Chris Sewrattan

The appellants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions on the grounds that jurors were exposed to extrinsic information (including internet searches and old newspaper articles) during the trial, and that the trial judge erred in her instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information affected the verdict given the trial judge's instructions and the nature of the information.

The court also upheld the trial judge's conspiracy instructions as compliant with the Carter and Mapara framework.

The accused was pulled over for using a cell phone while driving.

A search of the vehicle revealed cocaine, marijuana, and drug trafficking paraphernalia.

The accused claimed he was driving his mother's car in an emergency to help his injured wife and denied knowledge of the drugs.

The court rejected the accused's explanation as incredible, noting inconsistencies in his testimony and the fact that he was driving in the opposite direction of the alleged emergency.

The court inferred knowledge and control from the surrounding circumstances and found the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The applicant sought exclusion of evidence obtained after police entered his home following an emergency report that his young child had wandered onto a major roadway.

The court held the initial entry and protective sweep were authorized under the common law police duty framework applied in emergency child safety situations, but found later Charter breaches when the applicant was detained and questioned without being advised of his right to counsel and when the search continued after the focus shifted to criminal investigation.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court found the breaches were not sufficiently serious or impactful to justify exclusion.

The application to exclude the grow operation evidence was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of robbery-related charges on the basis that the anticipated 30-month period from charge to trial breached s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court found that 14.2 months of delay was institutional, 10.8 months was inherent, 4.25 months was attributable to the Crown, and 0.75 months was attributable to the defence.

The court rejected most claims of actual prejudice, inferred only modest prejudice from the overall delay, and gave weight to the seriousness of the armed robbery charge.

Balancing all factors, the court held the applicant had been brought to trial within a reasonable time and dismissed the stay application.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in the period following the initial trial date.

The court examined the approximately eighteen‑month period between the Charter exclusion ruling and the eventual sentencing and forfeiture proceedings.

Applying the factors from Supreme Court jurisprudence on delay, the court found the delay largely attributable to inherent case requirements, judicial deliberation time, scheduling conflicts, and the availability of counsel and court resources.

The applicant had not previously raised concerns about delay and demonstrated minimal prejudice from bail conditions or scheduling impacts.

The court concluded that the delay did not violate the applicant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court sentenced an offender for firearm and drug trafficking offences arising from the operation of a large marihuana processing and distribution enterprise.

The offender possessed a handgun with accessible ammunition in his bedroom at the location used for drug processing and packaging.

The court held the firearm functioned as a tool of the drug trade and imposed consecutive sentences for the drug trafficking and firearm offences, rejecting the joint submission for a fully concurrent global sentence.

The offender’s request for additional credit based on alleged stringent bail conditions was denied.

The court granted a DNA order and ordered forfeiture of large sums of cash and 70% of the offender’s residence as offence‑related property and proceeds of crime.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from a nightclub altercation where a single punch knocked out three of the complainant’s teeth.

The primary issue at trial was whether the accused acted in self‑defence after being pushed.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly assessed proportionality by focusing on the injuries rather than the force used, that new self‑defence provisions enacted by the Citizen’s Arrest and Self‑Defence Act should apply retroactively, and that the trial reasons were inadequate.

The court held the trial judge properly assessed proportionality by considering the nature of the force and surrounding circumstances, not merely the resulting injuries.

It further held the new statutory self‑defence provisions do not apply retroactively to completed trials on appeal and found the reasons for judgment adequate.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge reversed the onus, improperly resolved the case by choosing between competing versions of events, and erred in treating forensic evidence as neutral.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge’s reasons demonstrated a full appreciation of the burden of proof and proper application of the W.D. framework.

The court found the appellant’s evidence was reasonably rejected as incapable of raising a reasonable doubt and that the complainant’s evidence, together with supporting evidence, established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held the trial judge was entitled on the expert evidence to regard the forensic evidence as neutral.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a handgun, arguing that the trial judge erred in her correcting instruction to the jury.

During closing submissions, defence counsel improperly gave evidence by stating that if the appellant had touched the gun, his fingerprints would definitely be on it.

The trial judge corrected this by instructing the jury that there was no evidence on how often fingerprints are left on firearms, but went further to state that the jury could not reason that the absence of prints meant the appellant could not have handled the gun.

The Court of Appeal held that this final sentence improperly deprived the appellant of the ability to argue that the lack of fingerprint evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained following a roadside stop and arrest, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Police stopped a rented minivan under Highway Traffic Act authority during a proactive burglary investigation and detected the odour of fresh marihuana emanating from the vehicle, leading to arrest and discovery of large quantities of marihuana, cash, and a firearm through subsequent searches.

The court held the traffic stop was lawful and not an arbitrary detention, and that the odour of fresh marihuana together with surrounding circumstances provided reasonable grounds for arrest.

Searches of a box, the vehicle, the residence, and the accused were found lawful or supported by valid warrants, though a brief delay in providing right-to-counsel advice constituted a modest s.10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence and allowed the prosecution to proceed.

This is a ruling on committal for trial following a three-month preliminary inquiry into Project Marvel, a police investigation into drug and firearm trafficking by members of a criminal organization known as the Young Buck Killers (YBK).

Nine defendants faced sixty-four counts including trafficking and possession of cocaine and other drugs, trafficking and possession of firearms, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown alleged that most defendants committed these offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the YBK criminal organization.

The court applied the test for committal established in R. v. Arcuri, requiring that there be admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit most defendants to trial on the charges, though some counts were discharged where the evidence was insufficient or speculative.

The court's analysis focused on whether the predicate offences were sufficiently connected to the criminal organization and whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of robbery while armed with a firearm.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent because she was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he was carrying a handgun.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the use of a firearm as an essential element of the offence of robbery under section 343 of the Criminal Code, rather than a sentencing factor under section 344.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence for theft of a motor vehicle over $5,000.

The appellant had presented false identification, taken a test drive with a salesman, and forced the salesman out of the vehicle on a highway.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the premeditated nature of the offence, the terrifying impact on the victim, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of court orders.