Court File and Parties
Court File No.: 34/16 Date: 2017-06-29 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: Her Majesty The Queen, Appellant – and – Daniel Marton, Respondent
Counsel: Arish Khoorshed, for the Crown, Appellant No one for the Accused, Respondent
Heard: June 28, 2017
Reasons for Judgment
Gray J.
1This is an appeal by the Crown from the acquittal of Mr. Marton, by Forsyth J. of the Ontario Court of Justice, of a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. Mr. Marton was also acquitted of a charge of failing to stop his vehicle while being pursued by a police officer. The Crown does not appeal the acquittal of that charge.
Background
2The trial judge issued lengthy reasons for judgment, and I have borrowed extensively from his reasons in setting out the background of this matter.
3In the early hours of the morning of September 16, 2014, Officer Steve Hulsman of the OPP was on patrol on the Queen Elizabeth Way near Third Line in Oakville. He had in his possession a speed laser Atlanta device.
4Officer Hulsman testified that at 2:10 a.m., the traffic was light and the road was dry and clear. He observed a motor vehicle driving in the slow lane of the highway. The vehicle was travelling very fast and was passing other vehicles. Using his radar device, he clocked speeds of 182 and 171 kilometres per hour on the vehicle. He notified dispatch, and then followed the vehicle in order to stop it.
5When he caught up to the vehicle, he activated his grill lights and the siren. He testified that the vehicle activated a signal light and moved towards the right hand shoulder of the highway, but then the car sped off again. The officer followed in an attempt to catch up.
6The officer testified that when the vehicle attained a speed of 200 kilometres per hour, he could not keep up because the top speed of his cruiser was 205 kilometres per hour. The vehicle he was chasing was described as a white Volvo.
7The Volvo exited at the Burloak exit from the QEW. While he was far behind, he did see the Volvo turn right to go northbound on Burloak. There was no other traffic going in that direction.
8The officer followed the vehicle on Burloak and it was travelling between 100 and 120 kilometres per hour in what is a 60 kilometre per hour limit. Ultimately, he observed the Volvo spinning and eventually colliding with a steel guard rail.
9Mr. Marton was arrested on the dangerous driving charge at 2:21 a.m. The officer conducted an ASD test, but the reading was only 13 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.
10Mr. Marton testified that he had been attending a birthday party in Mississauga. He testified that when he was driving on the QEW he was driving in the middle lane at 100 – 120 kilometres per hour when he noticed headlights following him. He said he was “freaked out” by the headlights as they came right up to the bumper of his vehicle behind him. He decided to run for it, so he sped up and took the exit at Burloak. He said he believed his life was at risk and his nerves were shot. He lost control of his vehicle on Burloak and collided with a guard rail.
11Mr. Marton denied that he had heard any siren coming from the vehicle behind him.
12As noted earlier, the Crown has not appealed the acquittal of the charge that Mr. Marton evaded the police vehicle and failed without lawful excuse to stop the vehicle. Accordingly, I will say no more about it.
13With respect to the dangerous driving charge, I note that the trial judge encapsulated the Crown’s submission as follows:
While the Crown acknowledges that the current state of the common law in dangerous driving charges is that mere speed alone is often insufficient to substantiate a dangerous driving charge beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless such a high rate of speed, approximately 80 kilometres in excess of the posted limit, on a major four-lane highway with at least some other traffic on it at the time might well be considered to be sufficient to substantiate a charge of dangerous driving after the court applies the modified objective test from R. v. Beatty, supra, to the totality of the evidence.
14I will have more to say about what appears to be the Crown’s submission with respect to speed alone, in a moment.
15In substance, counsel for Mr. Marton argued that the Crown had not proven the elements of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt. In the alternative, counsel argued that Mr. Marton should be acquitted on the basis of the defence of necessity.
16The trial judge rejected the defence of necessity, but held that the charge of dangerous driving had not been proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.
17While the trial judge does not specifically say so, it seems clear from his reasons that he accepted that Mr. Marton was driving on the QEW at speeds of 171 kilometres and 182 kilometres per hour, particularly because Mr. Marton, in his evidence, did not dispute that that was so. He also accepted that Mr. Marton was driving at speeds of 100 – 120 kilometres per hour on Burloak where the speed limit was 60 kilometres per hour.
18For the most part, the trial judge accepted the evidence as to Mr. Marton’s driving, and the conditions under which he operated his vehicle. At paragraphs 86-89 of his reasons, the trial judge stated:
86I also accept the officer’s evidence that the accused passed a truck which was driving behind a car at some unquantified distance between them and then drove back into the inside lane briefly in order to the Burloak exit. However, I also find from the officer’s own evidence that I cannot be certain that the accused caused an evasive action to be taken by the truck driver, or, for that matter, that he had almost cut off the truck with his manoeuvre. Indeed the officer gave no evidence of brake lights being activated on the truck as the accused passed in front of it to take the exit and he was too far away to see whether the accused had signalled his exit.
87From the totality of the officer’s evidence, I find that there was no traffic interfered with by the accused’s operation of his car at the high rates of speed that both the officer and the accused testified had been attained by the accused on the Q.E.W.
88I also find that that only the light traffic would be expected to be on that section of the highway at that time of the morning and that the road surface was safe as having been dry with no impediment to visibility.
89On Burloak there was no evidence of any other vehicular traffic on the accused’s route north to the point of his collision with the guardrail at the end of the travelled portion of Burloak where it becomes the entrance to Bronte Creek Park.
