Demetrios Yiokaris

A family-owned meat processing business went bankrupt, terminating approximately 800 employees.

Two representative actions were commenced: one by Sam Caetano for unionized employees and another by Debbie and Alex Abreu for non-unionized employees, alleging wrongful dismissal, common employment, conspiracy, and oppression against solvent related companies and individuals.

The defendants brought motions to stay the Caetano action for lack of jurisdiction and to dismiss both representative actions as time-barred.

The court granted the jurisdiction motion, staying the Caetano action entirely, finding that claims by unionized employees under a collective agreement fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour tribunals.

The court also granted in part the limitations motion, dismissing the Caetano representative action as time-barred because the required Rule 12.08 representation order was not obtained prior to commencement.

However, the Abreu representative action, brought under Rule 10.01, was found not to be time-barred, but was allowed to proceed only on the condition that the plaintiffs forthwith obtain a representation order.

This motion sought an order for security for costs against the plaintiff, an Ontario corporation, in a $20 million lawyer's negligence claim.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, citing a previous decision where the same plaintiff was ordered to post security and its sole shareholder failed to establish impecuniosity.

The court applied the two-step inquiry under Rule 56.01, finding that the defendants had good reason to believe the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate ample assets or impecuniosity, and its claim was not found to have a "good chance of success." The motion was granted, ordering the plaintiff to post security for costs totaling $149,000 in three installments, and staying the proceeding until the first installment was posted.

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against John Vella, a director of Dual-Temp Insulation Incorporated, seeking $196,836.89 in unpaid wages, vacation pay, and trust fund contributions.

The defendants were noted in default.

The court found Vella personally liable under section 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act and for breach of trust under sections 8 and 13 of the Construction Lien Act, based on the deemed admission of facts in the statement of claim.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for property damage insurance coverage.

The motion judge initially granted summary judgment based on a coverage exclusion, but the Court of Appeal reversed this finding and remitted the limitation period issue back to the motion judge.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion regarding the limitation period, finding that disputed conversations between the plaintiff and her insurance broker raised significant credibility issues that required a trial.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for both the motion and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $90,000 in costs for the motion on a partial indemnity basis, payable by the respondents.

However, the court declined to award costs for the appeal, as the appellant's counsel had explicitly stated during the hearing that he was not seeking appeal costs due to the novelty of the issue and access to justice concerns.

The appellant's home was damaged during exterior restoration work when the contractor failed to properly seal areas against water.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage based on a 'faulty workmanship' exclusion.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding the exclusion precluded claims for both direct and resulting damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 'faulty workmanship' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to exclude only direct damage, preserving coverage for resulting damage under the all-risks policy.

The Receiver brought a motion to distribute funds to the secured creditor, RBC, and to approve its fees.

The Union opposed, claiming a super-priority for unpaid pension and other benefits under the BIA over all companies in the receivership, and sought to claw back the Receiver's fees.

The court held that the CRA's deemed trust for unremitted source deductions under the Income Tax Act takes priority over the Union's BIA super-priority claims.

The court also rejected the Union's attempt to extend its claims to other corporate entities in the group, finding no evidence they were related employers or participated in the pension plan.

The Union's attempt to claw back the Receiver's fees was dismissed as an impermissible collateral attack.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for delay.

He had failed to deliver an affidavit of documents or prepare a discovery plan as required by a consent timetable order issued at a status hearing.

The appellant argued the motion judge should have applied Rule 24, which places the onus on the moving party to show inordinate and inexcusable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in requiring the appellant to explain his delay under rule 48.14 and noting the court's power to dismiss a proceeding for failure to comply with an interlocutory order under rule 60.12.

Following successful summary judgment motions by the defendants in an insurance coverage dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants sought substantial costs exceeding $140,000 combined.

Applying Rule 57 and the principle of proportionality, the court considered the novelty of the legal issue, the defendants’ delay in bringing the summary judgment motions, and the plaintiff’s good‑faith pursuit of a non‑frivolous claim.

The court also emphasized access to justice concerns given the modest value of the underlying claim.

Costs were significantly reduced and fixed at $30,000 payable to the insurer and $20,000 payable to the broker, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants moved for declarations regarding their pension rights under a supplemental pension plan.

The respondent argued the claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, asserting the limitation period began when option statements denying the benefits were issued.

The court held that the claims were not statute-barred, finding that the cause of action for pension benefits does not crystallize until the payments actually fall due and are wrongfully refused, rather than when an anticipatory breach occurs.

In a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act restructuring, the applicants sought court approval of a sale transaction to BlackRock Kelso Capital Corporation, authorization to assign certain store leases and designated contracts, and related relief.

A former employee also moved to be appointed as representative of terminated employees and to appoint representative counsel funded from transaction proceeds to assist with potential Wage Earner Protection Program Act claims.

The court approved the sale transaction and the assignment of leases and contracts under ss. 36 and 11.3 of the CCAA, finding the sale process reasonable and the transaction maximized value while preserving employment and ongoing operations.

The court declined to appoint representative counsel for terminated employees, holding the proceeding lacked the complexity seen in cases such as Nortel and Canwest, and that WEPPA claims could be addressed in the anticipated bankruptcy process by the trustee.

Funding representative counsel from the purchaser’s transaction funds was also found inappropriate.

