Demetrios Yiokaris

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against her insurance company and broker after a nine-day trial, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff made unsupported allegations of bad faith and failed to accept reasonable offers to settle.

The plaintiff argued for a reduced costs award based on the principle of proportionality, given the modest size of her claim.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that doing so would require the plaintiff to pay costs totalling more than four times the value of her claim.

Applying the principle of proportionality and the factors under Rule 57, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing costs at $175,000 for the insurer and $115,000 for the broker.

The plaintiff, Diana Lynn Monk, sued her insurer (Farmers’ Mutual) and broker (Muskoka Insurance) for property damage to her log home caused by a contractor's negligent restoration work.

The court found that while the damage was covered under the "all-risk" homeowner's policy, the plaintiff failed to provide timely notice of the loss as required by Statutory Condition No. 6.

Despite the court's finding that the breach was imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance, the plaintiff's conduct was deemed unreasonable, and the insurer suffered significant prejudice due to the delay.

Consequently, the court denied relief from forfeiture and dismissed the claims against both the insurer and the broker.

A family-owned meat processing business went bankrupt, terminating approximately 800 employees.

Two representative actions were commenced: one by Sam Caetano for unionized employees and another by Debbie and Alex Abreu for non-unionized employees, alleging wrongful dismissal, common employment, conspiracy, and oppression against solvent related companies and individuals.

The defendants brought motions to stay the Caetano action for lack of jurisdiction and to dismiss both representative actions as time-barred.

The court granted the jurisdiction motion, staying the Caetano action entirely, finding that claims by unionized employees under a collective agreement fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour tribunals.

The court also granted in part the limitations motion, dismissing the Caetano representative action as time-barred because the required Rule 12.08 representation order was not obtained prior to commencement.

However, the Abreu representative action, brought under Rule 10.01, was found not to be time-barred, but was allowed to proceed only on the condition that the plaintiffs forthwith obtain a representation order.

This motion sought an order for security for costs against the plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, in a $20 million lawyer's negligence claim.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, citing a previous decision where the same plaintiff was ordered to post security and its sole shareholder failed to establish impecuniosity.

The court applied the two-step inquiry under Rule 56.01, finding that the defendants had good reason to believe the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate ample assets or impecuniosity, and its claim was not found to have a "good chance of success." The motion was granted, ordering the plaintiff to post security for costs totaling $149,000 in three installments, and staying the proceeding until the first installment was posted.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against John Vella, a director of Dual-Temp Insulation Incorporated, seeking $196,836.89 in unpaid wages, vacation pay, and trust fund contributions.

The defendants were noted in default.

The court found Vella personally liable under section 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act and for breach of trust under sections 8 and 13 of the Construction Lien Act, based on the deemed admission of facts in the statement of claim.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for property damage insurance coverage.

The motion judge initially granted summary judgment based on a coverage exclusion, but the Court of Appeal reversed this finding and remitted the limitation period issue back to the motion judge.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion regarding the limitation period, finding that disputed conversations between the plaintiff and her insurance broker raised significant credibility issues that required a trial.

The Receiver brought a motion to distribute funds to the secured creditor, RBC, and to approve its fees.

The Union opposed, claiming a super-priority for unpaid pension and other benefits under the BIA over all companies in the receivership, and sought to claw back the Receiver's fees.

The court held that the CRA's deemed trust for unremitted source deductions under the Income Tax Act takes priority over the Union's BIA super-priority claims.

The court also rejected the Union's attempt to extend its claims to other corporate entities in the group, finding no evidence they were related employers or participated in the pension plan.

The Union's attempt to claw back the Receiver's fees was dismissed as an impermissible collateral attack.

Following successful summary judgment motions by the defendants in an insurance coverage dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants sought substantial costs exceeding $140,000 combined.

Applying Rule 57 and the principle of proportionality, the court considered the novelty of the legal issue, the defendants’ delay in bringing the summary judgment motions, and the plaintiff’s good‑faith pursuit of a non‑frivolous claim.

The court also emphasized access to justice concerns given the modest value of the underlying claim.

Costs were significantly reduced and fixed at $30,000 payable to the insurer and $20,000 payable to the broker, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants moved for declarations regarding their pension rights under a supplemental pension plan.

The respondent argued the claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, asserting the limitation period began when option statements denying the benefits were issued.

The court held that the claims were not statute-barred, finding that the cause of action for pension benefits does not crystallize until the payments actually fall due and are wrongfully refused, rather than when an anticipatory breach occurs.

The defendants brought a motion for directions seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was a person under a legal disability requiring representation by a litigation guardian.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act to compel a mental examination in the context of Rule 7 proceedings.

The court held that it does have jurisdiction to order such an examination and that doing so would not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, given the procedural safeguards governing such orders.

However, because the plaintiff expressed willingness to undergo a voluntary assessment and provide an updated report addressing her litigation capacity, the court declined to order a compulsory examination at that stage.

The defendants’ motion was adjourned pending the plaintiff’s completion of the voluntary assessment and anticipated motion to continue the proceeding without a litigation guardian.

The appellants appealed from the Court of Appeal's reversal of the CCAA court's decision regarding the priority of pension plan wind-up deficiency claims over court-ordered DIP financing charges.

The majority held that wind-up deficiencies under s. 75(1)(b) of the Pension Benefits Act were subject to a statutory deemed trust under s. 57(4), but that the deemed trust was superseded by the DIP charge by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The majority further held that while the employer-administrator breached its fiduciary duty by failing to ensure the pension plan beneficiaries had adequate notice and representation in the CCAA proceedings, a constructive trust was not an appropriate remedy because the breach did not result in an identifiable asset that it would be unjust for the wrongdoer to retain.

Following dismissal of an application seeking a declaration that retention bonuses constituted pensionable earnings under a pension plan, the court determined the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful applicant sought to have his costs paid from the pension trust fund.

Applying the pension trust approach discussed in appellate authorities, the court held that costs may be payable from a pension fund where proceedings ensure proper administration of the trust or benefit all beneficiaries.

Because the claim sought increased benefits for the applicant alone and was adverse to other beneficiaries, costs could not be ordered from the trust fund.

Despite the applicant’s loss, the court exercised discretion to order no costs given the ambiguity of the plan terms, the novelty of the issue, and the applicant’s good faith.

The applicant sought a declaration that retention bonuses payable under an amended employment agreement constituted pensionable earnings under a multi-employer pension plan for purposes of calculating pension benefits.

The court considered the plan definition of “pensionable earnings,” which included wages, salary, and other amounts forming a regular and integral part of a member’s remuneration.

The applicant argued the bonuses were regular compensation tied to continued employment, while the plan administrator argued they were ad hoc payments replacing a severance-trigger provision.

The court held that although the payments occurred on fixed dates, they were not a regular and integral component of remuneration within the meaning of the plan.

The application was dismissed and the bonuses were found not to be pensionable earnings.