CITATION: Candido v Bramview Holdings Inc., 2026 ONSC 2622

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-247-0000

DATE: 2026 05 04

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Reno Candido, Mariann Candido Lampasona, Robert Candido, Julia Candido, Ray Candido, and Mirella Candido, Plaintiffs

AND:

Bramview Holdings Inc., Planet Ford Inc., and The Corporation of the City of Brampton, Defendants

BEFORE: Agarwal J

COUNSEL: Chris Paliare and Catherine Dunne, for the plaintiffs (moving parties)

William McDowell and Evan Linn, for the defendant (responding party) The Corporation of the City of Brampton

No one appearing for the defendants Bramview Holdings Inc. and Planet Ford Inc.

HEARD: May 1, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] Settlements are a critical tool in our civil justice system—they help reduce litigation delay, expense, and stress, and allow a defendant to achieve finality. In complex, multi-party cases, Pierringer agreements encourage settlements by mitigating defendants’ differing risk tolerances. Until fault is apportioned between the co-defendants, the financial terms of a Pierringer agreement are protected by settlement privilege.

[2] The defendants Bramview Holdings Inc. and Planet Ford Inc. (together, Planet Ford) settled the plaintiffs’ claim under a Pierringer agreement. The defendant The Corporation of the City of Brampton (Brampton) discovered the financial terms shortly afterward but didn’t tell the plaintiffs until just recently. The plaintiffs now move for an order removing Brampton’s counsel, David Boghosian, as lawyer of record.

[3] For the reasons discussed below, the plaintiffs’ motion is dismissed. Even though Mr. Boghosian’s conduct was blameworthy, removal would be an extreme response when there’s no prejudice to the conduct of the trial.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

[4] The plaintiff Reno Candido slipped and fell on a Brampton city sidewalk in December 2016. He sued for negligence in January 2018.

[5] In November 2025, the plaintiffs settled the action as against Planet Ford. A redacted copy of the Pierringer agreement was served on Mr. Boghosian. He discovered the settlement amount and told his instructing clients. At a pre-trial conference on April 9, 2026, Mr. Boghosian disclosed that he knew the financial terms of the settlement. The plaintiffs requested an urgent motion for removal of Mr. Boghosian.

[6] This action is on the trial list for the May 2026 sittings. The parties intend to call over 30 witnesses, including 11 experts. Their time estimate for trial is at least five weeks. The parties agree that if the motion is granted, the trial will have to be adjourned.

III. LAW

[7] Pierringer agreements allow a defendant in a multi-party proceeding to settle with the plaintiff and withdraw from the litigation, leaving the remaining defendant responsible only for the loss they actually caused. There’s no joint liability with the settling defendant—the non-settling defendant can only be held liable for their share of the damages and are severally, and not jointly, liable with the settling defendant. See Sable Offshore Energy Inc. v Ameron International Corp., 2013 SCC 37, at paras 6, 26.

[8] To achieve these outcomes, the essential terms of a Pierringer agreement are:

• the plaintiff limits its claim against any non-settling defendant to their several liability

• the settling defendant no longer seeks contribution and indemnity from any non-settling defendant

• the plaintiff indemnifies the settling defendant against any claim over by a non-settling defendant

See Cadieux v Cadieux, 2025 ONCA 405, at para 13, leave to appeal requested, 2025 CarswellOnt 20859 (SCC).

[9] As a result of a Pierringer agreement’s terms, the plaintiff may need leave to amend its pleading and to dismiss any crossclaims. Although the plaintiff doesn’t always need the court’s express approval of the agreement itself, such a motion effectively serves that purpose. See Cadieux, at para 15. It’s usually through this process that the Pierringer agreement is disclosed to the non-settling defendant. While the financial terms are protected by settlement privilege, the non-settling defendant receives disclosure of the non-financial terms. See Sable, at paras 18, 25.

[10] After the trial is concluded, the financial terms of the Pierringer agreement are disclosed to the court and the non-settling defendant to ensure that the plaintiff isn’t getting double recovery. See Sable, at para 25; Packard v Fitzgibbon, 2017 ONSC 566, at para 7.

IV. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

[11] The plaintiffs argue that removal of Mr. Boghosian is the only remedy that cures the problem here, even if it means the trial will be adjourned. Brampton responds that removal isn’t the appropriate solution because the disclosure doesn’t prejudice the trial process at this late stage.

