Grant Huscroft

The appellants, Greta Energy Inc. and Great Grand Valley 2 Limited Partnership, appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against Pembina Pipeline Corporation and BluEarth Renewables Inc. The case involved the sale of bundled assets, some subject to Rights of First Refusal (ROFRs).

The appellants alleged that the respondents manipulated asset prices in bad faith to prevent the exercise of ROFRs, breaching duties of good faith and honest performance, inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the respondents did not breach their duty of good faith, did not owe a fiduciary duty, did not conspire, and did not induce breach of contract, as their actions were commercially reasonable and not intended to "eviscerate" the ROFRs.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for negligent misrepresentation, which was found to be statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The trial judge also found the action could not succeed on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellants, as professional engineers, knew or ought to have known of their claim much earlier than when they filed their statement of claim, despite the respondents' ameliorative efforts and superior expertise.

The court emphasized that an expert report was not necessary for discoverability in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Todd Kehoe, appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl patches, knowingly causing a person to use forged fentanyl patches, and obtaining merchandise by false pretenses.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) ruling, which dismissed an application to exclude evidence arising from an alleged s. 8 Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal did not need to definitively rule on the s. 8 issue, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, which properly engaged with a Grant analysis and was owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ellyn Law, appealed a motion judge's order that its retainer agreement with the respondents, Alexander L. Bimman and 2182474 Ontario Inc., was valid and capped fees at 30% of recovery, disallowing certain additional fees and disbursements.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the validity and enforceability of the retainer agreement, clarifying that while lawyers can challenge their own agreements under s. 24 of the Solicitors Act, there is a presumption of fairness and reasonableness that requires exceptional circumstances to rebut.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in disallowing a disbursement for an external law firm (Chitiz Pathak LLP) as it was reasonably necessary to resolve the underlying action.

The appellant, R.F., appealed convictions for two sexual offences involving his niece, while having been acquitted of two other sexual offences involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically arguing that the judge erred by not considering all evidence holistically and by applying a lessened standard of scrutiny appropriate for children, despite the complainant being a teenager at the time of testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to credibility or the assessment of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding the core allegation of the "couch incident" versus peripheral inconsistencies.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, applied for release pending appeal under s. 679 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was not frivolous and there was no flight risk.

The court focused on whether detention was necessary in the public interest, considering public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

Finding no substantial public safety concerns and arguable grounds of appeal, the court granted the application for release, emphasizing that the public interest in reviewability can outweigh the enforceability interest in such circumstances.

The appellant, M.E., appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that dismissed her motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed a leave requirement for future filings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to the appellant's history of relitigating decided issues, non-compliance with court orders and rules, failure to pay costs, and making baseless allegations against opposing counsel.

The court also imposed a further restriction requiring leave to file any future materials.

This appeal addressed whether two insurers, AIG and Lloyd's, had a duty to defend a mutual policyholder (the City of Timmins) in a progressive property damage claim.

The key issues were the role of "premature" evidence in duty to defend analysis, the interpretation of an "Expected or Intended Injury" exclusion clause, and whether a "crystallizing event" (an AMEC Report) triggered this exclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the AMEC Report was "premature" evidence and not a "crystallizing event" that would negate Lloyd's duty to defend.

The court affirmed that the underlying claim was based on negligence, not intentional conduct, and therefore the exclusion clause did not apply, triggering Lloyd's duty to defend.

The appellant (Third Parties) appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the motions judge lacked authority to order the discontinuance of a third-party action, erred in awarding costs to the respondent, and failed to address their cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge had the authority to order discontinuance, with leave being subsumed in the order, and that the costs decision was within the judge's discretion.

The cross-motion issue was rendered moot.

The appellant sought to overturn an application judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement concerning estate matters, including jointly held bank accounts.

The Court of Appeal applied a two-step test to determine if an agreement to settle existed and if it should be enforced.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's finding that a clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous settlement had been reached and should be enforced.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is an appeal from a 17-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a guilty plea to second-degree murder.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by imposing a demonstrably unfit period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, emphasizing deference to the sentencing judge's weighing of factors, and concluded that the sentence was entirely fit given all circumstances, including significant aggravating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from an order striking the appellant’s action as an abuse of process.

The appellant claimed the motion judge erred in concluding the action was a collateral attack on prior family court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding the action entirely paralleled the basis upon which the appellant challenged those orders in Family Court and was a clear attempt to relitigate issues from the child protection proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a targeted shooting.

The Crown's circumstantial case relied on DNA evidence, video surveillance, and tracking data from the getaway vehicle's Infotainment system.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made multiple errors in the jury instructions, including cautions on exculpatory eyewitness evidence and after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant also challenged the admission of the Infotainment system data, alleging a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

Furthermore, the Court held the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle's data because he had fraudulently rented the vehicle and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement, awarding $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes to the respondent Toronto Police Services Board.

This decision followed an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice judgment.

The appellant, Professional Court Reporters Inc. (PCR), appealed a summary judgment decision concerning a sublease default by the respondents, Pistachio Financier Corp. and Real Crowd Capital Inc. o/a R2.

PCR sought damages for lost profit, post-judgment interest at a contractual rate, and costs on a higher scale, all of which were denied or limited by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to deny lost profits, finding insufficient evidence to establish a loss.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding post-judgment interest and costs, ruling that contractual terms for interest and costs should be enforced absent exceptional circumstances, which were not present.

The Court of Appeal heard three motions related to an ongoing appeal concerning the removal and replacement of estate and family trust trustees.

The Appellants (original trustees) sought a stay of the order removing them and appointing CIBC Trust Corporation.

The Respondent (Ottavio Di Santo) sought to lift a stay on a costs order and to quash or stay the Appellants' appeal.

The court granted the Appellants' stay motion, finding a serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience in their favour.

The Respondent's motions to lift the costs stay and to quash/stay the appeal were dismissed.

Costs were ordered payable from the Estate.

Benard Asante appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder, challenging the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appeal focused on the admission of prior firearms convictions (Corbett application), the admissibility of a photograph of a handgun found on the appellant's cell phone, and the jury instructions on party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the Corbett application, the admission of the photograph as circumstantial evidence of access to means, or the comprehensive and balanced jury instructions on aiding and party liability.

This is an appeal from a trial judgment awarding damages in lieu of notice for termination from employment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of the respondent’s reasonable notice period, entitlement to a bonus payment during the notice period, and the inclusion of disbursements from a mandatory mediation in the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's application of Bardal factors or the inclusion of pro-rata bonus entitlement.

The court also affirmed that expenses for mandatory mediation, even with a non-roster mediator, are properly included as disbursements in a costs award.

Optiva Inc. appealed a Superior Court decision that refused to set aside an arbitration award and denied leave to appeal.

The arbitration award found Optiva breached a contract with Tbaytel and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal addressed whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to proceed by summary judgment, whether Optiva's challenge to this ruling was time-barred under s. 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and whether the arbitrator based his interpretation of a limitation of liability clause on a legal theory not advanced by the parties.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator had broad procedural powers, the s. 17(8) time limit did not apply to procedural rulings, and no new legal theory was introduced.

This is an appeal from convictions for firearm offences.

The appellants argued Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) and unreasonable verdicts based on misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no Charter breaches, disagreeing with the trial judge's s. 8 finding.

However, it allowed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusion regarding an "exchange of gunfire" was based on a fundamental misapprehension of evidence, and that the use of cellphone photographs to infer possession was improper due to lack of similarity and risk of propensity reasoning.

Ahmed's convictions were quashed and acquittals entered, while Yusuf's convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.