Eric Granger

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and obstruction of justice, as well as her 14-month sentence.

She argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework regarding her alibi evidence and failed to consider Gladue factors on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misstated the second branch of the W.(D.) test, the error had no impact because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's difficult upbringing despite being unable to formally substantiate her Indigenous ancestry for Gladue purposes.

The accused, a personal support worker, was convicted of sexually assaulting a vulnerable patient in a psychiatric ward.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons insufficient on the issues of non-consent and vitiation of consent.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal agreed the reasons on subjective non-consent were insufficient due to a failure to address conflicting evidence.

However, the Court held the appeal judge erred in her interpretation of s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge was entitled to find, in the alternative, that any apparent consent was vitiated by the accused's abuse of his position of trust, and inducement could be inferred from the circumstances.

The conviction was restored.

The applicant, convicted of sexual offences against a minor and sentenced to seven years, sought bail pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and there were no flight or public safety risks, but argued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's failure to address material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding her post-offence contact with the applicant raised significant reviewability concerns.

Balancing enforceability and reviewability, the court concluded that the reviewability interest overshadowed the enforceability interest, and granted bail pending appeal.

Tamara Lich and Christopher Barber were convicted of mischief arising from their leadership roles in the Freedom Convoy, which gridlocked Ottawa from January 29 to February 18, 2022.

Barber was additionally convicted of counselling others to disobey a Court Order.

The Crown sought unprecedented custodial sentences of seven years for Lich and eight years for Barber.

The defence sought absolute discharges or non-custodial dispositions.

The court imposed conditional sentences of 18 months for Barber (concurrent with 3 months for the counselling conviction) and 15.5 months for Lich (after crediting 74 days pre-sentence custody), with strict conditions including house arrest, curfews, and community service.

The court rejected both the Crown's punitive approach and the defence's request for discharges, finding that conditional sentences with onerous conditions could achieve denunciation and deterrence while respecting principles of proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted James Cole’s motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from his convictions and sentence for dangerous driving and related offences.

Cole argued his guilty plea was uninformed and involuntary because neither he, his counsel, the Crown, nor the court were aware that his plea would trigger an automatic lifetime driving suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that Cole had adequately explained the delay in bringing the motion and had put forward arguable grounds of appeal, particularly regarding the significant collateral consequence of the automatic suspension.

The court concluded that the interests of justice warranted granting the extension.

The court allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on an "over 80" charge under s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to properly apply the objective element of the statutory defence in s. 320.14(5).

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's subjective belief that he would not be required to provide a breath sample after a car accident, but did not adequately consider whether that belief was objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.

The court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's findings on state agency and Charter s. 24(2).

The court considered charges of laundering proceeds of crime, making false statements in income tax returns, tax evasion, and obtaining unentitled tax refunds or credits against Peter Pavlovich Jr. and Jessica Sauve.

The Crown alleged that the accuseds’ net worth exceeded their reported income by over $200,000, and that unreported income was derived from drug trafficking and unreported construction work.

The defence presented evidence of substantial gifts and loans from family and friends as alternative sources of funds.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unexplained funds were unreported income or proceeds of crime, and acquitted both accused on all charges.

This decision concerns the manslaughter charge against Ian Rooney for the unlawful death of Yu Kun Xie.

The Crown alleged that Rooney's disproportionate response to Ms. Xie's aggressive behavior, including a blow to her face, caused a fatal brain injury, and that his failure to seek timely medical help constituted criminal negligence.

The trial judge found Rooney's evidence unreliable but accepted that Ms. Xie assaulted him and that his response was in self-defence and reasonable under the circumstances.

The judge further found that although Rooney's cancellation of 911 calls was reckless and a marked departure from reasonable conduct, the Crown failed to prove causation between this conduct and Ms. Xie's death.

Consequently, the manslaughter charge was dismissed.

The court allowed the appeal of Erwin Blanco’s conviction for sexual assault, finding that the trial judge’s reasons were insufficient regarding the complainant’s state of mind and the issue of consent.

