Douglas K. Gray

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and awaited sentencing and a dangerous offender application.

His retained counsel was suspended by the Law Society and failed to communicate with the accused or assist in transferring the file.

Given the serious consequences facing the in-custody accused, the court appointed amicus curiae to assist the court and protect the accused's rights, and adjourned the matter.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting his 18-year-old daughter child support and university expenses.

The daughter had withdrawn from parental control, and the central issue was whether this withdrawal was involuntary under s. 31(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal judge found that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment because there were significant facts in dispute regarding the voluntariness of the withdrawal that required a trial.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The interim support order was varied to account for financial contributions made by the mother.

The moving party requested that his 45-day sentence of imprisonment for contempt, which had been varied by the Court of Appeal, be served intermittently on weekends.

The moving party argued for a flexible approach to the doctrine of functus officio.

The court dismissed the request, finding that it was functus officio and had no jurisdiction to vary the sentence.

The court noted that the moving party had the opportunity to make submissions on an intermittent sentence during the original hearing and before the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff landlord claimed the defendant tenant was overholding after the expiry of a commercial lease because a subtenant left a functional computer server containing client data on the premises.

The landlord sought overholding rent.

The court dismissed the action, finding that leaving a single piece of equipment did not constitute use and occupation of the premises, especially since the tenant had no access to the building and no business was being conducted there.

The plaintiffs, an exotic car rental company, sued the renter and an unauthorized driver after a rented Aston Martin was destroyed in a collision.

The unauthorized driver's insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against the driver, relying on the no-fault property damage regime under s. 263 of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment against the renter for breach of contract.

The court granted the insurer's motion, dismissing the action against the driver because s. 263(5)(a) strictly bars property damage claims against anyone other than the insured's own insurer.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion against the renter, finding that s. 263(5)(a.1) requires a finding of fault or negligence, which involved genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his young niece.

At the preliminary inquiry, the child claimed to have no memory of the events or her prior police interview.

The Crown sought to admit her video-recorded police interview under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the statement met the criteria for necessity and threshold reliability and admitted it into evidence.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the child's statement over the defence evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed a family arbitration award that dismissed his claim to reduce spousal support.

The arbitrator found that the termination of child support was a material change in circumstances, but its only effect was to improve the appellant's financial position, thus not justifying a decrease in spousal support.

The appellant argued the arbitrator erred by not applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs) to recalculate support.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act, a court must only make a variation justified by the material change, rather than conducting a de novo review.

Since the original consent order was not based on the SSAGs, they had no application to the variation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the respondent driving at excessive speeds, because the surrounding circumstances (light traffic, dry road, no interference with other vehicles) did not establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in law by stating that speed alone cannot found a conviction for dangerous driving.

The appellate court reviewed relevant case law, confirming that while excessive speed can constitute dangerous driving, a contextual analysis of all surrounding circumstances is required.

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown had not proven dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent storage facility claimed approximately $25,000 in storage fees for a vehicle deemed a total loss by the applicant insurer.

The respondent commenced an application in Small Claims Court under s. 23 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act to determine the lien amount.

The applicant subsequently commenced an application in the Superior Court under s. 24 of the Act, paying the disputed amount into court to secure the vehicle's release.

The respondent moved to terminate the Superior Court proceeding, arguing its prior Small Claims Court application deprived the Superior Court of jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the motion to terminate, finding that s. 23(2) does not create a temporal limitation based on which application was filed first.

However, because the disputed amount was under $25,000, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to transfer the Superior Court application to the Small Claims Court to be consolidated with the respondent's application.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to challenge a justice of the peace's ruling that a charge under the Conservation Authorities Act was not statute-barred.

The applicants argued that the two-year limitation period commenced earlier than determined by the justice, rendering the charge out of time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the justice's ruling was made within jurisdiction and was not so obviously wrong as to warrant intervention during the ongoing trial.

The court emphasized that certiorari should be granted rarely in such circumstances, especially when an appeal is available post-trial, and that the policy considerations favour a non-interventionist approach to avoid fragmenting proceedings.

The court addressed an application for advice and direction regarding the interpretation of "issue" in a 1977 will, specifically whether a child born outside marriage was entitled to inherit.

