F. Bruce Fitzpatrick

The plaintiff, a director of a commercial cannabis business, brought a motion in an oppression remedy proceeding to nullify shareholder resolutions that removed him as a director and appointed a new sole director.

The court found that the resolution removing the plaintiff violated the Business Corporations Act because he was not given notice or an opportunity to submit a written statement opposing his removal.

The court ordered the plaintiff reinstated as a director but dismissed the request for an injunction against the newly appointed director, finding the test for injunctive relief was not met.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim at trial, the successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff conceded that substantial indemnity costs were warranted due to unsuccessful fraud allegations but disputed the quantum and whether the litigation administrator should be personally liable.

The court fixed costs at $45,000 for the Jolicouers and $55,000 for Debra.

The court ordered the litigation administrator to be personally liable for 67% of the costs, representing the portion incurred after the deceased's death when she continued the litigation for her own benefit, with the estate liable for the remaining 33%.

The defendant moved without notice for default judgment on its counterclaim after the plaintiff failed to defend and its claim was struck.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the relief sought in the draft judgment (declarations regarding property and assets) did not match the prayer for relief in the counterclaim (damages).

The court granted the defendant leave to amend its counterclaim but ordered no further steps be taken without court order due to ongoing case management of related bankruptcy proceedings.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, the defendant sought costs.

The plaintiff argued that an appeal had been filed, triggering an automatic stay under Rule 63.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which should preclude the court from making a costs award.

The court held that while Rule 63.01 stays enforcement, it does not preclude the motion judge from fixing costs.

The court awarded the defendant costs fixed at $70,291.52, noting the plaintiff's multiple changes of counsel and inefficient prosecution of the matter which caused significant expense to the defence.

The father brought a motion seeking an order requiring the mother to pay her proportionate share of their son's AAA hockey registration costs for the 2022-2023 season.

The mother conceded that AA hockey expenses for their other son were extraordinary expenses but argued that AAA hockey expenses were not.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father had covered the AAA expenses for the past six years, indicating he could reasonably afford them without contribution from the mother, and thus failed to meet the test under section 7(1)(f) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The defendant brought a motion to find the plaintiff in contempt for failing to comply with a court order requiring him to attend defence medical examinations in the Greater Toronto Area.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking accommodation under the Human Rights Code to have the medicals conducted in Thunder Bay.

The court found the plaintiff in contempt, noting his clear and intentional refusal to attend the scheduled appointments.

The cross-motion was dismissed as an abuse of process, as the court had previously determined the plaintiff was medically able to travel.

As a remedy for the contempt, the court dismissed the plaintiff's action in its entirety.

The applicant moved for temporary child support for three children, two of whom were from her previous relationships.

The respondent opposed paying support for the two non-biological children, arguing he did not stand in the place of a parent.

The court applied the Chartier factors and found a strong prima facie case that the respondent stood in the place of a parent.

Considering the respondent's financial responsibility for seven children in total, the court deviated from a strict Guideline calculation and ordered him to pay $500 per month for the three children.

The plaintiff estate administrator brought an action alleging that the deceased's daughter, acting as power of attorney, fraudulently transferred the deceased's farm properties to another daughter and son-in-law in 1997.

The court found no evidence of fraud or conspiracy, concluding that the deceased had authorized the transfers.

The court also held that any claim for the unpaid balance of the purchase price was barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendants' counterclaim regarding the severance of a joint tenancy was also dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order administratively dismissing her 2011 slip and fall action for delay.

The action was dismissed after failing to be restored to the trial list within two years of being struck on consent.

Applying the four-part test from Prescott v. Barbon, the court found the plaintiff's counsel's documented medical condition provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

The court concluded the plaintiff always intended to prosecute the action, moved forthwith upon learning of the dismissal, and the defendants suffered no significant prejudice.

The motion was granted and the action restored to the trial list.

The accused, an Indigenous man, was found guilty of sexually assaulting his cousin after providing her with a substance she believed was crack cocaine.

The Crown sought a 3-year sentence, while the defence sought 18 months to 2 years.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim, the accused's lack of a prior record, his rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated on unrelated charges, and his Indigenous background as detailed in a Gladue report.

The accused was sentenced to two years plus one day in a penitentiary, to be served consecutively to his current sentence.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion, the parties could not agree on the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff argued for a nominal award of $1,500 to $2,000, while the defendant sought $7,500 plus HST.

The court rejected the plaintiff's submission for a nominal award, noting the plaintiff had refused a reasonable request to amend an existing order regarding defence medical examinations.

The court found the defendant's request proportionate and consistent with a previous order, fixing costs at $7,500 plus HST payable forthwith by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff moved to set aside an order requiring in-person defence medical examinations, citing COVID-19 concerns and relying on Rule 59.06.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to vary the order due to changes in expert availability and location.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence, largely hearsay from counsel's associate, insufficient to justify setting aside the order and drew an adverse inference from the lack of direct evidence from the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion but granted the defendant's request to amend the order to reflect the new experts and examination locations, finding the plaintiff's refusal to consent unreasonable.