The trial judge failed to reconcile conflicting evidence about whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity, particularly her statements that she thought the activity “felt nice” and that she was “very tired.” The court also found that the trial judge did not properly address whether any consent was vitiated by abuse of a position of trust or authority under section 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

As a result, a new trial was ordered.

The court considered whether M.R. was guilty of sexually assaulting or sexually interfering with his daughter, C.R., when she was three and four years old.

The decision turned on the credibility and reliability of the evidence provided by both M.R. and C.R. The court found that M.R.'s denial could not be rejected, and that C.R.'s evidence was inconsistent and potentially tainted, failing to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

M.R. was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision for carrying a concealed weapon, arguing the trial judge erred by sentencing him as if he committed a "use" offence rather than a "possession" offence, and by overstating the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found no error in principle, stating the trial judge properly considered all circumstances, including the potential for harm, and that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

This case involves cross-appeals from a conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The appellant, E.N., appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 276 application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant and in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 276 ruling or credibility assessment, which was entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years of probation, arguing it was demonstrably unfit due to errors in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge made no reviewable error and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, having properly applied sentencing principles including denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and assault, alleging a W.(D.) error and misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) error as the trial judge's partial rejection of the complainant's choking evidence did not undermine her overall credibility for the sexual assault.

The court also rejected the speculative argument that the complainant had a motive to fabricate due to embarrassment over her Snapchat locator, finding it unsupported by the evidence.

This judgment addresses pre-trial motions concerning the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused to police and alleged breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The accused was initially arrested for aggravated assault, and later cautioned and 'arrested' for murder as the victim's condition worsened.

The defence argued police trickery regarding the victim's health status and failure to re-advise of the right to counsel upon change in jeopardy.

The court found the statement voluntary, concluding that the accused was aware of the extent of their jeopardy and that police conduct did not constitute trickery that would shock the community.

The court also found no breach of Charter rights, as the accused was informed of the change in jeopardy and had opportunities to consult counsel.

The Appellant, Jacques Dansereau, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing a miscarriage of justice.

He contended that the trial judge accepted an uninformed guilty plea without a proper plea inquiry and sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his state of mind and lack of memory due to a head injury.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's finding of guilt was based on the evidence presented during the trial, not an uninformed guilty plea.

The court concluded that the trial process was not "rife with errors" or "deeply flawed" to constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents for first-degree murder and kidnapping.

At trial, a key alleged co-conspirator refused to testify, prompting the Crown to seek the admission of his prior police statements under the principled hearsay exception.

The trial judge excluded the statements, finding they lacked threshold procedural and substantive reliability, particularly given the witness's status as a Vetrovec witness, inconsistencies in the statements, and the lack of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reversible error in applying the Bradshaw framework and concluding that the corroborative evidence did not overcome the specific hearsay dangers.

The applicant, a key organizer of the Freedom Convoy, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a Justice of the Peace ordered her detention on secondary and tertiary grounds following an alleged breach of her release conditions.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by conflating the reverse onus at a bail hearing with the onus at trial, misinterpreting the release condition, and failing to consider material changes in circumstances.

Conducting a hearing de novo, the court concluded that the applicant did not pose a substantial risk to public safety and that her detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted and judicial interim release was ordered.

The Crown and the accused both sought a review of the accused's bail conditions related to charges arising from the Freedom Convoy.

The Crown alleged the accused breached her conditions by agreeing to accept an award, while the accused sought to vary her conditions to allow travel to Ontario and use of social media.

The court found no breach of conditions and determined that a material change in circumstances warranted a de novo review.

The court ordered the accused's continued release with varied conditions, maintaining the social media ban but modifying the geographic restriction to allow her to visit Ottawa outside the downtown core.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple drug and firearm offences, alleging the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for dismissing a Charter motion and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons adequate, noting no obligation to reconcile every inconsistency, only those relevant to the Charter application.

While conceding a misapprehension regarding the location of the appellant's wallet, the court determined it had no impact on the verdicts due to overwhelming evidence of possession, including a padlock code found in the appellant's wallet connecting him directly to contraband.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact and inciting sexual contact with a person under 14.

He appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly regarding inconsistent statements about childhood events.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's age and health, and finding no exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant a reduced sentence.