David Barrie Williams

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion to extend the time permitted for cross-examinations of the defendants' affiants on pending anti-SLAPP motions.

The defendants had filed 14 affidavits across four separate motions.

The court found that limiting the plaintiffs to the statutory seven hours would prevent meaningful cross-examination and that it was in the interests of justice to extend the time to 15 hours.

This appeal concerned a solicitor's negligence claim where the appellant alleged his former lawyers settled an estates dispute without his instructions, specifically regarding his ability to sue another lawyer involved in the estate.

The trial judge found that the settlement document did not preclude such a claim and that the lawyers had acted within instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the settlement terms did not prevent subsequent litigation against the third-party lawyer and that the limitation period argument was not a bar to commencing an action.

The court emphasized that the objective intention of the parties, not a default "standard form release" determines the scope of settlement terms.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a national class proceeding against major online accommodation booking platforms for alleged systemic misleading advertising practices.

The appellants sought nominal damages, punitive damages, and disgorgement under consumer protection legislation, explicitly disclaiming compensatory damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that it was plain and obvious these remedies were unavailable under the Consumer Protection Act without proof of individual compensatory harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants Toufik Benhamiche and Kahina Bensaadi brought a motion challenging the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over a tort and contract claim arising from a fatal speedboat accident in Cuba.

They sought an order recognizing lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, summary judgment on jurisdiction or a stay based on forum non conveniens.

They also sought summary judgment for Kahina Bensaadi and a declaration limiting damages to Cuban law.

The court found that Ontario had a real and substantial connection to the litigation based on the domicile and business operations of other defendants (Sunwing), and the contract being made in Ontario.

The court dismissed the moving parties' arguments regarding forum non conveniens, finding Ontario to be the clearly more appropriate forum, partly due to the unavailability of certain remedies in Cuba.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed due to the moving parties' failure to file a statement of defence, and on the merits for Kahina Bensaadi.

The request to apply Cuban law was also deferred.

This appeal concerned the enforceability of a "kitchen table" domestic contract signed by former common-law spouses regarding the transfer of property.

The trial judge found the agreement unenforceable due to non-compliance with formal requirements under s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, specifically the lack of a witness, and alternatively, that it would be set aside under s. 56(4) due to the respondent's lack of understanding of its vague terms and absence of independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to her findings of fact.

The court affirmed that a video recording of signing was not a substitute for proper witnessing and that the test for relaxing s. 55(1) formalities is distinct from the test for setting aside a contract under s. 56(4).

The appeal was dismissed, and the property sale was ordered.

The plaintiff, Stephan Wiener, brought a claim for solicitor's negligence against his former lawyer, Paul Strickland, and his firm, Siskinds LLP.

The claim arose from a mediation where a settlement document was prepared.

The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Strickland bound him to the settlement without his instructions, specifically concerning his ability to sue a third-party lawyer (Douglas Gunn) and the expiry of a limitation period for such a claim.

The court found that the settlement document, which referred to "standard releases" did not prevent the plaintiff from suing Mr. Gunn.

The court also rejected the argument that the limitation period had expired, noting that the defendant was not retained to advise on a claim against Mr. Gunn and that a limitation period is a defence, not a bar to launching an action.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The appellant, Bluemoon Capital Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its application for a Norwich order and the quashing of a Rule 39.03 notice of examination.

The appellant, a shareholder of Ceridian HCM Holding Inc., sought pre-action discovery regarding the alleged undervaluation of LifeWorks Corporation Ltd. shares during Ceridian's 2018 distribution and subsequent sale to Morneau Shepell.

The application judge dismissed the Norwich order, finding it unnecessary and not in the interests of justice, and quashed the notice of examination as moot.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision that the appellant had sufficient information to commence its class action and that the Norwich order was not sought for a legitimate purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

On a certification motion in a proposed national class action concerning online travel and accommodation booking websites, the moving parties alleged misleading search result, discount, and urgency practices under the Competition Act, consumer protection statutes across Canada, and unjust enrichment.

The court held the pleaded statutory and restitutionary claims were legally deficient, including because the remedies pursued were unavailable, reliance and compensatory loss were not properly established where required, and several provincial and territorial claims were not properly pleaded.

The court also held there was no some basis in fact that two or more class members suffered compensable harm, as the alleged injury was disappointment from not choosing psychologically or economically preferable accommodation.

Aggregate damages and punitive damages were not certifiable common issues, and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support.