The defendants brought a motion for directions seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to determine whether she was a person under a legal disability requiring representation by a litigation guardian.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act to compel a mental examination in the context of Rule 7 proceedings.

The court held that it does have jurisdiction to order such an examination and that doing so would not violate s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, given the procedural safeguards governing such orders.

However, because the plaintiff expressed willingness to undergo a voluntary assessment and provide an updated report addressing her litigation capacity, the court declined to order a compulsory examination at that stage.

The defendants’ motion was adjourned pending the plaintiff’s completion of the voluntary assessment and anticipated motion to continue the proceeding without a litigation guardian.

The appellant challenged a status hearing order dismissing his civil action for delay arising from real estate transactions and sought leave to appeal costs.

The Court of Appeal held that the status hearing judge correctly applied the rule 48.14(13) framework, under which the plaintiff bears the burden to provide an acceptable explanation for delay and show that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The court rejected the submission that the rule 24.01 dismissal test should govern status hearings, emphasizing that the two mechanisms are distinct.

It also upheld the finding that the moving party bore primary responsibility for the prolonged inactivity and that the deaths of two material witnesses created severe prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed and costs of $10,500 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed from the Court of Appeal's reversal of the CCAA court's decision regarding the priority of pension plan wind-up deficiency claims over court-ordered DIP financing charges.

The majority held that wind-up deficiencies under s. 75(1)(b) of the Pension Benefits Act were subject to a statutory deemed trust under s. 57(4), but that the deemed trust was superseded by the DIP charge by virtue of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The majority further held that while the employer-administrator breached its fiduciary duty by failing to ensure the pension plan beneficiaries had adequate notice and representation in the CCAA proceedings, a constructive trust was not an appropriate remedy because the breach did not result in an identifiable asset that it would be unjust for the wrongdoer to retain.

Following dismissal of an application seeking a declaration that retention bonuses constituted pensionable earnings under a pension plan, the court determined the issue of costs.

The unsuccessful applicant sought to have his costs paid from the pension trust fund.

Applying the pension trust approach discussed in appellate authorities, the court held that costs may be payable from a pension fund where proceedings ensure proper administration of the trust or benefit all beneficiaries.

Because the claim sought increased benefits for the applicant alone and was adverse to other beneficiaries, costs could not be ordered from the trust fund.

Despite the applicant’s loss, the court exercised discretion to order no costs given the ambiguity of the plan terms, the novelty of the issue, and the applicant’s good faith.

The applicant sought a declaration that retention bonuses payable under an amended employment agreement constituted pensionable earnings under a multi-employer pension plan for purposes of calculating pension benefits.

The court considered the plan definition of “pensionable earnings,” which included wages, salary, and other amounts forming a regular and integral part of a member’s remuneration.

The applicant argued the bonuses were regular compensation tied to continued employment, while the plan administrator argued they were ad hoc payments replacing a severance-trigger provision.

The court held that although the payments occurred on fixed dates, they were not a regular and integral component of remuneration within the meaning of the plan.

The application was dismissed and the bonuses were found not to be pensionable earnings.

Following dismissal of a civil action for delay at a status hearing, several defendants sought partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed the reasonableness of the amounts claimed under Rules 57.01 and 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the factors governing proportionality and reasonable expectations.

The court found that the plaintiff’s reliance on extraneous affidavit evidence unnecessarily complicated the hearing and increased costs, and that the proceeding itself arose from the plaintiff’s dilatory conduct.

While the hourly rates generally complied with the applicable practice direction, the total amount sought by one defendant was considered excessive for a half‑day motion-like hearing.

The court reduced certain claimed amounts and fixed costs payable to the successful defendants.

At a Rule 48.14 status hearing, the plaintiff was required to show cause why a civil action alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and professional negligence arising from real estate transactions should not be dismissed for delay.

The court reviewed the procedural history and found that the plaintiff had taken minimal steps to advance the action over several years, failed to provide any reasonable explanation for the delay, and had not diligently pursued service, pleadings, or discovery.

The court further held that the deaths of two key defendants created significant non-compensable prejudice because their evidence regarding the disputed transactions could no longer be obtained.

Applying the principles in Savundranayagam v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada and related authorities, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to satisfy both branches of the test required to avoid dismissal.

The action was therefore dismissed for delay.

Following a decision in CCAA proceedings, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The court approved an agreement to pay the Retirees' full indemnity legal fees from the Executive Plan fund.

The court declined to make a similar order for the United Steelworkers regarding the Salaried Plan.

The court made no order as to costs for the underlying motions, following conventional CCAA practice.

For the appeal, the Retirees and the USW were awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $40,000, payable jointly and severally by Sun Indalex and the U.S. Trustee.

Indalex Limited, while under CCAA protection, obtained a super-priority charge for DIP financing and subsequently sold its assets.

The sale proceeds were insufficient to cover both the DIP lenders and the deficiencies in Indalex's underfunded pension plans.

The Court of Appeal held that a deemed trust under s. 57(4) of the Pension Benefits Act applied to the pension deficiencies and took priority over the DIP lenders' super-priority charge, as no explicit finding of federal paramountcy had been made.

Furthermore, the Court found that Indalex breached its fiduciary duties as the pension plans' administrator by failing to protect the beneficiaries' interests during the CCAA proceedings, justifying a constructive trust over the reserve fund.