Charles C. Chang

The applicant daughter and the respondent father were engaged in a property dispute over a condominium in Milton.

The matter proceeded through triage court, cross-examinations, and a judicial pretrial conference within approximately twelve months of the notice of application being issued.

The parties reached a full and final settlement on the eve of the hearing, and the court issued a consent judgment in accordance with the draft provided.

The court commended the parties and counsel for their professionalism, expeditious conduct, and respect for judicial resources.

The applicant, a land surveying company, sought indemnification from the respondent insurance company under a professional liability insurance policy for a settlement payment of $3,200,000.00 relating to the Halton Claim.

The respondent had already paid $5,000,000.00 under the policy for an unrelated Port Lands Claim.

The court determined that the Halton Claim fell within the policy's coverage, that it was covered under the first policy period based on when the applicant first received notice of the claim, and that the applicant did not breach its duty to cooperate with the insurer.

The court ordered full indemnification of the settlement amount plus costs.

The court denied the moving parties' request for leave to bring urgent motions to vacate claims for lien and certificates of action under section 44 of the Construction Act, finding no true urgency.

The endorsement criticizes the excessive length and lack of organization in the motion materials and highlights the improper use of the court’s urgent motion process.

However, the court allowed the moving parties a limited opportunity to proceed in writing, subject to strict conditions, to avoid jeopardizing an upcoming refinancing.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for substituted service and an extension of time to serve the statement of claim.

The court criticized the draft order for errors including an incorrect file number, improper preamble, and vague operative paragraphs.

The court also found the requested six-month extension unreasonable and the request to avoid serving motion materials unsupported.

The plaintiff was directed to file a proper draft order and, if pursuing the rule 37.07(4) order, to provide supporting materials.

The Bank of Montreal brought an action to collect moneys due under a line of credit agreement.

The only issue was whether the defendant, Joseph Ieradi, entered into the agreement personally or on behalf of his corporations.

The court found that the agreement was personal, not corporate, and that the defendant was personally liable for the debt, despite the absence of the original written agreement.

The court relied on secondary evidence and the parties' conduct to reach its conclusion.

The respondent, John Kenyon, brought an urgent motion to reinstate his parenting time with his child, RK, after it was suspended due to non-compliance with Soberlink alcohol testing protocols and outstanding costs orders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Kenyon’s breaches of multiple court orders, failure to pay costs, and lack of full and frank disclosure when seeking leave to bring the motion were significant.

The court emphasized the importance of compliance with court orders and the duty of candour in ex parte motions.

Costs were awarded to the applicant, Rachel Ross.

The court sentenced DD to eleven years’ imprisonment for two counts of sexual interference and one count of forcible confinement, conditionally staying two counts of sexual assault.

The offences involved the repeated sexual abuse of DD’s stepdaughter, L, over more than three years, beginning when she was twelve.

The decision reviews the legal principles of sentencing, the factual foundation, aggravating and mitigating factors, and comparable case law.

The court found the gravity, duration, and breach of trust to be highly aggravating, and determined that a sentence greater than that proposed by either party was necessary to reflect denunciation, deterrence, and the harm caused.

The court considered an application by Foodies Curry & Shawarma Inc. for specific performance and injunctive relief regarding an aborted agreement for the sale of restaurant assets to Royal Paan Leasing Ltd. The court dismissed the claims for specific performance and injunctive relief, finding that Foodies breached the agreement by failing to deliver unencumbered chattels or provide the required undertakings.

However, the court granted relief for unjust enrichment, ordering payment of the agreed purchase price through an escrow arrangement to ensure discharge of the remaining encumbrance.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order, arguing his costs submissions were improperly rejected by the court office and thus not considered by the trial judge.

The respondent opposed, citing procedural non-compliance and failure to meet the high threshold for leave to appeal costs orders.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate strong grounds for appeal, particularly as he did not make reasonable efforts to ensure his submissions reached the trial judge.

The court also declined to award costs for the present motion due to the respondent's unreasonable and inflammatory litigation conduct.

This ruling addresses a dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants regarding the wording of causation questions to be put to the jury in a medical negligence trial.

The plaintiffs sought "caused or contributed to" language and no particulars, arguing complexity and potential undermining of the verdict.

The defendants advocated for "but for" language and required particulars, citing clarity and the need for evidentiary foundation.

The court found that "but for" language should be used for causation questions, given the discrete nature of the alleged negligence of each defendant doctor.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the jury must provide particulars of their causation findings to ensure understanding of instructions and proper evidentiary basis, consistent with practices for standard of care particulars.

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant, LS, to give evidence at trial by videoconference from Bracebridge, Ontario, citing her location and personal circumstances.

