Chris G. Paliare

The appellant appealed a judgment awarding over one million dollars in damages to the respondents for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge discharged the jury after finding that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross-examine the plaintiff on a significant piece of evidence regarding fluid leaking from his ear, which was later introduced through expert witnesses.

The trial judge found the breach irreparably tainted the jury and proceeded with a bench trial, ultimately accepting the plaintiff's evidence and rejecting the defendant's malingering theory.

The Court of Appeal upheld all aspects of the trial judge's decision, including the finding of a Browne v. Dunn breach, the discharge of the jury, the qualification of a treating physician as an expert witness, and the damages award.

This costs endorsement followed a decision on an appeal and cross-appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties on both the appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The parties entered into a contract in 1999 for the provision of market pricing data.

The appellant, a custodial bank, redistributed the data to its numerous affiliates without authorization.

The respondent discovered the breach in 2016 and sued.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the contract and awarded damages based on a rateable approach, but also awarded damages for sharing data with a specific affiliate.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding, concluding the contract only authorized the appellant itself to access the data.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to change his unentered judgment and rejected the appellant's limitations defence.

On damages, the Court struck the award relating to the specific affiliate as double compensation but otherwise upheld the damages assessment, including an adverse inference drawn against the appellant for spoliation of evidence.

The respondent, Paul Wynn, brought a motion to bifurcate two key issues in a complex family law proceeding: the enforceability of a marriage contract and the determination of Paul's beneficial interest in significant family properties and businesses, including bare trust claims.

The added respondents supported the bifurcation of the property issue.

The applicant, Leslie Wynn, opposed the motion, seeking a single trial for all issues.

The court granted the motion, ordering the severance of issues into three separate trials or segments.

The court found that bifurcation was convenient and in the interests of justice due to the case's complexity, the potential for significant cost and time savings by avoiding extensive valuations, and the increased prospects for early settlement, concluding that there would be no undue prejudice to the applicant.

This appeal concerned the appropriate remedy for a party who deliberately accessed the opposing party's privileged information.

The application judge had struck the appellant's Notice of Appearance, barred them from filing evidence, and ordered the Partition Application to proceed undefended.

The appellant argued that this remedy was unpleaded, unproven, and that lesser remedies were available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found no error in applying the three-part test for unauthorized access to privileged documents, particularly given the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice or propose effective alternative remedies.

The Applicant brought a motion for judgment, alleging that the Respondent's principal, Paul Halyk, accessed confidential and privileged communications between the Applicant's principal and its legal counsel.

The court found that Halyk accessed privileged material and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as he did not provide specific details about the extent of his review.

While declining to grant judgment on the Application due to insufficient evidentiary record for the underlying merits, the court ordered the Respondent's Notice of Appearance struck, allowing the Application to proceed as undefended.

During a trial of an issue on damages arising from an application, the applicant objected to numerous pieces of viva voce evidence introduced by the respondents.

The court had previously directed that the damages trial proceed on the closed record as it existed when the application was initially argued.

The court applied a bright-line test, ruling that any evidence not actually found in the underlying application record was inadmissible to prevent trial by ambush.

The court sustained the majority of the applicant's objections, rejecting the respondents' arguments that the new evidence was merely a permissible amplification of the existing record or a necessary response to the applicant's expert.

The appellants, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company, sought an order staying a lower court judgment pending appeal.

They argued that the application judge's amendments to his reasons for judgment created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge, Lauwers J.A., dismissed the motion, finding that the appellants failed to demonstrate a real likelihood or probability of bias.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) and the overarching interests of justice, concluding that a stay was not warranted.

Leave was granted to file a Supplementary Notice of Appeal.

The Respondents brought a motion seeking the recusal of the presiding judge and a declaration of mistrial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegations stemmed from the judge's conduct and rulings in three prior decisions related to the ongoing application, specifically claiming predisposition towards the Applicant, disparagement of the Respondents, and insinuation into the appeal process.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that, when viewed realistically and in full context, the judge's actions did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The decision emphasized that adverse rulings, even if potentially erroneous, do not equate to bias and should be addressed through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the Applicant.

The applicant sought to vary a previous judgment regarding contract beneficiaries and liability for knowing receipt.

The court declined to change the finding on beneficiaries (para 19) as it was an intentional commercial interpretation.

The court did remove an erroneous finding of breach of contract against CIBC Mellon, but declined to substitute it with a finding of knowing receipt, as that relief was not sought in the initial application.

The court granted the applicant's request to introduce evidence of damages related to data sharing by all custodial entities of Mellon Financial Corporation at the time of the agreement, despite the previous finding that those entities were entitled to receive the data.

The appellants moved to expedite their appeal of a liability decision and to be relieved from filing a formal order, arguing that an early appeal could render a subsequent damages trial unnecessary.

