David L. Corbett

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding the termination of a union member for just cause.

The employer terminated the grievor after video surveillance showed him removing two rugs from the workplace without authorization.

The arbitrator rejected the grievor's explanation that he had bartered for the rugs with a co-worker, finding him complicit in the theft.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's factual findings and credibility assessments were reasonable and amply supported by the record.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) which upheld the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee's (ICRC) decision to take no disciplinary action against a nurse.

The applicant alleged that the nurse's improper application of an ice pack caused her elderly mother's death.

The court found that the clinical records attributed the death to vascular degeneration and that the HPARB's decision was reasonable.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence filed by the applicant, noting it was inadmissible on judicial review and immaterial to the clinical findings.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The tenants brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a case management judge's order requiring them to pay ongoing rent and a portion of substantial arrears to maintain a stay of eviction pending their appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The tenants argued the respondent was not the true landlord and objected to the case management process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the case management judge's discretionary order, and affirmed the court's practice of managing LTB appeals efficiently.

The self-represented applicant attempted to commence two fresh applications for judicial review regarding matters related to his ongoing criminal trial, including complaints about interpretation services and exhibit lists.

The Divisional Court had previously restricted the applicant's access to the court due to his repeated commencement of vexatious proceedings, requiring him to obtain prior permission before filing new matters.

Because the applicant failed to comply with this requirement, the court directed staff to refuse to issue the Notices of Application and cautioned the applicant about potential contempt proceedings.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding the constitutionality of Bill 66, which amended the Labour Relations Act to deem municipalities as non-construction employers.

The union argued this violated section 2(d) of the Charter by nullifying their collective agreements and subcontracting protections.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly applied binding precedent and that the amendments did not substantially interfere with the right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Review Body decision revoking his rent-geared-to-income (RGI) subsidy and a subsequent decision refusing to reconsider the revocation.

The applicant's subsidy was revoked after he failed to provide original tax documents and submitted falsified documents.

The Divisional Court held that the initial revocation was reasonable.

While the Review Body erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the decision simply because the applicant was no longer a tenant, the court found that declining reconsideration was nonetheless reasonable given the 18-month delay and the applicant's failure to provide valid documentation.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to add two snow removal contractors as defendants after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued misnomer and discoverability.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's findings that the statement of claim did not point the 'litigation finger' at the sidewalk contractor, as it only alleged injuries from a fall on the roadway.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to identify the contractors within the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Master's order granting the respondent leave to discontinue its defamation action.

The appellant argued that his outstanding anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act precluded the respondent from discontinuing the proceeding, relying on the statutory stay in s. 137.1(5).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory prohibition on taking 'further steps' does not prevent a plaintiff from moving to bring the entire proceeding to an end with prejudice.

The court found the Master had jurisdiction and properly exercised her discretion to grant leave to discontinue on terms that barred subsequent actions.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision awarding him compensation for an illegal lockout.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the short delay was unexplained, the proposed appeal raised only questions of fact rather than law, and the justice of the case favoured finality given the modest damages and the moving party's unreasonable claims.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Landlord and Tenant Board decision without first exhausting statutory appeal rights under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Board moved to quash the application on this basis.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, noting that the Court of Appeal's recent decision in Yatar shifted the jurisprudential ground regarding the necessity of exhausting appeal rights before seeking judicial review.

The court deferred the issue to be decided by the panel hearing the application.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion for contempt against the respondent mother for alleged breaches of a final family law order, including terms requiring joint decision-making for the children's medical care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, no material misapprehension of evidence, and no denial of procedural fairness by the motion judge.

The court emphasized that contempt is a remedy of last resort in family law and that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in managing the hearing and dismissing the ill-conceived motion.

The self-represented moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal two orders appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian in proceedings arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the 2017 order, finding no basis for an extension as the order had been relied upon for years.

However, the court granted the extension regarding the 2019 order, finding that the moving party had a timely intention to appeal, there was no prejudice to the respondents, and the justice of the case warranted allowing her the opportunity to seek leave, despite the weak merits of the proposed appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an OIPRD report that found her complaint against police unsubstantiated.

After the OIPRD lost jurisdiction because the implicated officer resigned, the applicant argued the court had inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying complaint.

The court issued a Rule 2.1 notice considering dismissal of the application as frivolous.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to decide the complaint but permitted the applicant to amend her application to seek only certiorari to quash the OIPRD report, given her concerns about issue estoppel.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with costs fixed at $3,000, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The court ordered the appeal to be heard on an expedited basis and scheduled a case management teleconference to set a schedule.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Land Planning Appeal Tribunal fixing compensation for expropriated land.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in refusing an adjournment, determining the highest and best use of the land, and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings that the appellant failed to establish a legal non-conforming commercial or industrial use.

The court also held the Tribunal's refusal of an adjournment and its procedural rulings to manage the appellant's disruptive behaviour were reasonable and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his eight complaints of discrimination and declared him a vexatious litigant.

The complaints primarily alleged discrimination based on ancestry and place of origin due to poor customer service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's dismissal of the complaints was reasonable as they were frivolous on their face.

The court also held that the Tribunal's process was procedurally fair and its declaration of the applicant as a vexatious litigant was justified given his history of bringing multiple meritless proceedings.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing an urgent motion for a sealing order over the court file.

The appellant had sued its former lawyer and filed allegedly privileged documents in the public court file, which were later obtained by the Attorney General of Canada for use in separate Superior Court proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant waived solicitor-client privilege by advertently disclosing the documents in the public proceeding, even if done in ignorance of the legal consequences.

The appellant failed to meet the stringent test for a sealing order.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal from an order of Myers J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding party was not required to provide materials, no costs were ordered.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision that found it lacked jurisdiction to order his return to a rental unit after he was evicted.

The landlord had obtained an eviction order claiming her disabled son needed the unit, but the tenant was not notified of the hearing.

The Board later granted a review but refused to reinstate the tenant based on the landlord's unsworn statement that her son was occupying the unit.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence showing the landlord had actually re-rented the unit to a third party at a higher rent.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law and breached procedural fairness by relying on unsworn, false statements.

The Court ordered the tenant immediately reinstated to the unit and remitted the issue of further remedies for the landlord's abuse of process back to the Board.

The applicant First Nation brought an application for judicial review alleging that the Crown's failure to decide applications for Permits to Take Water (PTTW) for existing hydroelectric dams breached the duty to consult and accommodate.

The Crown subsequently amended the Ontario Water Resources Act to exempt the dams from the PTTW requirement, as they were already regulated under the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the PTTW applications did not trigger the duty to consult because they sought only to continue historical operations without introducing novel adverse impacts.

Furthermore, the legislative amendments were not unconstitutional as they did not remove the sole trigger for consultation, which remained available under the overlapping regulatory regime.