Frederick L. Myers

The defendants requisitioned the registrar to have the plaintiff’s action reviewed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as potentially frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The claim arose after the plaintiff was evicted from cooperative housing pursuant to orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board and subsequent court proceedings.

The plaintiff commenced a new action against the tribunal member, court employee, the cooperative, its counsel, and a manager involved in service.

The court held that the action appeared to attempt to relitigate matters already decided and noted the immunity of tribunal adjudicators and the absence of duties owed by opposing counsel to adverse parties.

The court directed the registrar to give notice that dismissal under Rule 2.1 was being considered and stayed the action pending written submissions.

The defendants requested that the court consider dismissing the plaintiff’s action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it appeared frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged that publicly traded shares he purchased were associated with secret trust accounts holding millions of dollars in investment returns, which the defendants had failed to pay to him.

The court found no plausible basis in the pleadings or attached documents to support the existence of such trust accounts or any connection between them and the defendants.

Concluding that the claim appeared frivolous on its face, the court directed that the plaintiff provide written submissions explaining why the action should not be dismissed under Rule 2.1.

The proceeding was stayed pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The court considered whether to dismiss an action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous or vexatious on its face.

The plaintiff sought damages for multiple alleged causes of action after a prospective employer declined to proceed with a job interview.

The court found that the pleaded causes of action disclosed no viable claim, noting that there is no right to a job interview at common law, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to private sector employment, and the Competition Act provisions relied upon do not create a civil remedy.

The plaintiff’s submissions relied on allegations of a broad conspiracy involving organized crime targeting him.

The court concluded the action could not succeed and dismissed it under the Rule 2.1 process without costs.

In a motor vehicle action involving catastrophic injuries and an alleged unidentified motorist, the defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment arguing there was no evidence of a second vehicle’s involvement.

At a case conference, the parties agreed that competing expert evidence would require viva voce testimony to determine whether a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The court held that summary judgment under Rule 20 is not equivalent to bifurcation under Rule 6.1 and may proceed even where a jury notice has been served.

Applying the proportionality principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court exercised case management authority to direct that the summary judgment motion proceed with limited oral evidence and structured time limits.

Detailed procedural directions were issued to ensure an efficient and proportionate determination of the discrete liability issue.

The judgment creditors appealed a master's order dismissing their motion to compel a corporate officer to attend an examination in aid of execution.

The master held that because the creditors had commenced a related action against the officer and others alleging fraudulent asset transfers, the right to conduct an examination in aid of execution had merged into the new action.

The court held that this principle applied only to examinations of third parties and not to examinations of a corporate judgment debtor through its officers under Rule 60.18(2) and (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The master therefore erred in law by concluding the creditors lost their entitlement to examine the corporate representative.

The appeal was allowed and an order was made requiring the officer to attend for examination in aid of execution.

The plaintiff commenced an action alleging that a mortgagee had wrongly evicted her from a condominium unit following mortgage enforcement in 1980 and sought return of the property decades later.

The court initiated a Rule 2.1 review to determine whether the claim was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face.

After reviewing the plaintiff’s submissions and supporting documents, the court concluded the defendant had not conducted the power of sale and that the impugned events occurred approximately 35 years earlier.

The claim was barred by limitation periods under the Real Property Limitations Act and the issues had already been litigated previously.

The action was therefore dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court considered whether an action against a municipal defendant should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff alleged serious injuries after receiving an electric shock from a wire on a building while installing a sign and falling to the sidewalk.

The pleadings contained no allegations linking the municipality to the cause of the accident or establishing any basis for municipal liability.

After providing notice and receiving written submissions from the plaintiff, the court concluded the claim against the municipality could not succeed on its face.

The action against the municipality was dismissed under Rule 2.1.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment concerning alleged nondisclosure in a land sale, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had alleged that the vendor Crown breached duties of good faith and honesty by failing to disclose Indigenous land-related claims affecting the property.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act and rejected the argument that the Crown’s costs should be discounted because government counsel are salaried.

The court held the defendants’ claimed fees and disbursements were reasonable given the complexity of responding to allegations of bad faith and the extensive factual investigation required.

Costs of $383,745.81 on a partial indemnity basis were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff sought costs following the dismissal of motions by the defendants to set aside Mareva and Anton Piller orders and to release frozen funds.

The underlying proceeding involved a large-scale insurance fraud scheme in which insured individuals allegedly submitted claims for therapy services that were never provided, splitting the proceeds with the defendants.

The court found that the defendants had engaged in reprehensible conduct both in their business dealings and throughout the litigation, including failing to comply with court schedules and engaging in unfair procedural tactics.

Applying the factors under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $75,000 in fees plus $11,291.87 in disbursements and taxes.

The court considered whether to dismiss an action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After issuing a Form 2.1A notice inviting the plaintiff to provide written submissions explaining why the claim should not be dismissed, no submissions were received within the permitted time.

Relying on its earlier endorsement and the characteristics of abusive proceedings identified in relevant jurisprudence, the court concluded the statement of claim exhibited hallmarks of proceedings suitable for summary dismissal under Rule 2.1.

The action was dismissed and costs were ordered in favour of the defendants, subject to assessment.

