David L. Corbett

The applicant, a member of the Aamjiwnaang First Nation, sought judicial review of the Band Council's decisions to refuse her an allocation of tax-exempt unmarked cigarettes for her smoke shop.

The Council based its refusal on criminal convictions related to an unlicensed cannabis dispensary operating on the same property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Council reasonably interpreted its authority under the Tobacco Tax Act regulations to revoke quotas from retailers involved in the illegal sale of drugs.

Although the Council breached its minimal duty of procedural fairness by not giving the applicant an opportunity to respond to the information, the Court declined to quash the decisions because the outcome would not have been different.

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Animal Care Review Board regarding their sled dog business.

The Board had confirmed orders requiring the applicants to improve living conditions for their dogs, including lengthening tethers and remediating doghouses.

When the applicants failed to comply, animal welfare inspectors removed approximately 230 dogs.

The Board subsequently ordered that most of the dogs not be returned until the applicants complied with the orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding the Board's interpretation of the tethering requirements reasonable and concluding that the removal and retention of the dogs were justified due to the applicants' ongoing non-compliance with the minimum standards of care.

The appellant owner appealed a summary judgment finding it liable to pay a subcontractor directly for amounts owed by the contractor, pursuant to a termination agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the owner agreed to pay the subcontractor's outstanding balance.

However, the court set aside the motion judge's award of 24% interest, finding the issue was not properly addressed, and directed the parties to provide further written submissions on the proper calculation of interest.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Review and Appeal Board (HPARB) confirming the revocation of her hospital privileges by the respondent hospital.

The revocation was based on a long-standing pattern of unprofessional conduct, inability to collaborate with colleagues, and failure to improve, which jeopardized patient safety.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the HPARB's factual and credibility findings were firmly grounded in the evidence and that it correctly applied the test under the Public Hospitals Act and hospital by-laws.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her defamation and negligence action against the respondent for publishing regulatory disciplinary decisions about her.

The Deputy Judge dismissed the action at a settlement conference on the basis that it was bound to fail because the publication of quasi-judicial decisions is protected by absolute privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Deputy Judge's conclusion that the claims had no merit and that the action could be summarily dismissed.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory decision of the License Appeal Tribunal directing her to attend insurer-requested medical examinations regarding her catastrophic impairment claim.

The Divisional Court issued a Rule 2.1 notice considering dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory LAT orders.

The court resolved conflicting lines of authority, affirming that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory LAT orders, though judicial review is available in exceptional circumstances.

The court struck the Notice of Appeal but granted the appellant leave to convert the proceeding into an application for judicial review.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $292,000 in damages for oppression under the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found the appellant engaged in oppressive conduct by failing to keep proper financial records, using company funds for personal expenses, and misappropriating funds through an undisclosed arrangement with another company.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of oppression and the damages awarded for loss of profits and personal expenses.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the $182,000 award for loss of business value, finding it was an error in principle because the parties had agreed to wind up the business and distribute net assets, making book value or fair market value irrelevant.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding his entitlement to an Income Replacement Benefit (IRB) and a special award following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the LAT erred in calculating his IRB by deducting post-accident income, failing to quantify ongoing benefits, and denying a special award for unreasonable delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the LAT correctly applied the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to calculate the IRB, reasonably exercised its discretion in finding the ongoing quantum issue moot, and applied the correct legal test in denying the special award.

The applicant teachers' association sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision finding he lacked jurisdiction over a grievance regarding preparation, planning, and supervision provisions.

The arbitrator concluded these provisions were local terms, not central terms under the School Boards Collective Bargaining Act, 2014.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding his purposive and contextual interpretation of 'central terms' was consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative intent.

The appellant employer sought to amend its statement of defence to add a counterclaim against the respondent, alleging that the respondent's lawsuit against a former employee constituted intentional interference with economic relations and induced a breach of contract.

The Associate Justice dismissed the motion, finding the proposed claims untenable in law because commencing a civil action is not an unlawful act.

