Grant Huscroft

The appellant brought a motion to strike portions of the respondents' factums, arguing they raised issues beyond the scope of the appeal.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to consolidate their Divisional Court appeal with the appellant's Court of Appeal appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to strike, finding the respondents were entitled to raise additional arguments to sustain the lower court's order.

The Court granted the motion to consolidate, noting overlapping issues regarding the discoverability rule under the Competition Act and overlapping evidence.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from her 2010 convictions, citing unforeseen immigration consequences that recently culminated in an admissibility hearing.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed regarding collateral consequences and raised potential ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the applicant acted promptly upon receiving notice of the admissibility hearing and that there were arguable grounds of appeal, making the extension in the interests of justice.

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding of adverse possession, arguing the judge failed to consider relevant evidence, make a finding on the ownership of the fence, and find sufficient usage of the disputed strip of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly stated the elements of adverse possession and made findings of fact reasonably supported by the evidence, including that both parties treated the fence line as a boundary.

Costs of $5,600 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment and granting the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, which declared the respondents entitled to statutory rescission of their franchise agreement.

The respondents had rescinded the agreement due to the appellants' failure to provide disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellants were not exempt from disclosure requirements, as they had required a new franchise agreement and a $10,000 transfer fee.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay or dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge had adjourned the motion on his own initiative to help the plaintiffs, dismissed the motion without hearing oral argument on key issues, made unwarranted findings of abuse of process, repeatedly criticized the defendants' counsel, and released delayed reasons that appeared to be an after-the-fact justification for his decision.

A new hearing before a different judge was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to change spousal support.

He argued his income had declined and the respondent had purchased a home in France without a mortgage, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's refusal to find a material change, as the appellant's income was trending upward and he provided no evidence of the respondent's asset position at the time of the original order.

The court also rejected claims of bias and improper procedure.

The appellant, an auto glass repair company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent insurer for breach of contract and intentional interference with economic interests.

The appellant claimed it had obtained assignments from insureds to receive direct payments for windshield repairs at a market rate of $100, but the insurer only paid $50 per repair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that individual contracts were formed between the repair company and the insurer for each repair at the specified $50 rate, and that the purported assignments were ineffective because the insureds had paid nothing and had no claim against the insurer to assign.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were not entitled to register a Notice under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act.

The appellants argued that their potential right to become a 50% shareholder in a corporation that owns land, and thereby share in profits from the sale of that land, constituted a registrable interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that such a potential financial interest is too remote to qualify as an unregistered estate, right, interest, or equity in land under s. 71.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding the respondent employee six months' reasonable notice.

The employer argued the notice period was too long and that the motion judge failed to deduct mitigation income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the six-month notice period, finding it was not outside the acceptable range despite the motion judge's emphasis on the availability of comparable employment.

On consent, the court reduced the award by $1,634.62 to account for mitigation income earned during the notice period.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The moving party sought to review a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to review an earlier order that denied a stay of her eviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the refusal, noting the unexplained delay and that the matter was moot since the eviction had already occurred.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating his common-law spouse to death.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W. (D.) instruction regarding his exculpatory statements to police and by refusing to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury.

He also appealed his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof and intent, and that there was no air of reality to the provocation defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was reasonable given the aggravating factors.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of counselling to commit murder.

At trial, the judge excluded an out-of-court statement made by the accused's common law spouse, relying on the spousal incompetency rule.

The trial judge also set aside wiretap authorizations and excluded intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the police affiant failed to disclose material facts about an informant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in applying the spousal incompetency rule to a common law spouse, the error did not affect the verdict because the statement was inadmissible hearsay.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to excise the informant's information from the wiretap application and exclude the resulting evidence due to serious police misconduct.

The appellants, students in a post-graduate program, brought a class action against the respondent college for a misleading statement in its course calendar regarding the opportunity to complete industry designations.

At the damages trial, the judge awarded aggregate damages under the Consumer Protection Act but excluded the third cohort of students from the class.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the third cohort into the class, finding that reliance is not required for a Consumer Protection Act claim.

The Court dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's award of aggregate damages.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing its claim for breach of a non-competition covenant.

The appellant alleged the respondent, as a director of a holding company, supplied a refrigerated truck to a competitor for free.

The motion judge found evidence that rental payments were being made for the truck, which permitted the rejection of the appellant's claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant's home was damaged during exterior restoration work when the contractor failed to properly seal areas against water.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage based on a 'faulty workmanship' exclusion.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding the exclusion precluded claims for both direct and resulting damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 'faulty workmanship' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to exclude only direct damage, preserving coverage for resulting damage under the all-risks policy.

The Regional Municipality of Durham appealed the dismissal of its motion requiring Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. to defend it in an automobile negligence action.

Durham was an additional insured under a policy held by its winter maintenance contractor.

The statement of claim included allegations related to the contractor's work as well as other allegations against Durham.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer has an unqualified duty to defend the entire action where pleadings allege facts that trigger coverage, even if the defence furthers the defence of uncovered claims.

The insurer was ordered to provide Durham with independent counsel at its expense, subject to a potential apportionment of costs at the end of the proceedings.

The appellant was successful in an oppression action against the respondents.

The respondents had served an offer to settle nine calendar days before trial, which technically amounted to fewer than seven days under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge treated the offer as a valid Rule 49 offer and awarded costs accordingly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 'no near miss' policy applies to the timing requirement under rule 49.03, meaning the offer was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

However, the Court upheld the costs award, finding that the trial judge was entitled to take the offer into account under his residual discretion pursuant to rule 49.13.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order quashing notices of examination served on the responding defendants in relation to a Mareva injunction motion.

The responding defendants moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it did not terminate the underlying action or resolve a substantive claim or defence.

The appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for index offences in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that concluded he constituted a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordered his continued detention without community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to address conflicts and ambiguities in the expert evidence regarding whether the appellant posed a significant threat, particularly given his lack of violent offences since 2003.

The matter was returned to the Board for a fresh determination.

The appellant appealed from orders striking his statement of claim against seven respondents without leave to amend and setting aside a noting in default against one respondent.

The motions judge found the claims, which included allegations of torture and invasion of privacy, to be frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process, and lacking any reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the decision to set aside the noting in default and agreeing that the pleadings were properly struck under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.