's s. 7 right against self-incrimination, and acquitted the accused.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that statements compelled under the Highway Traffic Act cannot be used to establish reasonable grounds for a breath demand.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 21 years.

He appealed the parole ineligibility period, arguing it should be in the 16-18 year range proposed by the Crown at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not over-emphasize the brutality of the crimes and that the 21-year period was justified.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was unduly harsh and that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his likely deportation to South Africa.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments based on the trial record.

However, the Court admitted fresh evidence confirming a formal deportation order and detailing the appellant's lack of family support in South Africa.

Based on this enhanced record, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, plus three years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, erred in a section 10(b) Charter ruling, and improperly handled evidence of the appellant's flight before trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly addressed the inconsistencies and made no errors in the Charter ruling or the treatment of the flight evidence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification evidence and the Vetrovec warning regarding the main Crown witness were deficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the eyewitness identification evidence was not central to the Crown's case and its frailties were drawn to the jury's attention by defence counsel.

The Court also held that the Vetrovec instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the danger of relying on the main witness's evidence without independent confirmatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.