The respondent opposed, contending that the appeal should not be scheduled until the damages trial was adjudicated, allowing for a single, comprehensive appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the principle of judicial economy and the ordinary practice of pursuing a single appeal encompassing both liability and damages.

The court found that fragmenting the appeal would likely delay the overall administration of justice and that any potential costs thrown away could be addressed in a costs award.

This costs endorsement followed successful appeals by the Fram and Kerbel entities against Romandale Farms Limited.

Romandale had initially been awarded substantial indemnity costs for four intertwined actions tried together.

The Court of Appeal, applying the principle of overall success rather than issue-by-issue determination, found that Fram and Kerbel were entitled to partial indemnity costs for the original actions, having achieved overall success on appeal and having beaten a joint settlement offer.

The appellants, Fram and Kerbel, appealed a trial judgment that declared a 2005 land sale agreement between Kerbel and Romandale at an end.

The trial judge had found that Kerbel repudiated the agreement by entering into a settlement agreement with Fram that delayed the closing of the land sale until after secondary plan approval.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that Romandale was estopped by convention from asserting that the settlement agreement breached the 2005 agreement, as all parties had shared the assumption that the sale could only close after secondary plan approval.

The Court also held that the 2005 agreement was not frustrated or void for mistake, Kerbel's claim was not limitation-barred, and Kerbel was entitled to specific performance because the lands were unique.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal concerning the assessment of a law firm's fees under an unenforceable contingency fee agreement (CFA).

The law firm, Singer Kwinter (SK), appealed the application judge's reduction of their fees and a finding of double-billed disbursements.

Their former client, David Lima, cross-appealed the quantum meruit assessment and sought a greater reduction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that an unenforceable CFA leads to a quantum meruit assessment, not forfeiture of fees, and reversed the double-billing finding due to procedural unfairness.

On costs, the court balanced SK's responsibility for the assessment due to non-compliance with the Solicitors Act against Lima's responsibility for the hearing's length due to rejecting reasonable settlement offers.

This decision addresses competing carriage motions in proposed class actions concerning business interruption insurance claims related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered an "omnibus" action against 16 insurers and several focused actions against Aviva.

The court ruled that the Aviva-specific actions should proceed expeditiously, carved out from the omnibus action, with the Nordik Consortium and Lerners LLP appointed as carriage counsel for the Aviva claims.

The Workman Consortium was appointed carriage counsel for the omnibus action, excluding the Aviva defendants.

The decision prioritized the best interests of the class, fairness to defendants, and the objectives of the Class Proceedings Act, particularly access to justice and expeditious determination.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a U.S. resident with no assets in Ontario, in a complex family dispute over trust funds.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity and that his action was not devoid of merit.

The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated impecuniosity with sufficient financial disclosure and that, while the merits were not decisive, they favored granting security due to prior releases.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs totaling $130,000 on a partial indemnity scale, balancing the plaintiff's access to justice with the defendants' protection against an unenforceable costs award.

The applicants, former officers of the respondent corporation, brought applications for advance funding of their legal fees to defend an action alleging complex commercial fraud.

The applications were brought pursuant to the corporation's Unanimous Shareholders Agreement and section 124 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court applied the strong prima facie case test to determine if advance funding should be denied due to bad faith.

The court dismissed the application of the former CEO, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud had been established against him in a related Mareva injunction motion.

The court granted the application of the former COO, as the evidence did not establish a strong prima facie case of fraud against him.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction (asset freezing order) against several defendants, alleging a complex commercial fraud involving misappropriated funds, illicit acquisition fees, and kickbacks across multiple real estate development projects.

While the court found a strong prima facie case of fraud against the defendant Lee regarding his receipt of concealed acquisition fees, it found no such case against the other responding defendants.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the motion against all defendants because the plaintiffs failed to establish a real risk of asset dissipation, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the extraordinary remedy.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment order finding them liable for breach of contractual warranty and/or negligent representation arising from an inaccurate tree inventory attached to an Asset Purchase Agreement for the sale of tree farm assets.

The respondents claimed a shortfall of 83,106 saleable trees from the represented inventory of 236,341 trees.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the liability finding, holding that the tree inventory was not a contractual representation or warranty but rather a description of purchased assets.

The court found that the respondents had expressly agreed through due diligence inspection provisions that they had satisfied themselves as to the quantity and quality of plant material, precluding subsequent claims of misrepresentation.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a family law matter.

The appellant (father) sought to stay family law claims pending resolution of a constitutional challenge under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The motion judge struck the amended answer as lacking proper pleading of the constitutional claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting leave to amend the answer but refusing to stay the interim support order or the family law claims.

The respondent (mother) was found to be more successful on the appeal.

The court awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of the costs of a stay motion and all disbursements and HST.