The court regretfully concluded that, due to the explicit temporal limitation in section 1(4) of the Succession Law Reform Act (which applied its new presumption of inclusion only to wills made on or after March 31, 1978), the common law presumption (excluding children born outside marriage) applied to the will in question.

Consequently, the grandson born outside marriage was not entitled to a share of the estate.

The accused was tried on two counts of transmitting sexually explicit material and one count of child luring arising from lengthy online communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The court held that the statutory presumptions concerning age belief applied because the interlocutor was repeatedly represented as under 16, and the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain age within the meaning of the Criminal Code and the governing Supreme Court of Canada authorities.

Relying on the communications as a whole and the accused's contemporaneous private writings, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the communications and images was to facilitate sexual interference by grooming and arranging a possible sexual encounter.

Convictions were entered on all three counts.

The plaintiff sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring a motion for the production of new material (third year sales data or supporting documents for existing sales data) from the defendants after the action had been set down for trial.

The court applied the stricter test for leave under Rule 48.04(1), requiring a "substantial or unexpected change in circumstances such that a refusal to grant leave would be manifestly unjust." The court found that the plaintiff's request for new material, arising from the defendants' inability to provide supporting documents for previously disclosed sales data, did not constitute a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances, especially since the plaintiff had not pursued available remedies earlier.

The motion for leave was dismissed, though the plaintiff was permitted to bring a motion for the original supporting documents without leave.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiffs' claim under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, which was added after one defendant transferred property to his wife for no consideration following a personal injury action.

The plaintiffs sought damages exceeding insurance policy limits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a fraudulent conveyance claim can be pursued before a judgment is obtained in the main action and that joining the claims avoids multiplicity of proceedings, with the trial judge having discretion to manage the trial process to prevent prejudice.

This interim motion addressed parental alienation in a custody dispute involving two children.

The court found clear evidence that the children had been alienated from the respondent mother through the combined efforts of the applicant father and Caroline Hay, a former nanny with a close bond to the children.

The court emphasized the need for immediate action in parental alienation cases.

It ordered the parties and children to forthwith attend reintegration therapy with Andrea Barclay, with costs shared, and prohibited Caroline Hay from having any contact with the children.

The court rejected the applicant's proposal to continue therapy with Melissa Healy, finding her approach to reintegration inappropriate.

A judicial review was scheduled to determine the necessity of a s.30 assessment and a residential schedule after the therapy report.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming $320,000 from her deceased ex-husband's estate.

The claim was based on a separation agreement that guaranteed her $1.5 million from the sale of a property, provided the deceased required her to accept an offer for less.

The plaintiff sold the property for $1.18 million without advising the deceased of the listing price or the offer before acceptance.

The court dismissed the action, finding that under the clear wording of the agreement, the deceased had the right to decide whether an offer under $1.5 million should be accepted.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument of promissory estoppel, finding the deceased's silence did not amount to a representation.

This endorsement addresses two issues arising from a case conference in a class action: whether the defendant should disclose its process for identifying class members, and the appropriate cut-off date for class membership.

The court declined to compel disclosure of the defendant's identification process, relying on counsel's undertaking to provide an accurate list, but allowed for future disclosure if disputes arise.

The court determined that the cut-off date for class membership should be the date notice is given to class members, approximately five months after certification, to ensure broader inclusion.

Due to mixed success on the issues and late filings by both parties, no costs were awarded for the attendance.

The applicant, charged with drug offences arising from an alleged internal pharmacy theft, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a warrantless search of his backpack incident to arrest and a subsequent warranted search of his home.

The applicant argued his arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on information from a private investigator and police observations.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants, who were charged under the Conservation Authorities Act, brought an application for certiorari to quash a justice of the peace's decision that their charges were not statute-barred.

The applicants requested an adjournment of their certiorari application, which was granted.

The respondent brought a motion under section 141(2.1) of the Provincial Offences Act for an order that the trial continue despite the pending certiorari application.

The court granted the respondent's motion, finding that it is generally inappropriate to interrupt ongoing proceedings with judicial review applications and that continuing the trial was in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed his incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The Board found that while the appellant understood relevant information, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision or lack thereof, primarily due to his denial of his psychiatric illness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the Board's electronic hearing, no misconstruction of the statutory test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence.