Douglas K. Gray

Both parents brought motions to change a prior consent parenting order concerning custody, decision‑making, travel, and parenting arrangements for a child.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary the order.

Evidence demonstrated persistent conflict and an inability to cooperate in joint decision‑making, including disputes about medical care, extracurricular activities, travel documentation, and scheduling.

The court concluded that joint decision‑making had become unworkable and granted the mother unilateral decision‑making authority following consultation with the father, while maintaining the existing parenting schedule.

The court also ordered retroactive and ongoing contributions for special or extraordinary expenses and an adjustment to guideline child support.

Contempt motions brought by both parties were dismissed despite findings that each had deliberately breached aspects of the order.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court assessed delay under the framework from R. v. Morin, allocating periods between inherent time requirements, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Crown and institutional delay totalled approximately 19 months, modestly exceeding the Morin guideline range of 14–18 months.

While much of the claimed prejudice was typical of criminal charges, one accused demonstrated significant personal, financial, and health-related prejudice arising from the delay.

Balancing the factors, including prejudice and the seriousness of the charges, the court found the delay unreasonable and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce a family arbitration award arising from minutes of settlement reached during mediation, while the respondent moved to set aside the settlement and award.

The respondent alleged she lacked the capacity to understand the agreement due to medication and anxiety during the mediation.

The court held that the respondent failed to establish incapacity or that the applicant had knowledge or constructive notice of any incapacity at the time of settlement.

The psychological evidence did not establish that the respondent was incapable of understanding the proceedings.

The court therefore enforced the arbitration award and dismissed the motion to set aside the minutes of settlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment based on promissory notes totaling more than $8 million CAD and $290,750 USD, supported by a Confirmation of Indebtedness and a Consent to Judgment signed by the defendant with independent legal advice.

The defendant filed a statement of defence and counterclaim alleging that the notes were executed only to assist the plaintiff with banking arrangements and that the plaintiff breached an investment agreement.

The court found the defence consisted of unsupported bald allegations and that the documentary evidence, including the acknowledgment of indebtedness and consent to judgment, was clear and unambiguous.

Applying the summary judgment principles from Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff and the defendant’s counterclaim and motion to transfer the matter to Toronto were dismissed.

An execution creditor sought an order compelling a mortgagee bank to produce a mortgage statement to permit the sheriff to sell a debtor’s property to satisfy a judgment.

The mortgagee refused to disclose the statement on the basis that disclosure would violate the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

After the creditor examined a representative of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18 and the bank maintained its refusal, the creditor renewed the motion.

The court held that, in light of binding Court of Appeal authority interpreting PIPEDA, disclosure of the mortgage statement was prohibited.

The motion to compel production was therefore dismissed.

The applicants and respondents are trustees of a religious corporation.

The applicants signed a petition alleging improprieties by the board.

In response, the respondent trustees initiated show cause hearings to terminate the applicants' membership in the corporation.

The applicants sought an order declaring these actions unlawful.

The court granted the application, finding that the respondents acted in bad faith by using the membership termination process for the oblique purpose of removing the applicants from the board of trustees, which could only be done for lack of attendance under the bylaws.

A family law trial addressing custody, access, child support, spousal support, equalization, and property division following the breakdown of a marriage involving two young children.

The court accepted the recommendation of a custody assessor and granted sole custody to the applicant father while maintaining unsupervised access for the respondent mother, finding that although her parenting lapses were concerning, supervised access was not justified.

The respondent was ordered to pay guideline child support based on her previous year’s income and proportionate section 7 expenses.

Her claim for spousal support and damages was dismissed.

The court also ordered an equalization payment and resolved disputes regarding the value of the matrimonial home, ultimately ordering the transfer of the respondent’s interest to the applicant with a net payment calculated after deductions.

The employer sought an interlocutory injunction restricting picketing during a lawful strike at one of its warehouse facilities.

The union’s picketing activities caused substantial delays for vehicles entering and exiting several warehouse locations, effectively disrupting operations despite remaining largely peaceful.

The court applied the interlocutory injunction framework from RJR‑MacDonald and considered the special context of labour disputes and the balance between property access rights and constitutionally protected expressive activity in picketing.

The court held that while employers are entitled to access their property, labour picketing may justify some degree of inconvenience and delay as part of the economic dynamics of a strike.

An injunction was granted permitting continued picketing but limiting the extent of delays in accessing the employer’s facilities.

The plaintiff corporation, a publisher of trade magazines for the wood industry, brought an action against its former officer and shareholder for breach of non-competition and non-solicitation clauses in a shareholders agreement.

After the defendant's shares were bought out, he engaged in consulting work for various wood industry associations.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the consulting work did not constitute 'ancillary and related activities' to the plaintiff's magazine publishing business, and the defendant did not solicit the plaintiff's advertising clients or compete in the Canadian magazine marketplace.

The applicant bank brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The evidence showed that the respondent repeatedly commenced motions, applications, and appeals related to mortgage enforcement proceedings and related matters, often relitigating issues already decided, attempting to represent another individual without standing, and disregarding court orders restricting further proceedings.

