Gregory Lafontaine

The appellant, a person of Roma ethnicity who was granted 'protected person' status in Canada, appealed his committal for extradition to Hungary and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

He argued that the extradition judge erred in refusing a stay for abuse of process, that the judge's comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the Minister of Justice erred in consulting the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration regarding his risk of persecution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and holding that the Minister of Justice properly assessed the risk of surrender under the Extradition Act framework, which differs from the immigration risk assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the police officer lacked adequate grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the totality of the information relied on by the officer provided adequate grounds for the demand.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, uttering a threat, and pointing a firearm against his intimate partner, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and using evidence of discreditable conduct, and in finding a pellet gun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as narrative and the pellet gun met the definition of a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court noting that under s. 732(3) of the Criminal Code, the imposition of a conditional sentence alongside an intermittent sentence causes the intermittent sentence to be served on consecutive days.

The appellants appealed a sending order made under s. 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The application judge had found that the search warrant was facially overbroad and that the seizure exceeded the terms of the warrant, but concluded he had the discretion to send the requesting state the materials that could properly have been seized under a valid warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge did not err in his interpretation of s. 15 and properly exercised his discretion in making the sending order despite the defective warrant.

The appellant appealed her convictions for aggravated assault and failing to provide the necessaries of life relating to severe injuries sustained by her premature infant.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction for failing to provide necessaries, finding insufficient evidence that a short delay in seeking medical attention permanently endangered the child's health.

The Court also ordered a new trial on the aggravated assault charge, holding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for party liability by suggesting that mere knowledge of the abuse, rather than an intention to aid or encourage the principal offender, was sufficient for a conviction.

The Court also provided guidance on the application of the 'deemed consent' defence in the context of normal child care.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that neither the relevant treaty nor legislation provided any basis to conclude the appellant was unlawfully detained or entitled to relief.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the doctrine of recent possession and in dismissing his application for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of recent possession without reversing the burden of proof.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's decision to treat the appellant differently from his co-accused regarding the delay, given his greater number of charges, role in the offences, and minimal prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death.

The trial judge found that the appellant engaged in an unplanned street race at an excessive rate of speed, resulting in a collision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for a minor adjustment to the start date of the ten-year driving prohibition, as the custodial term and prohibition were deemed fit given the appellant's poor driving record.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury.

The principal defence was that the appellant accidentally hit the victim, relying on his almost complete blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that blindness was only relevant to the foreseeability of bodily harm and not to the issue of accident.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the Crown's appeal from an order quashing search warrants obtained under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding the appeal was moot because the Crown had made a deliberate choice not to execute the impugned warrants to keep the trial process moving.

The court also held that the ancillary costs order could not sustain the moot appeal.

The appeal was quashed in its entirety.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States to face charges of delivering cocaine to a minor and sexual assault.

The applicant argued that the Minister exceeded his jurisdiction because the surrender order included transactions not supported by the committal evidence, that the underlying offence of 'trafficking by giving' was unconstitutional, and that the Minister erred in assessing the risks of indefinite detention or deportation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the minor discrepancies in the transactions did not render the decision unjust or unreasonable, that the constitutional argument was moot given evidence of other forms of trafficking, and that the Minister's assessment of the risks was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death, driving over 80, and dangerous driving causing death, and sentenced to four years and ten months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of bolus drinking and improperly drew an adverse inference from his failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge properly rejected the bolus drinking evidence and correctly applied the burden of proof, though it conditionally stayed the over 80 conviction based on a Crown concession.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and robbery arising from the Just Desserts café shooting.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury selection process by prioritizing the return dates of potential jurors from identifiable minority groups to ensure representativeness.

The Court of Appeal held that while the process departed from strict statutory requirements, it did not prejudice the appellant or undermine the jury's impartiality.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of surveillance videotapes, recognition witness evidence, the jury charge on identification, and the trial judge's refusal to compel testimony.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and the sentence appeal was quashed.

The appellant, a former teacher at a boarding school, appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for eight counts of historical indecent assault involving seven students.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding unreasonable delay, admission of similar fact evidence, application of reasonable doubt, and refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on delay or similar fact evidence, deferring to the credibility findings, and upholding the three-year sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and lack of remorse.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, holding that questions of law should not be decided in the abstract and that the record's findings were not sufficiently clear to permit dealing with the legal question posed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and arson after driving to the home of his estranged wife's lover, shooting the lover, assaulting his wife, and setting the house on fire.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code by suggesting he could be liable if he actively participated in a struggle that accidentally caused the gun to discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the causation instruction was potentially confusing, it caused no prejudice because the jury's verdict demonstrated they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally shot the deceased.

The appellant appealed his long term offender designation.

On consent of the Crown and the appellant, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission.

The appellant was declared a long term offender and sentenced to ten years and four months imprisonment, with six years of pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a further four years and four months of incarceration.

This is to be followed by an eight-year long term supervision order.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of a boating accident after his boat collided with another vessel at night.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard for criminal negligence, the knowledge requirement for failing to remain, the presumption of intent to escape liability, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, seeking to strike his guilty pleas.

The trial judge had held a full hearing and found the pleas were voluntary, fully informed, and unequivocal, supported by duty counsel's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal.

However, the Crown conceded that the dangerous offender proceeding was invalid because it occurred without the consent of the Attorney General as mandated by s. 754 of the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new sentence hearing before a different judge.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a pilot charged with importing, trafficking, and possession of cocaine and hashish for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding he was not a member of the conspiracy to import drugs, lacked actual knowledge of the drugs, and was not wilfully blind.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by excluding the accused's own intercepted statements, which were admissible as admissions regardless of his membership in the conspiracy.

The trial judge also erred in excluding hearsay statements of alleged co-conspirators and relying on irrelevant factors to determine conspiracy membership.

Furthermore, the trial judge's finding that the accused was not wilfully blind because further inquiry would have placed him in jeopardy was logically incompatible with his earlier finding that the accused was not acting under duress.