The respondent opposed, arguing the parties were not spouses under the Family Law Act as they did not cohabit in a conjugal relationship for three years.

The court found a prima facie case that the parties cohabited in a conjugal relationship for ten years, despite maintaining separate residences at times.

The court ordered the respondent to pay temporary spousal support of $1,400 per month based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The appellant tenants appealed decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing their motions to set aside eviction orders.

The landlord had obtained the eviction orders ex parte after the tenants signed agreements to terminate their tenancies (N11 forms) under pressure, having been told they had to vacate for renovations without being informed of their statutory rights.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding the Board Member erred in law by failing to apply the proper test under s. 77(8)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, failing to consider all the circumstances, and failing to assess the real substance of the transactions and the landlord's good faith under s. 202.

The eviction orders were set aside and new hearings were ordered.

Following a successful appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the appellant sought costs of $9,454.44, while the respondent proposed $6,000.

The Divisional Court fixed the costs of the appeal at $8,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the appellant's actual costs were over $42,000.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,000 in damages for defamation arising from an email sent to their condominium management following an altercation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding multiple errors of law.

The court held that the defamation claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was added to the pleadings more than three years after the email was sent.

Furthermore, the court found that the respondent failed to properly plead or prove the elements of defamation, and the trial judge erred by failing to consider available defences such as qualified privilege.

The plaintiff abattoir sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion arising from the 19-month suspension of its licence and detention of meat products following an investigation into the processing of uninspected and dead animals.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the provincial regulator did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiff, as its statutory mandate was to protect public health.

Even if a duty existed, the regulator did not breach the standard of care given the extraordinary circumstances of concurrent criminal investigations, nor did its actions cause the plaintiff's business losses.

A non-party lawyer appealed an order requiring him to attend for examination as a witness in a motion pending before the Superior Court of Justice.

The lawyer was counsel of record for the City of Windsor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the case management judge had properly applied the stringent test for ordering opposing counsel to be examined and had made no error warranting appellate intervention.

The Personal Insurance Company appealed a motion judge's decision striking out a third party claim against the plaintiffs' lawyers.

The plaintiffs had sued the insurer for negligence in failing to preserve a vehicle that might have helped prove their case in a personal injury action.

The insurer sought contribution and indemnity from the lawyers, alleging they breached their duty to preserve evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the third party claim, holding that the lawyers' alleged negligence fell within the scope of their retainer and was therefore attributable to the plaintiffs.

Where a third party's negligence is attributable to the plaintiff, no cause of action for contribution and indemnity exists against that third party.

The respondent and the deceased operated a jewellery store through a company and each named the other as sole beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

Following the deceased's death, the respondent sought a declaration that he was entitled to the insurance proceeds and judgment on a promissory note.

The estate claimed the proceeds were subject to a buy-sell agreement and constructive trust.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment declaring the respondent entitled to the proceeds and dismissed the estate's counterclaim, but directed the promissory note claim to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The statutory third party, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The moving party claimed that plaintiffs' counsel provided legal advice to the unrepresented defendant driver, objected to questions on his behalf, and met with him behind closed doors during a discovery break.

The court found that counsel's actions did not amount to a solicitor-client relationship with the unrepresented defendant and that no confidential information was exchanged.

The motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Catherine Patrick, was injured in a single-car accident in February 2014.

She initially sued Southwest Middlesex, but later sought to add The Corporation of the County of Middlesex ("Middlesex County") as a defendant.

Middlesex County moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide timely statutory notice under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001, and that her claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Patrick did not establish a "reasonable excuse" for the more than two-year delay in notifying Middlesex County, particularly for the initial 16-month period of inaction before retaining counsel.

As satisfying the "reasonable excuse" prong of s. 44(12) is mandatory, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action against Middlesex County.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim against his former lawyer and law firm on the basis that the claim was statute barred under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant discovered the material facts giving rise to his claim no later than February 3, 2014, and that the statement of claim issued on March 2, 2016 was therefore outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

This is the third appeal in a class action arising from the acquisition of London Life by Great-West Life.

The class alleged that participating policy account (PAR) transactions violated the Insurance Companies Act.

The trial judge found breaches and awarded class counsel fees of $16.4 million with a first charge over the $56.43 million returned to PAR accounts, awarded $4 million in partial indemnity costs to the class, and imposed a levy in favour of the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The appellants challenged the class counsel fees, costs award, and levy.

The majority upheld all trial judge decisions, while the dissent argued that no monetary award was made to the class and therefore no charge could attach to the PAR accounts.