Gregory Lafontaine

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing the trial judge failed to find the officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds to believe the roadside screening device was working before demanding a blood sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was alive to the need for both subjective and objective grounds, and that such a finding was implicit in the reasons.

The summary conviction appeal judge also correctly found a basis for reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for defrauding the public of over $3 million in income tax and GST payments.

He argued that no fraud occurred because no false income tax returns were actually filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant caused false GST returns to be filed and that his deliberate failure to file income tax returns, combined with creating false records, imperilled the public purse and constituted a risk of deprivation.

The sentence of six years' imprisonment and a $2,000,000 fine was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence and dismissed the appeal.

However, the Court strongly urged Correctional Services Canada to expedite the classification procedure and ensure the appellant's medical needs are promptly met and continuously monitored in an appropriate security level.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for narcotics offences.

The Court of Appeal assumed a section 8 Charter breach occurred when an officer looked over a locker wall, but concluded that the evidence of narcotics seized from the appellant's car, person, and duffel bag should not be excluded under section 24(2).

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the factors strongly favoured admission.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The extradition judge committed the respondent for second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder under Canadian law.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the respondent's surrender for the American offence of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal quashed the surrender order, applying the 'misalignment test' to find it unreasonable to surrender the respondent for first degree murder without evidence of premeditation at the committal hearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Minister's surrender order, holding that the 'misalignment test' is incompatible with the conduct-based approach to double criminality, the principle of comity, and the role of the extradition judge.

The appellants were convicted of multiple counts of fraud and laundering proceeds of crime arising from a large-scale advance fee scheme operated out of a condominium.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of evidence obtained from a search of the condominium, arguing breaches of section 8 of the Charter based on information provided to police by building management following a flood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and no state agency by the building staff.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, upholding the penitentiary sentences as appropriate for large-scale fraud.

The appellant was sentenced to a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault causing bodily harm, and two concurrent 18-month conditional sentences for uttering a death threat and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal held the intermittent sentence was legal but had to be served on consecutive days.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is not a 'sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore does not render an intermittent sentence illegal or require it to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to conclude the first breath sample was taken within two hours, triggering the statutory presumption.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge imposed an illegal combination of a penitentiary term and three years' probation.

The sentence was varied to a reformatory term of two years less a day and three years' probation, while the lifetime driving prohibition was upheld.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting at a Toronto nightclub.

On appeal, they argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding eye-witness identification, post-offence conduct, and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that the eye-witness testimony, combined with confirmatory physical evidence such as gunshot residue and hidden bullets, was sufficient to support the convictions.

The court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions were fair, balanced, and legally correct.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a former Venturers leader, appealed his convictions for historical indecent assault against two complainants.

He argued that the jury's verdicts were unreasonable due to inconsistencies and improbabilities in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have rendered the verdicts.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal regarding one complainant, finding the evidence surrounding the incident highly improbable.

The appellants were convicted of robbery with a firearm and conspiracy to commit robbery.

On appeal, one appellant argued his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated, while the other argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both of these grounds.

However, both appellants also argued the trial judge's charge to the jury was fatally flawed regarding both the conspiracy and robbery counts.

The Court agreed, finding the charge failed to adequately explain the law, the three-step process for conspiracy, and the evidence relevant to each appellant's position.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that overturned the respondent's conviction.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, citing the very lengthy delay in perfecting the appeal and the significant prejudice the respondent had endured over a lengthy period of time.

The appellants were committed for trial on fraud-related charges and appealed the dismissal of their motion to quash the committals.

The appellant Suissa argued that the preliminary inquiry judge's reasons were inadequate and constituted jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal held that inadequate reasons for committal are not per se a jurisdictional error and that the application judge properly reviewed the record to find a basis for committal.

The appellant Tehrani argued there was insufficient evidence for committal, but the Court found a sufficient evidentiary basis existed.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, which had dismissed his appeal from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that despite the appeal judge's comments, she had applied the proper test under Morrissey.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The sole issue in dispute was whether the appeal was frivolous under s. 679(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the applicant's grounds of appeal, which included complaints about the form of the count and the prosecution's theory of liability, were arguable.

The application for release pending appeal was granted.

The appellant was committed for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud, and laundering the proceeds of crime.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered his surrender on those charges, as well as conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering.

The appellant appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the surrender order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order, finding sufficient evidence of the offences.

However, the Court allowed the judicial review in part, setting aside the surrender order regarding conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering, as the extradition judge had made no findings to support committal on those specific charges.

The appellant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.

He appealed the period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found that 15 years was outside the appropriate range given the appellant's young age, lack of prior criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

However, noting the brutal and senseless nature of the group murder, the Court concluded that an increase from the minimum period was warranted.

The appeal was allowed and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was convicted in absentia in France for serious drug offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He was subsequently convicted of unrelated drug offences in Canada.

France requested his extradition to serve his sentence.

The appellant appealed his committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the delay in extradition proceedings constituted an abuse of process and that his surrender would violate his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding no evidence of state misconduct or manipulation to support an abuse of process claim.

The Court also held that the Minister reasonably applied the Cotroni factors in determining that extradition was appropriate despite the possibility of domestic prosecution.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer, who took over the case shortly before trial expecting a guilty plea, was inadequately prepared when the trial proceeded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that claims of ineffective assistance based on inadequate preparation only lead to a miscarriage of justice if the lack of preparation undermines the reliability of the verdict.

The appellant failed to show any prejudice or that the trial could have been conducted differently.