[12] Mr. Boghosian’s actions were intentional. His conduct is unacceptable. Even so, his knowledge about the financial terms of the Pierringer agreement isn’t prejudicial to the conduct of the trial. The measures proposed by Brampton, which I discuss below, are an adequate firewall to avoid any further mischief.

A. Law

[13] The test to decide the appropriate remedy where privileged information is received by an opposing party or its lawyer is:

(a) the moving party must establish that the opposing party obtained access to relevant privileged material;

(b) there is a presumption of prejudice arising from the receipt of privileged information, and the opposing party may rebut that presumption by providing clear and convincing evidence that a reasonably informed person would be satisfied that the confidential information will not be used; and

(c) the court must fashion the appropriate remedy.

See 2177546 Ontario Inc. v 2177545 Ontario Inc., 2023 ONCA 693, at paras 11-16, citing Continental Currency Exchange Canada Inc. v Sprott, 2023 ONCA 61, leave to appeal ref’d, 2023 79348 (SCC), and Celanese Canada Inc. v Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36.

[14] The court considers several factors when determining the appropriate remedy:

• how the documents came into the possession of the opposing party or their lawyer

• what the opposing party and their lawyer did upon recognition that the documents were potentially privileged

• the extent of review of the privileged material

• the contents of the privileged communications and the degree to which they are prejudicial

• the stage of the litigation

• the potential effectiveness of a firewall or other precautionary steps to avoid mischief

See Celanese, at para 59; 2177, at para 18.

[15] This test comes from cases where the opposing party has access to the moving party’s solicitor-client privileged documents. The test has also been applied to the disclosure of documents protected by litigation privilege. See White v 123627 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2682, leave to appeal ref’d, 2014 ONSC 6234.

[16] The plaintiffs submit that this test equally applies to the disclosure of information protected by settlement privilege. Brampton doesn’t dispute this point but argues that the test should be modified because there are exceptions to settlement privilege. I agree with the parties that the Celanese test applies to information protected by settlement privilege. As I discuss below, the test itself doesn’t need modification, though certain factors are duplicative in this context.

B. Discussion

[17] There’s no dispute that Mr. Boghosian and his instructing clients have the settlement amount.

[18] And Brampton doesn’t attempt to rebut the presumption that the receipt of this information by it or Mr. Boghosian was prejudicial. In Celanese, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the opposing party is best positioned to tell the court what privileged information it received and reviewed. In documentary disclosure cases, it may be possible to show that no privileged documents were reviewed, or that any review was unlikely to cause prejudice, which may end the inquiry. Here, however, it’s undisputed that Mr. Boghosian saw the settlement amount and then disclosed it to his instructing clients. As noted in Sable, at para 28, knowledge of a settlement amount can disincentivize a non‑settling defendant from pursuing settlement, which is prejudicial to the plaintiff. There is thus clear prejudice to the conduct of this action as a whole.

[19] As a result, this case turns on the appropriate remedy.

1. How the documents came into the lawyer’s possession

[20] Mr. Boghosian received the redacted Pierringer agreement as part of the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their statement of claim. The settlement amount was blacked out:

[21] Unfortunately, the redaction wasn’t “burned in”. Someone in Mr. Boghosian’s office unredacted the document and told Mr. Boghosian the settlement amount. Mr. Boghosian then emailed that information to his instructing clients.

[22] Mr. Boghosian’s evidence doesn’t make it clear whether he actively sought the privileged information from his colleague or whether it was provided to him without solicitation. Regardless, Mr. Boghosian’s actions weren’t a mistake or inadvertent. Even if Mr. Boghosian’s colleague blurted the information out, Mr. Boghosian shouldn’t have shared the settlement amount with his instructing clients. At the very least, he intentionally disclosed privileged information. At worst, he participated in his colleague’s breach of the plaintiffs’ settlement privilege.

2. Steps taken after recognizing potential privilege

[23] Mr. Boghosian didn’t tell the plaintiffs or Planet Ford that he knew the settlement amount or that he shared it with his instructing clients.

[24] Lawyers sometimes receive documents that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties. If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, the Rules of Professional Conduct, r 7.2-10, require the lawyer to notify the sender promptly to permit that person to take protective measures.

[25] Mr. Boghosian asserts that he didn’t “appreciate” that the settlement amount was privileged. His evidence is unchallenged, but that’s incredible. He’s been practicing law in this area for almost 40 years. Even if Mr. Boghosian had some doubt as to whether the settlement amount was confidential, he could’ve asked the plaintiffs if the agreement was redacted by mistake.