19At paragraph 91 of his reasons, the trial judge stated:
91It has been established that mere speed alone will not substantiate a charge of dangerous driving as a marked departure from the norm in the absence of a contextual analysis of that speed with the words of the section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. It must be said that perhaps there is a speed beyond which a motor vehicle may be considered to be inherently unsafe and thereby present a danger to the public or to any other traffic that might be or might be expected to be in the area because of a potential loss of control by the driver or aerodynamic forces such as hydroplaning. However, this would require expert evidence about the type of vehicle and evidence of the particular driving skills of the driver, which clearly is not present in this case.
20The trial judge’s conclusion was as follows:
93In conclusion, then, I find that I am not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the totality of the evidence, the accused, objectively, was driving in a manner that was ‘dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition, and use of the place at which the vehicle is [was] being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is [was] or might reasonably be expected to be [have been] at that place’.
94For these reasons, I find that the Crown has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the actus reus of the charge pursuant to s.249(1)(a) of the Code.
Submissions
21Mr. Khoorshed, counsel for the Crown, submits that the trial judge committed an error of law when he stated that speed alone cannot found a conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. He submits that the Court of Appeal, in R. v. Richards (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 154 (Ont. C.A.), held to the contrary. He submits that the Court of Appeal’s decision stands for the proposition that excessive speed, standing alone, can form the basis of a conviction.
22Mr. Khoorshed submits that this conclusion is not affected by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, and this has been recognized by judges of this court in R. v. Ranger, [2015] O.J. No. 1423 (S.C.J.); and R. v. Aleksev, 2016 ONSC 1834, [2016] O.J. No. 1962 (S.C.J.).
23Mr. Khoorshed requests that the appeal be allowed, and a conviction substituted.
Analysis
24As noted earlier, it might appear, from the reasons of the trial judge, that counsel for the Crown at trial took a position that is contrary to the position of the Crown on appeal. According to the trial judge, counsel for the Crown acknowledged that mere speed alone is often insufficient to substantiate a dangerous driving charge beyond a reasonable doubt. In this court, the Crown argues that speed alone can be sufficient to substantiate a dangerous driving charge.
25Mr. Khoorshed points out that when one reviews the transcript of Crown counsel’s submissions at trial, it does not appear that Crown counsel took the position that the trial judge apparently believed he took.
26Having reviewed the transcript, I think Mr. Khoorshed is right.
27In any event, even if Crown counsel did take the position at trial that the trial judge ascribes to him, I do not think that would be fatal to the Crown’s position on appeal. It is clear, in my view, that if a trial judge is urged by the accused to accept a principle of law that is incorrect, and it is in fact incorrect, that does not in any way restrict the accused from arguing the contrary proposition on appeal: see R. v. MacLeod (2014), 2014 NSCA 63, 311 C.C.C. (3d) 300 (N.S.C.A.); aff’d 2014 SCC 76, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 619. I see no reason why the same principle should not apply to the Crown.
28With respect, I do not think the Richards case, relied on by the Crown, goes quite as far as Mr. Khoorshed would have it.
29In Richards, the court discussed two earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal: R. v. Pezzo (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 530 (Ont. C.A.); and R. v. M.K.M., [1998] O.J. No. 1606 (C.A.).
30In Pezzo, the Crown had given particulars of dangerous driving and had restricted it to excessive speed. Based on what the court characterized as the “scanty evidence” presented, the majority of the Court concluded that it would be unsafe to maintain a conviction.
31Gale C.J.O. dissented. He held that, depending on the conditions, excessive speed can support a conviction for dangerous driving. He stated:
Moreover, I am of the view that, in all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place where the automobile was being driven, and the kind of traffic that at time might reasonably be expected to be present including pedestrian traffic, such excessive speed represented dangerous driving on the part of the appellant within the definition s.233(4) of the Criminal Code.
[Emphasis Added]
32In M.K.M., the court, in its endorsement, stated at para. 2:
Depending on the context in which it occurred, excessive speed can amount to a marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent driver. Here the context included the following: the accident occurred on a busy highway in a built-up area of Mississauga, and just before the accident the appellant had been driving aggressively and engaging in “horseplay” on the road with her co-accused.
[Emphasis added]
33In Richards itself, the court stated at para. 11: “This court recognized in Pezzo, under certain circumstances, evidence of excessive speed, in itself, can constitute the offence of dangerous driving.” [Emphasis added]
34Significantly, in Richards, the court declined to substitute a conviction. It ordered a new trial so that the surrounding circumstances could be considered, along with the speed of the vehicle. At para. 14, the court noted that although the posted speed in the area was 100 kilometres per hour, speeds in the passing lane of up to 130 kilometres per hour were not uncommon. At para. 15 the court stated: “Given the evidence which indicated the speeding practices of other drivers on the highway where the accident occurred, we are not persuaded that the demonstrated evidence supports no conclusion other than the conclusion that the respondent’s driving was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver in a similar situation.”
35It is clear from these cases, in my view, that it is necessary to take into account the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether excessive speed necessarily gives rise to a conviction for dangerous driving.
36In this case, the trial judge found that there was no traffic interfered with by Mr. Marton’s operation of his car at the high rates of speed at which it was travelling; only light traffic would be expected to be on that section of the highway at that time of the morning; the road surface was safe having been dry with no impediment to visibility; and that on Burloak there was no evidence of any other vehicular traffic on Mr. Marton’s route to the point of his collision with the guard rail. To repeat, his conclusion was as follows:
93In conclusion, then, I find that I am not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that, on the totality of the evidence, the accused, objectively, was driving in a manner that was ‘dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition, and use of the place at which the vehicle is [was] being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is [was] or might reasonably be expected to be [have been] at that place’. [Emphasis added]
37The trial judge’s conclusion was open to him on the evidence, which included evidence of excessive speed as well as the surrounding circumstances. No reviewable error has been shown.
Disposition
38The appeal is dismissed.
Gray J.
Released: June 29, 2017