Chris Rudnicki

The appellant, G.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault and incest against his daughter.

The trial judge found the complainant credible but rejected two specific incidents of abuse as unreliable.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) analysis by compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the evidence as a whole, applied the burden of proof, and was entitled to accept some parts of the complainant's testimony while rejecting others, without misapprehending W.(D.) principles.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order granting certiorari, which overturned a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the appellant on charges of impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm, and instead committed the appellant for trial.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the reviewing judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors in discharging the appellant and upheld the decision to commit the appellant for trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms offences and breaches, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge failed to adequately address significant discrepancies between police officers' evidence.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to give credit for pre-sentence incarceration conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or in the sentencing judge's discretion regarding enhanced credit for COVID-19 conditions.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for domestic assault, arguing the trial judge made fundamental errors in assessing credibility.

Specifically, the appellant alleged the trial judge improperly used prior discreditable conduct evidence, used the complainant's lack of exaggeration to buttress her credibility, and relied on ungrounded common sense assumptions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were grounded in the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court emphasized that appellate courts should not dissect trial reasons in a search for technical errors.

The appellant, Robert Stack, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and breach offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the police operation constituted entrapment, an argument not raised at trial.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the entrapment argument, finding that the Crown would be procedurally prejudiced as they were deprived of the opportunity to lead evidence on the bona fide inquiry test at trial.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding wilful blindness and found no error in principle or unfitness in the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

Michael Mills appealed a six-month conditional sentence for fraud under $5,000, seeking a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by requiring an "exceptionality" threshold for a discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

Considering Mills' lack of prior record, guilty plea, remorse, restitution, minimal financial gain, and significant impact on employability due to the conviction, the Court determined an absolute discharge was appropriate and in the public interest, allowing the appeal and imposing the discharge.

The appellants, Elias Akhi and Jezreel Moxam, appealed their convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Court of Appeal found serious errors in the trial judge's jury instructions, specifically regarding party liability (aiding and common intention) and the failure to adequately delineate between the two accused and the multiple counts.

The instructions were deemed confusing and insufficient to properly equip the jury.

Consequently, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

The appellant was convicted by jury of possession of a loaded restricted firearm after a nightclub incident.

At trial, the trial judge made four rulings curtailing defence counsel's cross-examination of the sole Crown witness linking the appellant to the gun.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding three of the four rulings were proper exercises of trial management power and the one erroneous ruling was saved by the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that trial management powers cannot be used to exclude relevant and material evidence, and that the erroneous ruling — which prevented cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement going to the heart of the indictment — was not harmless and could not be saved by the proviso.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence concerning the health of her four-year-old son, who required ongoing care that her partner could not provide.

While the court found the original sentence to be fit, it reduced the carceral portion of the sentence to time served due to these unusual circumstances, while maintaining the three-year probation order and other conditions.

The applicant, G.J.R., sought bail pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new charges while on house arrest.

The application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court found that the applicant failed to satisfy the "not frivolous" test for the appeal's merits, specifically regarding the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The trial judge's rejection of the defence was upheld, as it was based on independent reasons, including a finding of no evidence of communicated consent and a lack of reasonable steps taken by the applicant, and the trial judge's ultimate assessment of credibility.

This appeal concerned the applicability of the third-party records regime under sections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code to a former police officer's anticipated testimony and a draft statement of claim in a criminal trial.

The appellants, J.R. (the former officer) and Toronto Police Service, sought to overturn a subpoena requiring J.R. to testify and to prevent the use of the draft statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the third-party records regime did not apply to oral statements made by J.R. and, in the specific circumstances, did not apply to the draft statement of claim.

Furthermore, even if the regime applied to the draft statement, its production was deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and an interim stay was set aside, making the lower court's unsealing and set aside orders effective.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual offences against two foster children, RY and TY, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding collusion among complainants, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and failed to adequately consider tainting of evidence by police questions.

The Court of Appeal found that while there were minor misapprehensions of evidence, they were peripheral and did not affect the material assessment of credibility or the similar act evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof, and rejected the argument of uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Michael Karas, appealed a global sentence of 21 years (net 15 years, 6 months, 10 days) imposed for multiple bank robberies involving an imitation firearm and forcible confinement.

He argued the sentence was disproportionate, a significant increase from prior sentences, and that the sentencing judge failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, including his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, affirming the weight given to the guilty plea and emphasizing public protection as the overriding sentencing goal given the appellant's extensive criminal history of armed bank robberies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand at a RIDE check.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons by failing to address the investigating officer's failure to record the interaction, and that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework when assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the trial record, and that there was no error in the application of the burden of proof or the assessment of the evidence.

The appellant, Peter Cowan, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his nine-month sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, specifically the "could reasonably be true" phrase in relation to the W.(D.) questions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the inappropriate language, the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

Regarding the sentence, the parties agreed the trial judge misapprehended the likelihood of deportation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence and varied it to a 12-month conditional sentence, considering the appellant's first-offender status, low-level trafficking, and mental disabilities.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence imposed following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and threatening death.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's weighing of the appellant's statements to psychiatric experts, arguing it effectively penalized him for not testifying and violated his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach, which considered the statements in light of the entire evidentiary record and afforded them less weight due to the lack of cross-examination.

The applicants, a police constable and the Toronto Police Service, brought an application for certiorari to quash a trial judge's ruling issuing a subpoena to the constable to testify on a Charter application in a criminal trial.

The applicants argued that a draft statement of claim and information provided to the defence by another officer were protected by settlement privilege and unlawfully disclosed, triggering the third-party records regime.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record in the trial judge's conclusions that settlement privilege did not apply, the disclosure was not unlawful, and the test for issuing a subpoena was met.

The appellant, a youth convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm stemming from a mass shooting, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) program and by failing to consider collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, concluding that the alleged IRCS error did not impact the sentence and that immigration consequences could not reduce a sentence to a point disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving and appealed on the basis that his section 9 Charter rights were violated due to arbitrary detention.

He was held in custody for six hours after completing his breath test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the police conducted an ongoing assessment and reasonably detained him due to his high level of intoxication and risk of repeating the offence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the law and dismissed the appeal.