Faye E. McWatt

This is a costs ruling following motions where the respondent's motion to change an order was unsuccessful, and the applicant's motion to impute income and change child and spousal support was successful.

The City of Toronto also participated due to an assignment of arrears.

The court awarded the City of Toronto $5,000 in costs and the applicant $20,000 plus HST and disbursements for her solicitor's fees, and $2,000 plus HST and disbursements for her self-represented preparation time, finding the respondent's conduct unreasonable, particularly regarding financial disclosure and disregard for court orders.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total time from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

However, the accused had left Canada for over 10 months before being arrested.

The court held that the pre-arrest period did not engage s. 11(b) interests as the accused was unaware of the charges, or alternatively, it constituted a discrete event exceptional circumstance.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness due to defence delay, including allowing his Legal Aid certificate to lapse.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Justin Wallace, brought two motions during his criminal trial.

The first sought a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter due to lost preliminary inquiry evidence (cross-examination transcript of a complainant).

The second sought to exclude a BB gun under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and delayed right to counsel.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no actual prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence regarding the lost evidence, and no Charter breaches regarding the detention and search, accepting the officers' credibility over the defendant's.

This is a costs ruling following a trial where the respondent was entirely successful.

The applicant, who was self-represented, failed to provide costs submissions.

The court found the applicant's conduct throughout the proceedings to be unreasonable, including denying access to the parties' child without cause, making unreasonable demands in her draft order, and ignoring court orders.

The respondent, conversely, acted reasonably and made two offers to settle that were more favorable than the final trial order.

Despite the applicant's self-representation, her unreasonable behaviour necessitated the trial and warranted a costs award.

The respondent was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict trial over the custody of their three-year-old son.

The mother sought sole custody, while the father sought the same, alleging the mother was manipulative, alienated the children from their fathers, and fabricated criminal assault charges against him.

The court found the mother lacked credibility, repeatedly breached court orders, and acted contrary to the child's best interests.

Relying on evidence from the mother's own family members and the father of her older child, including surreptitiously recorded conversations, the court awarded sole custody to the father and granted the mother specified access.

The United States sought the extradition of Jianghong Wang for prosecution of sexual assault.

The respondent conceded identification and the sufficiency of evidence for the Canadian equivalent offence but argued the identification evidence was unreliable and insufficient for committal.

The court, applying the limited screening function of an extradition judge, found that the identification evidence, including multiple complainants identifying the respondent from news reports and consistent assault patterns, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case for committal.

The application for extradition was granted.

The defendant, Michael Campbell, challenged the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the 'misconduct exception' which limits pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio when an offender is denied bail under section 524(4) or (8).

The court found this provision to be overbroad and in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, declaring it of no force and effect.

Consequently, the defendant was granted enhanced pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with additional credit for harsh institutional conditions and successful house arrest.

The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant for exercising control over a prostitute and possessing a prohibited firearm, imposing a total sentence of 45 months imprisonment, reduced by the enhanced pre-trial credit, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, B.P. (YOA), appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's errors regarding the admissibility and reliability of the complainant's hearsay statement, the weight given to the complainant's mother's evidence despite misidentification, the failure to properly analyze the appellant's evidence against the burden of proof, and impermissible speculation about the complainant's knowledge of sexual activity.

The Superior Court of Justice found multiple errors in the trial judge's approach to hearsay reliability, assessment of witness credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's reliance on inadmissible evidence, an error in finding an unequivocal refusal, and an error in finding the incident was not a "single transaction." The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the entire video evidence was admissible as it was tendered without limitation, the trial judge's finding of an unequivocal refusal was supported by evidence and entitled to deference, and the appellant's late inquiry about providing a sample did not constitute an unequivocal offer or part of a "single transaction" to mitigate the initial refusal.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, sought to vary a sealing order to prohibit publication of information from an Information to Obtain (ITO) DNA warrants, arguing it was necessary to preserve trial fairness and prevent witness tainting and stigmatization.

The Crown supported the ban for consistency with a prior publication ban on conflict motion materials.

The media respondents opposed the ban.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban, which requires demonstrating a serious risk to the proper administration of justice that cannot be prevented by alternative measures, and that the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public right to know.

The court emphasized the presumptive openness of warrant materials and the public interest in the investigation of police officers.

The applicant sought to challenge the constitutionality of s. 674 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated her Charter rights by barring an appeal of a dismissed directed verdict application after her first trial ended in a mistrial.

However, prior to the hearing of the constitutional application, the Crown withdrew all charges against the applicant.

The court dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a freestanding Charter challenge once the underlying criminal charges had been withdrawn.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 8 and 24(2) to quash a search telewarrant and exclude evidence seized from his residence.

The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

After applying the Step Six procedure from Garafoli to review redacted portions of the Information to Obtain, the court assessed the informant's tips based on their compelling nature, credibility, and police corroboration.

The court found the information sufficient to justify the warrant.

The court also dismissed the applicant's argument that the police improperly used a telewarrant, finding that personal attendance before a justice was impracticable under the circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, and the judge erred in finding his version of events did not afford a defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement were logical and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in the swarming.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that his statement to police and the officer's observations of the smell of alcohol were inadmissible under section 7 of the Charter, as he was statutorily compelled to report the accident under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's observations were not conscriptive evidence and that the appellant failed to establish an honest and reasonably held belief that he was required by law to make the statement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting 18-month sentence.

The Crown's case at trial relied entirely on circumstantial forensic evidence, including the presence of the appellant's DNA on the complainant's underwear.

The appeal court found the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, as he drew impermissible inferences not supported by the evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining his credibility findings and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions on sexual interference charges involving two children at his parent's home day care.

The appeal court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence of both complainants and the appellant.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to properly consider one child's adoption of prior inconsistent statements to police, overlooked evidence relevant to the other child's credibility, and mischaracterized the appellant's testimony without basis.

The appeal was allowed, with acquittals entered for the charges relating to one complainant and a new trial ordered for the charges relating to the other.

The offender pleaded guilty to historical offences of break and enter and sexual assault with a weapon committed in 1998, after being linked by DNA evidence in 2013.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four years, characterizing the offence as a home invasion, while the defence sought a non-custodial or conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's significant Gladue factors, his extensive rehabilitation efforts over the past five years, and the profound impact on the victim.

The court distinguished the case from typical home invasions and sentenced the offender to two years less a day in custody followed by three years of probation.