[26] Thus, Mr. Boghosian was obligated to tell the plaintiffs immediately that he accessed the settlement amount in the Pierringer agreement and permanently delete the document. See White, at para 16. He failed to do so.

3. Extent of review of the privileged material

[27] Unlike in documentary disclosure cases, there’s only one piece of privileged information here: the settlement amount. But the fact that the breach was instantaneous doesn’t change Mr. Boghosian’s obligation. He was in full possession of information protected by settlement privilege and should’ve told the plaintiffs immediately.

4. Content of the communications and degree of prejudice

[28] The plaintiffs settled with Planet Ford in November 2025. Subsequently, there were three pre-trial conferences. One of the express matters addressed at a pre-trial conference is the “possibility of settlement”. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 50.06.

[29] The case, obviously, didn’t settle. I don’t know whether Brampton and the plaintiffs engaged in settlement discussions after November 2025. Again, as discussed above, knowledge of the settlement amount can discourage a non-settling defendant from settling. Mr. Boghosian hasn’t adduced any evidence about whether Brampton’s settlement posture changed after he learned about the settlement amount. As a result, I can’t determine the degree to which this disclosure prejudiced the parties’ settlement discussions. Without this evidence, I infer that Brampton’s position on settlement changed now that it knew the plaintiffs would get some compensation at the end of the case.

5. Stage of the litigation

[30] Mr. Candido was injured almost ten years ago. He set the action down for trial in 2022. The trial is less than a week away. It’s a long and complex trial. As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Celanese, “an order removing counsel can be ‘extreme’ and may have a ‘devastating’ effect on the party whose counsel is removed” (at para 64).

[31] If the trial is adjourned, it may not be called until late 2027 or even 2028. The plaintiffs are prepared to bear the burden of an adjournment. But Brampton has also been waiting for its day in court. Further, it has a right to be represented by its counsel of choice. See Celanese, at para 56. It will be costly and time-consuming for a new lawyer to get up to speed on the facts and issues.

6. Effectiveness of a firewall

[32] Brampton advises the court that Mr. Boghosian and his instructing clients will give undertakings not to mention or rely on the settlement amount until the apportionment phase, and not to disclose the settlement amount to anybody else.

[33] The plaintiffs’ position is that these measures are inadequate. They submit that the disclosure of the settlement amount has destroyed “the level playing field”—even if Mr. Boghosian doesn’t disclose the settlement amount, he has an advantage when cross-examining the plaintiffs’ witnesses. See Celanese, at para 34.

[34] As I have found, there’s clear prejudice to the conduct of the litigation as a whole because of this disclosure. But that prejudice arises during any settlement discussions. There’s no evidence that the parties intend to re-engage in settlement talks. There’s no mediation scheduled. There will be another pre-trial conference, but it’s focused on the estimated duration of the trial.

[35] In contrast, I don’t see any prejudice to the trial proper. The settlement amount is irrelevant to whether Brampton is liable for negligence and, if so, any damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs haven’t articulated an express disadvantage they will suffer only because Mr. Boghosian knows the settlement amount.

C. Disposition

[36] Mr. Boghosian is hardly blameless. He failed to do the right thing after he discovered the settlement amount. He compounded the issue by sending the information to his instructing clients.

[37] But, in all the circumstances, I agree with Brampton that removing him as lawyer of record and adjourning the trial is an extreme response here. His and his clients’ knowledge of the settlement amount isn’t going to give Brampton an undue advantage at trial. The remedy for disclosure of privileged information is intended to be curative not punitive. See Celanese, at para 34.

[38] That said, this outcome should not undermine the seriousness of Mr. Boghosian’s breach. As Farley J said in Nova Growth Corp. v Kepinski, [2001] OTC 1037 (Sup Ct), at para 15, the passing grade on matters of ethics is 100 percent. Mr. Boghosian failed this test and, in doing so, he has undermined the integrity of the justice system.

V. CONCLUSION

[39] The plaintiffs’ motion is dismissed. Mr. Boghosian and his instructing clients will undertake not to disclose the settlement amount to any third party or otherwise rely on that information during the trial.

[40] If the parties can’t agree on costs, they shall deliver and upload brief submissions (1000 words), together with bills of costs, by May 14, 2026, 4pm.

Agarwal J

Date: May 4, 2026