Numerous proceedings were initiated in multiple courts and tribunals, many of which were not pursued or were dismissed, and several outstanding costs orders remained unpaid.

Applying the principles in Re Lang Michener et al and Fabian et al, the court held that the respondent’s persistent litigation conduct constituted vexatious proceedings.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant, imposed a requirement that she obtain leave of a Superior Court judge before instituting or continuing any court proceeding, and dismissed a related action she had commenced against the bank, its solicitors, and a property manager.

The plaintiff commenced an intended class proceeding against the Crown arising from a criminal proceeding where his Charter rights were infringed due to an incompetent interpreter.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to provide the requisite 60 days' written notice under s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The plaintiff argued that a release signed in relation to a costs settlement in the criminal matter, along with the application record and factum, constituted sufficient notice.

The court held that the documents did not provide sufficient particulars to identify the occasion out of which the civil claim arose, leaving the Crown to guess its potential liability.

The action was dismissed as a nullity.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2009 consent order to terminate child support and post-secondary education expenses for his adult daughter, arguing that she had completely alienated him.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion to increase the father's proportionate share of the expenses based on his increased income.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no material change in circumstances because the estrangement existed when the consent order was made, and income variations were foreseeable.

However, the court ordered that the adult daughter must contribute 75% of her income towards her own post-secondary expenses, and suspended the father's base child support obligations during the months the daughter attends university away from home.

Employees brought a motion for default judgment in wrongful dismissal actions after the defendants’ statements of defence were struck and the defendants were noted in default.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants operated as common employers and were jointly and severally liable following the discontinuation of the business and termination of employees without adequate notice or severance.

Affidavit evidence detailed employment history, mitigation efforts, and damages.

Although the court rejected the proposed formula of one month’s pay per year of service and questioned the appropriateness of a fixed 24‑month cap, it held that the damages claimed were reasonable in the circumstances.

Default judgment was granted against two corporate defendants for the amounts claimed with pre‑judgment interest and costs.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside an order made after an undefended trial that granted the mother sole custody, adjusted parenting time, imputed income to the father, and ordered child support.

The moving party sought leave to file an answer and financial statement, arguing the order resulted in injustice and that he had not participated in the proceeding.

The court held that the Family Law Rules did not authorize setting aside the order and that the Rules of Civil Procedure provisions respecting default judgments could not be applied by analogy.

Even if applicable, the moving party failed to provide any explanation for his default and did not satisfy the criteria required to set aside a default judgment.

The court further found no manifest injustice warranting use of inherent jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s commercial tenancy action on the basis that it was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that construction, signage interference, and other landlord conduct caused a severe decline in its restaurant business at a shopping mall.

The court held that the limitation period began when the plaintiff knew the defendants’ conduct had caused damage to the business, not when the business ultimately vacated the premises.

Evidence from the plaintiff’s principal indicated that he knew the business was “sinking” by July 2006.

As the action was not commenced until February 25, 2009, the claim was brought outside the two‑year limitation period and was dismissed on summary judgment.

A spouse sought substantial spousal support following a short marriage after becoming permanently disabled due to multiple sclerosis and residing in a nursing home.

The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggested support between $156 and $208 per month for a duration of two to five years based on the parties’ incomes and the length of the marriage.

The court considered the disability exception discussed in the Guidelines and the principles from Bracklow regarding non-compensatory support for a disabled spouse.

While recognizing the respondent’s severe disability and financial need, the court declined to award the requested $1,000 per month indefinitely.

Instead, it modestly exceeded the guideline amount and ordered $300 per month for an indefinite duration, subject to variation upon a material change in circumstances.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiffs, former employees of GMA Cover Corp., were summarily terminated without notice or compensation following a complex corporate reorganization.

They brought an action claiming the various corporate defendants were common employers and moved for a Mareva injunction to prevent the sale or encumbrance of the defendants' only remaining asset in Ontario, a property in Guelph.

The court found the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case on the merits of the common employer claim and satisfied the test for a Mareva injunction, inferring an intent by the defendants to frustrate the plaintiffs' claims.

The motion for a Mareva injunction was granted.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant’s pleadings due to persistent non‑compliance with court orders and disclosure obligations.

The court found the applicant had repeatedly failed to pay court‑ordered interim child and spousal support, accumulated significant arrears, and provided incomplete or late financial disclosure despite multiple orders.

The applicant also improperly cashed a registered education savings plan intended for the parties’ children and failed to fully reimburse the funds.

The court concluded that the applicant’s conduct demonstrated ongoing disregard for court orders and the integrity of the process.

As a result, the applicant’s pleadings were struck and the matter permitted to proceed as an undefended trial.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff bank’s summary judgment motion on personal guarantees under the simplified procedure, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of over $18,000.

The court rejected arguments that contractual provisions or the plaintiff’s decision to pursue summary judgment justified elevated costs.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs generally require reprehensible conduct, which was not established.

The claimed hours and duplication caused by a change of counsel rendered the defendants’ bill excessive.

Costs were therefore fixed on a partial indemnity basis in a reduced all‑inclusive amount.