This is a costs endorsement following a 12-day family law trial.

The trial primarily addressed whether the respondent stood in the place of a parent to the applicant's children and had child support obligations, and whether the applicant was entitled to spousal support.

The court found in favour of the applicant on all primary issues, rejecting the respondent's positions.

The applicant, as the successful party, was presumptively entitled to costs.

The court considered the respondent's "incredible" testimony, which prolonged the trial, and awarded the applicant substantial indemnity costs, reduced slightly for a withdrawn equalization claim.

The accused, Mr. Breton, brought an application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, following previous findings of serious section 8 Charter violations by the police.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant, assessing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found the police conduct to be serious and deliberate, including disingenuous warrant applications, warrantless searches of outbuildings, and oppressive personal searches.

The impact on the accused's privacy and dignity was deemed significant.

While the evidence was reliable and critical to the Crown's case, the court concluded that the strong pull for exclusion from the first two Grant factors outweighed society's interest in admission.

Consequently, all evidence obtained after 9:00 a.m. on December 1, 2009, including property seized under three warrants and derivative evidence, was excluded from the trial.

The applicants, Robin and Jennifer Lacey, brought an application seeking declarations that a 1968 lease held by Kakabeka Falls Flying Inc. (KFFI) was void ab initio due to contravention of the Planning Act, and sought mandatory orders for possession of the land.

KFFI argued the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, barred by laches, and that the lease was valid due to part performance and proprietary estoppel.

The court found the applicants' claims (except for property taxes) were statute-barred as they had knowledge of their claim in 2010 but did not commence the application until 2017, and they sought consequential relief, negating the no-limitation period for declarations.

The court also found the claims barred by laches due to the applicants' delay and acquiescence (accepting rent).

Furthermore, the court found persuasive evidence of an oral lease and part performance prior to the Planning Act changes, and that proprietary estoppel applied given the applicants' knowledge of the lease upon purchase and their acceptance of rent.

The application for declaration and possession was dismissed, and the discrete issue of property taxes was converted to an action to proceed to trial.

Both the plaintiff, J.T.J. Contracting (Emo) Ltd. (JTJ), and the defendant, 444616 Ontario Inc. o/a Lunam Drillers Ltd. (Lunam), moved for summary judgment.

JTJ sought a declaration of a profit a prendre interest in crushed rock material and restitution based on unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.

Lunam sought dismissal of JTJ's claim and summary judgment on its counterclaim.

The court dismissed JTJ's claim for a profit a prendre, finding no valid assignment of rights.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding JTJ's equitable claim for unjust enrichment/quantum meruit for the work performed, thus denying Lunam's motion to dismiss the balance of JTJ's claim.

Lunam's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim was also dismissed, as genuine issues for trial remained.

The respondent (Mom) brought a motion to increase her parenting time with the child, K. The child, K (aged 14), represented by the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL), opposed the increase, as did the applicant (Dad).

The court found that Mom failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances as required by section 17(5) of the Divorce Act.

Considering the child's views and preferences, and the factors under section 16(3) of the Divorce Act, the court dismissed Mom's motion, maintaining the existing parenting arrangement.

The court also ordered that no further motions be brought without leave of the court pending trial.

The accused, J.B., was charged with sexual assault and uttering death threats against his cousin, C.B. The alleged sexual assault occurred in September 2017, after C.B. ingested a substance provided by J.B. and blacked out.

C.B. testified she awoke to find J.B. sexually assaulting her.

The Crown relied heavily on C.B.'s testimony, while the defence challenged her credibility and reliability due to intoxication and delayed reporting.

The court found C.B.'s evidence regarding the sexual assault credible and reliable, despite her intoxication and initial disbelief, partly due to J.B.'s subsequent actions (asking about pregnancy).

However, the court found the evidence regarding the death threats, primarily from C.B.'s mother (X.B.), to be vague, imprecise, and unreliable.

C.B. was convicted of six charges, including sexual assault and sexual interference, involving a minor.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years incarceration for the sexual interference charges, conditionally staying the sexual assault charges based on the Kienapple principle.

The decision emphasized the profound wrongfulness of child sexual victimization, aligning with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen, and highlighted grooming behavior as an aggravating factor.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, and a weapons prohibition were also made.

The plaintiff, Pomata Investment Corp., sought summary judgment against the defendant, Yanhua Shi, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a residential property.

The defendant argued misrepresentation and lack of duty of care by the plaintiff's agent, and challenged the damages calculation and mitigation efforts.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding liability, rejecting the non est factum defence and the alleged duty of care.

The court also found the plaintiff's mitigation efforts reasonable and the damages calculation valid.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the claimed damages plus interest and costs.