The defendant requested dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that it appeared frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged multiple causes of action after not receiving a job interview, including discrimination, deceptive marketing, breach of the Human Rights Code, and violations of the Canadian Charter and Competition Act.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed no recognized cause of action and contained legally unsustainable assertions, including claims that private employment decisions violated the Charter and that deceptive marketing provisions of the Competition Act created a civil remedy.

The court concluded the claim appeared frivolous or vexatious and directed that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to explain why the action should not be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The action was stayed pending the written hearing process.

The plaintiff brought a motion requesting that the registrar issue a Rule 2.1 notice to strike the defendants’ counterclaim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The underlying action alleged fraud and misrepresentation in relation to entrepreneurial immigration investment opportunities and sought recovery of $30,000.

The counterclaim sought over $25 million in damages and injunctive relief for alleged defamation and business sabotage.

The court held that, despite drafting deficiencies and procedural irregularities, the counterclaim disclosed recognizable causes of action when read generously.

Rule 2.1 was therefore inappropriate because the pleading did not present the kind of clearly abusive claim warranting the rule’s abbreviated procedure.

The defendants moved under Rule 59.06(2)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a consent judgment on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud.

They alleged that the plaintiff lender had agreed to hold the consent judgment in escrow and not enforce it, and raised additional arguments concerning the validity of default interest under the Interest Act.

The court held that Rule 59.06 is limited to circumstances where fraud in obtaining the judgment is established and does not permit the court to revisit the correctness of the judgment itself.

The defendants failed to prove that any representation was made that the consent judgment would not be enforced, and the alleged oral arrangement was inconsistent with the written agreements and the parties’ conduct.

The motion was dismissed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the defendants.

The court considered whether a civil action should be summarily dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged that medical professionals and hospital staff had stolen and sold the plaintiff’s newborn child and made additional unsupported allegations, including accusations of organ trafficking.

The statement of claim contained no prayer for relief and appeared to arise from circumstances involving the lawful apprehension of a child under child protection legislation.

After providing notice under Rule 2.1 and reviewing written submissions, the court concluded the action was frivolous and vexatious on its face.

The action was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs payable to the defendants.

Following dismissal of a motion for production of documents, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered allegations made by the moving party against opposing counsel and a physician defendant, including claims of document alteration and misleading the court.

The court found the allegations unsupported and characterized them as serious and scurrilous.

Applying the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that such unfounded allegations justified substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded against the plaintiff in favour of the physician defendant on a substantial indemnity basis and modest costs to another defendant.

A registrar referred a matter to the court under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after defence counsel requested review of a statement of claim alleged to be frivolous or vexatious.

The self-represented plaintiff sought the return of a condominium allegedly wrongfully taken through mortgage enforcement approximately 35 years earlier and requested an out-of-court settlement while asserting she would not attend court.

The court held that the claim appeared to be statute-barred, sought relief the court could not grant, and was internally inconsistent with the court process.

The court found that the pleading appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff was given notice and an opportunity to make written submissions explaining why the action should not be dismissed.

The defendant moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by a lawyer seeking payment of unpaid legal fees.

The defendant argued that significant portions of the claim were released by bankruptcy, statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, or subject to review under the Solicitors Act.

Applying the factors for setting aside default judgment from appellate authority, the court found the defendant had an arguable defence on the merits despite having deliberately failed to defend earlier.

The court also expressed concern about the plaintiff’s strategy of delaying issuance of a final invoice until after the defendant’s discharge from bankruptcy.

Balancing fairness, potential prejudice, and the integrity of the administration of justice, the court concluded the matter should proceed on its merits.

The defendant requested that the court consider dismissing the plaintiff’s action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the claim was frivolous and vexatious.

The statement of claim alleged that the defendant bar encouraged a tenant’s alcoholism and that the tenant later assaulted the plaintiff, causing the tenant to be subject to bail conditions preventing contact with the plaintiff and thereby depriving the plaintiff of rental income.

The court held that no cause of action lies against a defendant based on bail conditions imposed under the Criminal Code and that the pleading did not disclose a recognizable claim for slander or other actionable wrong.

The court directed the registrar to issue notice under Rule 2.1.01 giving the plaintiff an opportunity to explain why the action should not be dismissed and stayed the action pending the written hearing.

The defendants requested that the registrar issue a Rule 2.1 notice to summarily dismiss the plaintiff’s action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The claim alleged a conspiracy and related misconduct arising from a Small Claims Court action commenced to collect unpaid expert witness fees and various alleged disparaging statements.

The court held that Rule 2.1 provides an abbreviated procedure reserved for obvious cases of abusive litigation.

Although the statement of claim was poorly pleaded and raised concerns regarding privilege and other legal barriers, it was not so clearly abusive on its face as to justify the exceptional Rule 2.1 process.

The court declined to direct issuance of a Form 2.1A notice and left any further challenges to the claim to ordinary motion procedures.

The plaintiff commenced an action for damages arising from the withdrawal of criminal charges laid against its travel agency business many years earlier.

The court issued notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that it was considering dismissing the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff responded with submissions attempting to revisit prior disputes and earlier dismissed malicious prosecution claims.

The court held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the action and that the claim was a clear attempt to re‑litigate matters already determined.

The action was dismissed under the abbreviated Rule 2.1 procedure.