Chris Rudnicki

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual assault, one count of invitation to sexual touching, and one count of indecent exposure to a person under 16.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in the collusion instruction by failing to direct the jury that the instruction did not apply to him, and by failing to caution the jury that rejection of his family members' evidence on the basis of collusion could not be used to infer that the appellant was less credible or guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no evidentiary basis to include the appellant in the collusion instruction, as he had not been cross-examined about participating in any family discussions of the allegations.

The failure to provide limiting instructions left the jury inadequately instructed on fundamental credibility issues.

The curative proviso was not applied because credibility was the central issue in the trial and the errors were not harmless or trivial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police discovered a loaded handgun during a warrantless search of a rental car under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when officers failed to advise him of his rights before conducting the CCA search, consistent with the court's intervening decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the vehicle search did not breach s. 8 but allowed the appeal on the s. 10(b) ground, setting aside convictions and ordering a new trial where the admissibility of the appellant's flight evidence and his racial profiling claim could be properly assessed.

Appeal from conviction for aggravated assault of a two-year-old child.

The appellant was convicted based on medical evidence establishing that the child's severe cranial fracture and extensive bruising could not have resulted from accidental falls or self-inflicted injuries.

The appellant provided multiple inconsistent accounts of events, culminating in trial testimony that the child fell from a bed and then engaged in self-injurious conduct.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's credibility based on inconsistencies with medical evidence, the implausibility of the narrative, and the failure to mention the critical fall from the bed in earlier statements.

The appeal challenged whether the trial judge erred by rejecting credibility based on the appellant's access to disclosure and presence at trial.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error and applying the curative proviso based on overwhelming evidence.

The appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault, three counts of assault, and one count of uttering threats against his common law spouse.

He was acquitted of one count of assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred by artificially compartmentalizing the complainant's testimony and by relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to bolster her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing credibility and the weight of evidence.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of her section 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The applicant was charged with attempt murder, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon (x2), and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose arising from an incident on April 16, 2023.

The information was sworn on April 17, 2023, and the trial was scheduled to commence on August 5, 2025.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated conclusion of trial was 27 months and 28 days, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish both that the defence took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appellant, Ahmed Othman, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was correct in concluding there was no air of reality to the defence, as the evidence presented diametrically opposed versions of events—consent or no consent—without a situation of ambiguity that could support the defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses a post-verdict application by Patrick Delisle seeking to set aside his conviction and declare a mistrial on grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The core issue was whether trial counsel failed to properly advise Delisle of his right to elect the mode of trial, a fundamental procedural right under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that trial counsel did not adequately inform Delisle of this right, particularly after significant additional charges were laid, which increased Delisle’s jeopardy.

The court held that this failure constituted a denial of Delisle’s right to make an informed election, undermining the fairness of the trial process.

The only appropriate remedy was to grant a mistrial and vacate the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The appellant, Gregory Whalen, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his stepdaughter, V.K., and appealed his conviction.

The central issue on appeal was the admissibility of surreptitious audio recordings made by V.K.’s mother during phone calls with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the recordings, finding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were appropriate.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings granted due to a breach of the respondents’ rights under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed with the trial judge that last-minute offering of earlier trial dates did not require defence counsel to be available, nor did it make any resulting delay attributable to the defence.

The court also found the case was not sufficiently complex to justify an exception to the Jordan framework, and the presence of a Garofoli application did not elevate the case’s complexity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario declined jurisdiction to hear Dwayne Gordon’s application for judicial release pending retrial on human trafficking charges, following the setting aside of his convictions.

The court found that the Superior Court of Justice was better suited to conduct the contested bail hearing, particularly given the Crown’s desire to cross-examine the proposed surety.

The decision clarifies the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the appellate and trial courts regarding bail release after an order for a new trial, and the circumstances in which the appellate court will exercise its jurisdiction.

The appellant, Z.V., appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant’s evidence regarding consent to oral sex, and (2) that the trial judge erred by using a finding of fabrication in the appellant’s evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt without independent evidence of fabrication.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the complainant’s evidence and held that the trial judge’s use of the fabrication finding was limited to credibility assessment and did not constitute an error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Dwayne Gordon’s appeal from his guilty plea to human trafficking-related offences, finding that the plea was uninformed.

Gordon believed, based on his counsel’s assurances, that the plea judge would impose no more than six additional months in custody, but was instead sentenced to two-and-a-half years.

The court held that this misunderstanding constituted a serious unknown legal consequence and that Gordon would not have pleaded guilty had he known the true risk.

The plea was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, convicted of firearms offences, applied for a review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown consenting to release, the bail judge had denied bail based on the seriousness of the offence and the perceived weakness of the sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to consider the merit of the conviction appeal and the numerous public safety factors supporting release.

The application was granted and bail was ordered on the terms proposed by the parties.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his conviction and sentence appeal for firearm offences, including pointing a firearm, assault with a weapon, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, stemming from a drive-by shooting.

Despite the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal denied the application.

The court found the appeal grounds, particularly regarding the sentence, to be weak and determined that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest, given the serious nature of the gun violence and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Oladele Olafimihan pleaded guilty to sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The court delivered a sentence of 4 years in penitentiary, minus pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA sample, lifetime weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA registration.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as stalking, threats, and victim vulnerability, and mitigating factors including the offender's lack of criminal record, strong family support, self-help initiatives, and a significant guilty plea.

The court accepted the joint submission from the Crown and Defence, finding it proportionate and not bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, while also acknowledging the serious collateral consequences of deportation.

The appellant, Selvin De Flores Bermudez, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The Crown cross-appealed the three-year concurrent sentence imposed at first instance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission of bad character evidence (due to defence counsel's tactical decision) or the trial judge's approach to emotional response evidence.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence, concluding that the trial judge erred in declining to apply the sentencing principles from R. v. Friesen to historical offences.

The Court of Appeal substituted a four-year custodial sentence, emphasizing that the effects of the sentence on the offender and his prospects for rehabilitation, while considered, cannot take precedence over the harm caused to the child victim.

The appellant, convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, unauthorized possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, appealed his sentence and alleged breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach to presentence custody credit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

Regarding the Charter claims, the court found the detention and subsequent search lawful due to reasonable suspicion and safety concerns.

The court also determined that exigent circumstances justified the delay in providing the appellant with his right to counsel under s. 10(b), as the encounter was brief and officers observed a firearm.

Even if a breach occurred, the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence.

Specifically, the appellant contended that if the trial judge had a reasonable doubt regarding one allegation (kicking the complainant in the ribs), she should have had a reasonable doubt concerning the remaining allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of guilt were based on a reasoned acceptance of the complainant's evidence, a rejection of the appellant's evidence, and consideration of corroborating evidence.

The court affirmed that an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial judge's assessment of credibility unless it is unsupported by any reasonable view of the evidence.

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The defendant, Samuel Osei-Tutu, was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine (2.8899 kg) and was before the court for sentencing.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed 4.5 years (net 4 years) due to mitigating factors.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the quantity and commercial nature of the drug, and mitigating factors including the defendant's lack of a criminal record, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on sentencing, as per R. v. Morris.

A sentence of 5.5 years (net 5 years after pre-trial credit) was imposed, along with ancillary orders.