Gregory Lafontaine

The respondent, a convicted sex offender, challenged the constitutionality of s. 487.055 of the Criminal Code, which permits ex parte applications for DNA samples from convicted offenders for inclusion in the national DNA data bank.

He argued the provision violated his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, and 11 by allowing ex parte proceedings, lacking reasonable and probable grounds linking him to a specific crime, and constituting double punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the DNA data bank provisions.

The Court found that the collection of DNA for identification purposes is reasonable under s. 8, analogous to fingerprinting, and that the ex parte procedure meets the requirements of procedural fairness under s. 7.

The Court also held that a DNA order is not a punishment under s. 11.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing death, arguing that the trial judge's interventions during the defence expert's testimony raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the judge misapprehended the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the judge's interventions were appropriate in a judge-alone trial involving highly technical evidence and that the judge correctly understood and rejected the defence theory.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, no failure to consider relevant factors, and concluded the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit extortion, extortion, and possession of bugging equipment.

The charges arose from a private investigation business where female operatives were hired to lure targets into surreptitiously recorded sexual encounters to extort money.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conspiracy convictions, finding insufficient evidence that the appellants had formed an agreement with the alleged co-conspirators to commit extortion.

However, the court upheld one appellant's conviction for extortion, ruling that threatening to have a debtor fired to collect a legitimate debt lacked reasonable justification or excuse.

The court also upheld the conviction for possessing bugging equipment, finding the devices were primarily useful for surreptitious interception.

The 10-month sentence was affirmed.

The appellant sought to vary the remaining 3.5 months of his conditional sentence to allow him to leave house arrest two days a week for business purposes.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and allowed the appeal, varying the sentence to permit the appellant to leave his residence on Mondays and Thursdays in the company of his spouse to examine job sites.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual assaults committed against boys in his foster care and appealed a global ten-year penitentiary sentence.

The court upheld the admission of each complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, finding a high degree of connectedness arising from exploitation of vulnerable boys under the appellant’s care and no material risk of misuse by the jury given the charge as delivered.

The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on similar fact evidence, good character evidence, and delayed reporting.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the sentencing judge placed the case in too high a range when compared with the governing authority, given the absence of physical violence, threats, or extortion and the presence of substantial mitigating factors.

The global sentence was reduced from ten years to seven and a half years.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge, which had dismissed an appeal from a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the reasoning of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of assault and sexual assault against his spouse and sentenced to a total of two years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for credibility findings and misapplied the W.(D.) principles.

He also appealed the sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and her application of W.(D.) correct.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the overriding principles of denunciation and deterrence for serious domestic violence militated against a conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction and ordered a new trial.

The lower appellate court had found that the trial judge disregarded a glaring inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and that the loss of a videotape exhibit prejudiced the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had properly considered the inconsistency and the complainant's explanation, which was objectively reasonable.

Furthermore, the loss of the exhibit did not deprive the accused of a ground of appeal.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of prohibited firearms, and was sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge made significant errors, including misapprehending the maximum penalty for the drug offence and relying on inaccurate facts.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing proceedings contained significant errors, warranting a non-deferential review.

However, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed was ultimately fit given the seriousness of the offences, particularly the possession of loaded handguns, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative potential.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing a fellow inmate and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the conviction, arguing errors in the jury instructions regarding self-defence, manslaughter, after-the-fact conduct, and character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to hear evidence of the appellant's prior attempted murder conviction before making their parole ineligibility recommendation.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 16 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual touching, and indecent assault involving multiple complainants.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, reversed the burden of proof, and erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for all counts except count 14, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and the burden of proof was not reversed.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence for count 14 due to a lack of persuasive similarity, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable after the trial judge excluded his admission of being the driver under section 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the sentence of 60 days imprisonment, two years probation, and a four-year driving prohibition as demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The conviction was supported by in-dock identification and circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's obvious impairment at the scene.

While the 60-day sentence was a marked departure from the usual range, the Court deferred to the trial judge, finding the leniency was offset by the probation order and the lengthy driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his convictions and four-year sentence for sexually assaulting his niece.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence regarding his daughter and uncharged incidents, providing reasons for the evidentiary ruling at the end of the trial, shifting the burden of proof, and misapprehending evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the similar fact evidence was properly admitted for narrative and pattern purposes, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the sentence was appropriate given the breach of trust.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a vehicle 'over 80'.

The accused was stopped and a roadside breath demand was made, but the officer had to wait 16 minutes for a screening device to arrive.

During this time, the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, despite having a cellular phone and being near a police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that because the officer was not in a position to require a breath sample before there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel, the demand was not made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) Charter rights was not justified.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest between him and the police officer.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained why the appellant's evidence was rejected and that it was implicit she found his testimony incredible, leaving no reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a telemarketing scheme.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the mens rea for aiding the principal offender under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code could be satisfied by recklessness.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as party liability requires purpose or intent, which can be established by actual knowledge or wilful blindness, but not mere recklessness.

The court also found a similar error in the conspiracy instruction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of an impaired driving-related offence after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the officer lacked reasonable grounds for a breath demand.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal, concluding the trial judge analyzed the evidence piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal.

The majority held that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence and his conclusion that the officer lacked reasonable grounds was not unreasonable.

The trial judge's application of the Collins factors to exclude the evidence was also upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On consent, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial on one count.

Based on fresh evidence, the court allowed the sentence appeal on the remaining counts and varied the sentences to time served, finding no basis to reincarcerate the appellant.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing issue estoppel regarding his presence at the incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish the foundation for issue estoppel and that it was open to the trial judge to conclude he was present at the incident.