Chris Sewrattan

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not meaningfully address defence evidence from the appellant's mother.

The court held that appellate review of reasons is functional and contextual, and that the impugned defence evidence was largely hearsay and of limited probative value.

Even if accepted, that evidence could not materially support the defence theory or give rise to a reasonable doubt in light of the trial judge's credibility findings rejecting the appellant's account and accepting the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The Crown's case at trial was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's presence at his residence shortly after a white truck was reported driving erratically.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by rejecting an alternate suspect theory, misapprehending evidence regarding the vehicle's keys and timing of police arrival, and receiving inadmissible hearsay.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, no material misapprehension of evidence, and that the trial judge did not rely on the inadmissible hearsay to convict.

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to three respondents on the basis of their s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge had found breaches of the Jordan ceilings, but the Court of Appeal found that she did not adequately account for the systemic disruptions to court operations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as discrete exceptional circumstances.

The Court provided guidance on how trial courts should account for pandemic-related delays, emphasizing a holistic approach and treating province-wide closures, jury blackouts, local restrictions, and backlog prioritization as discrete exceptional circumstances.

The appeals were allowed, and the stays of proceedings were set aside.

The accused, Alaelddein Alhajsalem, brought an application for a stay of proceedings due to a 17-day delay in his bail hearing, arguing a violation of sections 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded a breach of section 11(e) but argued against a stay.

The court found the delay was caused by systemic issues in the Newmarket Bail Court, not related to the pandemic, and that a judicial admonition or sentence reduction would be inadequate.

Balancing the seriousness of the charges against the persistent systemic problem and the flagrant Charter breach, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

J.T. appealed convictions for possessing and making child pornography available, arguing two errors by the trial judge: admitting expert evidence without qualification regarding file downloading, and committing a Sekhon error by relying on anecdotal evidence that child pornography does not automatically appear on computers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first point did not require expertise as it was mundane factual evidence, and the second was not a Sekhon error as the testimony explained technical operation, not guilt, and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant, a real estate agent, was convicted of fraud in relation to three real estate transactions.

She appealed her convictions on the sole ground that the trial judge impermissibly intervened during her cross-examination, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were primarily questions seeking clarification of confusing evidence and did not compromise the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, claiming the verdict was unreasonable, arguing he may have unwittingly sat on the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had physical possession and knowledge of the crack cocaine.

The court noted the appellant's failure to testify and the implausibility of the "unknowingly sitting" explanation, which was not raised by trial counsel.

The appellant, Justice Okojie, appealed his convictions for importing and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal concerned when the offence of importing is complete, particularly in controlled delivery scenarios, arguing it was complete before his involvement.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, asserting that his knowledge of the package containing a controlled substance was not the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, clarifying that importing is complete when the contraband is no longer under the control of customs authorities, and upholding the trial judge's finding of knowledge based on circumstantial evidence.

The applicant, Jamal Daye, sought re-release pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new firearms and breach charges.

He had previously been convicted of narcotics trafficking and sentenced to 5.5 years.

The Crown opposed his re-release on tertiary grounds, arguing that his detention was necessary to preserve public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, its strength did not outweigh the public interest concerns, particularly given the seriousness of the new alleged offences and the breach of bail conditions.

The application for re-release was denied.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and failing to stop for police, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his identification as the driver.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge mistakenly attributed evidence to an independent witness who had not actually identified the driver, but argued there was no substantial wrong.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the remaining identification evidence was not overwhelming and, given the frailties of eye-witness identification, the error was significant.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The accused applied to sever counts on an indictment charging him and a co-accused with a home invasion and firearms offences.

The accused sought separate trials so he could testify regarding the firearms charges without implicating himself in the home invasion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the counts were closely connected factually and legally, and that the desire to testify on some counts but not others did not outweigh the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings.

The Attorney General for Ontario and the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario (CLA) sought leave to intervene in an upcoming appeal concerning the scope of the actus reus of importing contraband.

The Attorney General sought to argue the impact of the definition on provincial prosecutions of importing firearms and child pornography.

The CLA sought to argue that extending the actus reus beyond the immediate entry point disproportionately impacts racialized communities, relying on social context evidence.

The court granted both applications for leave to intervene, finding the proposed arguments and materials relevant and non-controversial.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine hidden in food items.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the importation was complete before they handled the package, and that the circumstantial evidence did not prove they knew the package contained drugs.

They also argued the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the ultimate domestic recipient was the importer, the circumstantial evidence supported the jury's inference of knowledge, and the inherently suspicious circumstances justified the wilful blindness instruction.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on wilful blindness when there was no air of reality to it on the record.

The Crown conceded there was no air of reality to wilful blindness but argued the trial judge found actual knowledge, or alternatively, that the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repeated references to wilful blindness suggested he may have had a reasonable doubt about actual knowledge.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, as the error was not minor and the prosecution's case was not overwhelming, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault, alleging that improper Crown submissions during closing argument and inadequate corrective instructions deprived him of a fair trial.

He also argued the trial judge improperly limited the jury’s ability to rely on the absence of evidence when responding to a deliberation question about blood‑alcohol testing.

The Court of Appeal held the Crown’s submissions did not misstate the law or invite an improper credibility contest and that the jury was properly instructed using the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge’s response to the jury correctly distinguished between drawing reasonable doubt from evidentiary gaps and speculating about uncalled evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm against his father and sister.

The appeal was based on the trial judge's erroneous application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and an impermissible adverse inference drawn from the appellant's exercise of his right to silence when questioned by police about his injuries.

The Crown conceded the Browne v. Dunn errors but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the errors were not harmless or trivial and the evidence was not so overwhelming as to make a conviction inevitable.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the absence of evidence that anyone heard the alleged assault.

The appellant contended that given the complainant's evidence, it was implausible that no one would have heard anything if the assault had actually occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge understood and correctly applied the law regarding absence of evidence and reasonable doubt, and that the trial judge's thorough reasons demonstrated a clear path to conviction based on the facts found.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, arguing the trial judge improperly used the complainant's text messages as prior consistent statements for the truth of their contents.

The complainant had texted a friend calling the appellant a rapist and texted the appellant calling him a disgusting man, to which he apologized.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's reasons and found she properly used the texts as narrative, circumstantial evidence of the complainant's emotional state, and context for the appellant's apology, rather than for their truth.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's conclusion on a Garofoli application regarding a CDSA warrant for a warehouse search.

The appellant argued that the affiant failed to disclose relevant information, included inappropriate opinion, intentionally misled the authorizing judge, and that insufficient grounds existed that marijuana would be found in the warehouse.

The Court of Appeal found the ITO provided ample evidentiary basis for the conclusion that marijuana would be found at the warehouse and saw no basis to find the affiant was untruthful or provided inappropriate opinion.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence imposed did not reflect an error in principle or was otherwise unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and his sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to indicate she was not relying on improper expert opinion evidence regarding drug quantities; and second, that the trial judge erred in her section 24(2) Charter analysis by admitting evidence obtained following a section 10(a) breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge was not required to explicitly reference the improper evidence and that the trial judge properly analyzed the causative link between the breach and the evidence as real evidence rather than conscriptive statements.