The defence opposed, arguing it would compromise the accused's right to a fair trial by impairing cross-examination and that the proposed location was unsuitable.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that LS's age, physical and mental disabilities, and the significant distance to the courthouse weighed in favour of the order.

The court dismissed the defence's concerns, noting that arrangements for physical evidence and police presence would mitigate risks to a fair trial and the integrity of testimony.

The respondent, Kevin Ross Blainey, brought a motion to change seeking to terminate his spousal support obligation.

The applicant, Dawn Marie Blainey a.k.a.

Dawn Marie Demeter, sought to push back the spousal support review and claim retroactive child support.

The court found no material change in circumstances to vary the spousal support review or grant retroactive child support.

The court granted the termination of spousal support effective July 7, 2022, finding the applicant had failed to prove continued entitlement and had received sufficient support for fifteen years, noting her financial mismanagement and the lack of credible evidence regarding her PTSD impacting her ability to work.

The applicant sought to continue an ex parte order granting her a restraining order, sole decision-making, primary residence for children, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent moved to set aside the ex parte order, alleging the applicant made material omissions in her initial motion materials.

The court found that the applicant failed to fully and frankly disclose material facts, including details about the respondent's mental health treatment, her own mental health, police involvement, financial access, and the circumstances of the respondent's job termination.

Crucially, the applicant left the children in the respondent's sole care despite claiming he posed a significant risk of harm.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion and set aside the ex parte order, emphasizing the strict duty of full disclosure in ex parte proceedings and the lack of sufficient evidence to justify continuing the order.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant and seeking to exclude seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued the information to obtain (ITO) the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds and contained misleading information.

The court found that the ITO disclosed sufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant's issuance, thus no s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

The court also determined that, even if a s. 8 violation had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant tripartite framework, as the breach was not serious, the impact on the applicant's Charter rights was not significant, and society's interest in the adjudication on the merits was high.

The application was dismissed.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank brought an ex parte motion to amend a default judgment from 2015 to add an alleged alias of the defendant, "Joseph Raymond Wing," and to obtain a writ of seizure and sale in that name.

The court denied the requested relief, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient admissible evidence to establish that the defendant and Joseph Raymond Wing were the same person.

The court also noted the plaintiff's lack of due diligence in discovering the alleged alias earlier and expressed strong disapproval of counsel's conduct in bringing such a motion ex parte with inadequate materials.

The motion was adjourned to be heard orally on notice to both the defendant and Joseph Raymond Wing.

The applicants brought a motion for consent orders to discharge construction liens and direct the return of security paid into court.

The court refused to grant the relief due to significant deficiencies in the motion materials and the proposed draft order.

These deficiencies included incorrect legal terminology (e.g., referring to discharge of a "Claim for Construction Lien" instead of a "lien"), failure to provide updated parcel registers to address sheltering liens, an improper preamble in the draft order, and an incorrect provision for the return of security that contravened Section 46(4) of the Construction Act.

The court emphasized the need for counsel to be meticulous in drafting and noted the waste of judicial resources caused by such carelessness.

The applicant sought an order to relocate with the children from Oakville to Sarnia and to vary the existing parenting time schedule.

She also requested retroactive and ongoing child support, including Section 7 expenses, and life insurance as security.

The respondent opposed the relocation and sought to vary the parenting time schedule regardless of the relocation outcome.

The court denied the applicant's proposed relocation, finding it not to be in the children's best interests due to the significant risk it posed to their relationships with the respondent and their half-sister, exacerbated by the applicant's diminished view of the respondent's parental role.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request to vary the Final Order, determining that no material change in circumstances had been proven.

The applicant's claims for child support and life insurance were also dismissed due to lack of evidence.

The applicant sought declarations and an order of mandamus to compel the Attorney General of Ontario to provide statistical data and court file numbers related to civil trials.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the open court principle does not extend to requiring the aggregation and generation of such bulk data, and that the Attorney General lacked the authority to provide the information, as it rests exclusively with the court.

The court also denied the applicant's request to transfer the application to the Divisional Court for judicial review, citing procedural deficiencies and lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant sought directions regarding the testamentary estate of Mary Frances Rae, specifically concerning the beneficial ownership of a property transferred by Mary to the respondent in 2004.

The core issue was whether the property was held on a resulting trust for Mary's estate or passed to the respondent by right of survivorship.

The court found that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption of resulting trust with clear, convincing, and cogent evidence of Mary's donative intention, concluding that full beneficial ownership passed to the respondent upon Mary's death.

Counsel for the defendants brought a motion to be removed as lawyer of record.

The motion was dismissed due to the moving party's failure to comply with Rules 15.04(1.2) and (1.3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the disclosure of privileged and prejudicial information.

The court emphasized the need for compliance with rules and fiduciary obligations, imposing costs against the moving party.