On appeal, the appellant raised a new argument based on the tort of abuse of civil process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that new arguments should generally not be raised on appeal and that, in any event, the proposed counterclaim did not meet the test for abuse of process.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order that imposed testing requirements and access restrictions based on his COVID-19 vaccination status, and raised issues regarding the vaccination of the children.

The Divisional Court set aside the restrictions related to the father's vaccination status, finding the motion judge erred in imposing them.

The court reserved its decision on the vaccination of the children and the ultimate parenting schedule, directing the parties to attempt to agree on a temporary schedule in the interim.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Crown's decision to enact amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act and revoke the Forestry Regulation, arguing these actions breached the Crown's duty to consult under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

The majority held that the duty to consult does not apply to the legislative process, relying on Mikisew Cree.

Regarding the revocation of the Forestry Regulation, the majority found no constitutional duty to consult as the revocation did not adversely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, and even if a duty existed, it was at the low end of the spectrum and the Crown's consultation was adequate.

The applicant, LifeLabs LP, brought a motion seeking additional disclosure from the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to complete the record for its application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged a joint decision by the Ontario and British Columbia privacy commissioners rejecting LifeLabs' claims of privilege over documents related to a cyber-attack.

LifeLabs sought internal policies, correspondence between the commissioners, and documents generated during the decision-making process, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the requested documents were protected by deliberative secrecy (adjudicative privilege) and that LifeLabs had not established a sufficient foundation of procedural unfairness to displace the privilege.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review regarding a public service member's refusal to provide a certificate for a court recording furnished for transcript preparation.

The court issued a Rule 2.1 notice and subsequently dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court held that providing a recording is an administrative task, not a statutory power of decision, and that the applicant should pursue his concerns in the Ontario Court of Justice or the appropriate appellate court, which control their own processes.

The self-represented applicant commenced a third proceeding in the Divisional Court seeking judicial review regarding the Ministry of the Attorney General's process for providing court recordings for transcription.

The court had previously dismissed two similar proceedings and provided directions on how to properly obtain authoritative transcripts.

The court found the current application to be an attempt to re-litigate previously decided issues and a waste of judicial resources.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1, and the applicant was prohibited from commencing further proceedings in the Divisional Court without prior permission.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the landlords possession of the rental unit for personal use, thereby obtaining an automatic stay of eviction.

The tenant repeatedly refused to follow the court's case management directions, including failing to obtain and file transcripts of the tribunal hearing, and engaged in vexatious communications with the court.

The court lifted the stay of eviction and ultimately dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the tenant's failure to comply with court orders.

The applicant private schools sought judicial review of Ontario's decision to allocate the federal 'Safe Return to Class Fund' exclusively to public schools.

Ontario raised preliminary issues of timeliness and justiciability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the expenditure of public funds is a discretionary public policy decision made pursuant to the Crown's common law spending powers.

The court found that the funding allocation was a core policy choice and therefore not justiciable absent jurisdictional error, a constitutional challenge, bad faith, or irrationality, none of which were established.

The appellant landlord sought to adduce fresh evidence at the outset of an appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The proposed evidence was an affidavit from building management stating there was no record of the landlord requesting the deactivation of the tenant's key fob.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test.

The court found the evidence could have been obtained prior to the Board hearing with reasonable diligence, and that it would not have been dispositive of the lockout issue given the other evidence of the landlord's threats.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding it discriminated against a resident with disabilities by implementing a strict COVID-19 visitation policy in its congregate care setting.

The Divisional Court held the HRTO's decision was unreasonable, finding the policy was based on public health guidance rather than presumed characteristics of persons with disabilities, and thus did not constitute prima facie discrimination.

Furthermore, the court found the HRTO unreasonably concluded the applicant failed in its duty to accommodate, as it ignored the fluid nature of pandemic guidance and the reasonable alternatives offered.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the HRTO decisions were set aside.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order of Doi J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $2,500 inclusive.