Chris Rudnicki

Oladele Olafimihan pleaded guilty to sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The court delivered a sentence of 4 years in penitentiary, minus pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA sample, lifetime weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA registration.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as stalking, threats, and victim vulnerability, and mitigating factors including the offender's lack of criminal record, strong family support, self-help initiatives, and a significant guilty plea.

The court accepted the joint submission from the Crown and Defence, finding it proportionate and not bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, while also acknowledging the serious collateral consequences of deportation.

The appellant, Selvin De Flores Bermudez, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The Crown cross-appealed the three-year concurrent sentence imposed at first instance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission of bad character evidence (due to defence counsel's tactical decision) or the trial judge's approach to emotional response evidence.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence, concluding that the trial judge erred in declining to apply the sentencing principles from R. v. Friesen to historical offences.

The Court of Appeal substituted a four-year custodial sentence, emphasizing that the effects of the sentence on the offender and his prospects for rehabilitation, while considered, cannot take precedence over the harm caused to the child victim.

The appellant, convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, unauthorized possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, appealed his sentence and alleged breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach to presentence custody credit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

Regarding the Charter claims, the court found the detention and subsequent search lawful due to reasonable suspicion and safety concerns.

The court also determined that exigent circumstances justified the delay in providing the appellant with his right to counsel under s. 10(b), as the encounter was brief and officers observed a firearm.

Even if a breach occurred, the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The defendant, Samuel Osei-Tutu, was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine (2.8899 kg) and was before the court for sentencing.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed 4.5 years (net 4 years) due to mitigating factors.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the quantity and commercial nature of the drug, and mitigating factors including the defendant's lack of a criminal record, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on sentencing, as per R. v. Morris.

A sentence of 5.5 years (net 5 years after pre-trial credit) was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

This is an appeal from conviction where the appellant argued the Crown breached confidential informant privilege by disclosing information to a co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying an overly narrow standard for determining a privilege breach, emphasizing that any information that *might tend* to identify an informant is protected.

The Crown's failure to protect this near-absolute privilege, despite repeated warnings, constituted an abuse of process.

The convictions were set aside, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant, Kevin Bacchus, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, stemming from a physical altercation with the complainant.

The appeal raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, and error in the use of an audio recording.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court reiterated the high bar for unreasonable verdicts under the Beaudry/Sinclair error and found the alleged misapprehensions immaterial.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, S.C., appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of the complainant's prior consistent statement (a Facebook message).

The Crown had invited the jury to use this statement as corroboration and the appellant's lack of response as evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by not providing a limiting instruction, which was crucial given the Crown's impermissible use of the evidence and the central role of the complainant's credibility.

The court reiterated that prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible for truth or corroboration and require limiting instructions even if admissible under an exception or as after-the-fact conduct.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Robert Casarsa, appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's assessment of collusion risk between complainants and the alleged reversal of the onus of proof concerning corroborating evidence.

The sentence appeal sought to introduce fresh evidence of job loss and challenged the denial of a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no material errors in the trial judge's reasoning on conviction and concluding that the fresh evidence or conditional sentence arguments would not have altered the imposed sentence.

The appellant, David Griffith, appealed his convictions for possession for the purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained in breach of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)).

The trial judge found breaches but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the *Grant* analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the *Grant* analysis, specifically regarding the lawfulness of the pat-down search incident to investigative detention and the application of discoverability.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by imposing a "straitjacket" on the sentencing process by expressing a starting point for the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding that the trial judge carefully explained how a fit global sentence was reached, considering all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and properly deducted credit for time served.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding alleged improper cross-examination by Crown counsel concerning the appellant's attraction to the complainant, and claims of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination permissible given the specific circumstances of the case, which involved a non-physically forced relationship with an underage teenager.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility or the fairness of the trial.

Regarding the sentence, the court affirmed that the six-year and six-month imprisonment for sexual interference was not demonstrably unfit, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust, grooming, and the victim's age, consistent with sentencing principles for child sexual offences.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to three respondents on the basis of their s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge had found breaches of the Jordan ceilings, but the Court of Appeal found that she did not adequately account for the systemic disruptions to court operations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as discrete exceptional circumstances.

The Court provided guidance on how trial courts should account for pandemic-related delays, emphasizing a holistic approach and treating province-wide closures, jury blackouts, local restrictions, and backlog prioritization as discrete exceptional circumstances.

The appeals were allowed, and the stays of proceedings were set aside.

The appellant, Ersan Buakasa, appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences, arguing that the gun and ammunition found in his car should have been excluded as evidence due to violations of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The trial judge had found the warrantless search of the car justified as a stand-alone safety search, and while finding breaches of ss. 10(a) and (b), did not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the search was a lawful and justified safety search.

The court affirmed that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was an imminent threat to public safety, justifying the search, and that the evidence should not be excluded even if there were Charter breaches.

The accused, Kevin Barreau, was charged with five Criminal Code offences related to human trafficking and procuring.

The trial involved complex procedural issues, including an application to excuse a witness (P.C. Rice) due to PTSD and a Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, including racial slurs and denial of counsel.

The court found the accused guilty of human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The charge of facilitating another offence was acquitted.

The Charter application for a stay was dismissed, but a s. 10(b) breach (denial of counsel) was found, entitling the accused to sentencing credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, choking, and uttering a death threat, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found trial counsel's representation ineffective due to eliciting highly prejudicial bad character evidence, failing to seek disclosure of an arrest warrant and criminal record for the complainant, and providing inadequate advice on challenging jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict, rendering it unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Nicholas Wong, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He was convicted of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and other related offences.

The Crown sought the dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, including prior firearm possession offences.

Wong argued the sentencing judge erred by considering firearm possession as part of the pattern and by admitting expert evidence on gang affiliation and prior gun use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's determination that Wong met the dangerous offender criteria, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence.

Following a jury conviction for second-degree murder arising from an intimate-partner shooting, the court was required to impose life imprisonment and determine the period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the killing was a deliberate execution of an unarmed pregnant partner, committed at close range with extreme violence, and placed heavy weight on the offender's serious prior record for domestic attempted murder, absence of remorse, high risk of recidivism, and the jury's recommendation.

Social context evidence, including anti-Black racism, poverty, childhood abuse, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions, was reviewed but held not to materially mitigate moral culpability or reduce the parole ineligibility period on the facts.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with 22 years of parole ineligibility, together with ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, non-communication, and forfeiture orders.

Donovan Shah appealed his convictions for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the search warrant affiant regarding the inclusion of information about dismissed charges, and whether the trial judge improperly used Shah's pretrial silence to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to deny cross-examination and concluding that the trial judge did not rely on pretrial silence in assessing credibility.

The appellant, Vadim Ilia, appealed convictions for accessing and possessing child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in denying his Charter application to exclude evidence obtained via search warrants.

The trial judge had found a Charter violation due to a misdescription in one warrant but admitted the evidence, and relied on a prior 2015 investigation to establish reasonable grounds for the warrants, despite the Crown's concession against its use for that purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2015 investigation was properly available for consideration and, in any event, there was no "gap" in the reasonable grounds for the warrants, as the possibility of third-party internet access was not sufficiently weighty to undermine the probability of the IP address being used by someone at the linked address.