ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Norra D’Silva
Applicant
Self-represented
- and -
Furat Ilia
Respondent
G. Gill, for the Respondent
HEARD: March 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, and April 1, 2, 7, and 8, 2026
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
C. Chang J.
1The respondent brings this motion to change for a variation of the consent final order of Kurz J. dated March 16, 2023 (the “Parenting Final Order”) respecting decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and police enforcement.
2In her amended response to motion to change, the applicant seeks the dismissal of the respondent’s motion to change, and seeks her own variations of both the Parenting Final Order and the consent final order of Bloom J. dated December 11, 2023 (the “Financial Final Order”). Specifically, she seeks variations of the Final Orders respecting her proposed relocation of the children to Dubai, parenting time, child support, and communication between the parties1.
3The parties agree that the disposition of this motion to change turns on whether the court authorizes the applicant’s proposed relocation.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4The relevant material facts are, for the most part, undisputed.
5The applicant and the respondent are both university-educated Iraqi Christians. They met in Birmingham, England in 2005, and were married in Dubai, U.A.E. on November 4, 2006 following a ceremonial wedding in England in July 2006. The respondent had been living in Dubai since 2000, and the applicant joined him there in November 2006. They then agreed to immigrate to Canada, with the respondent coming first in March 2009, and the applicant joining him in November 2009.
6There are two children of the marriage: D (11 years old) and M (9 years old).
7The applicant commenced the original application shortly after the parties’ separation in early 2022. Following a case conference, and in accordance with duly executed minutes of settlement, the parties consented to a temporary order on April 7, 2022 that provided for joint decision-making responsibility, and equal parenting time on a 2-2-5-5 basis.
8The parties resolved the parenting issues on a final basis at the March 16, 2023 settlement conference before Kurz J., who issued the Parenting Final Order in accordance with the applicable duly executed minutes of settlement. That Final Order provided for, among other things, a 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule, the applicant’s sole decision-making responsibility for the children respecting their education, healthcare, culture, and religion, the applicant’s obligation to consult with the respondent respecting those areas of decision-making, the parties’ joint decision-making responsibility respecting the children’s extracurricular activities, and the locations of the parties’ respective residences.
9It is undisputed that the parties have complied with the April 7, 2022 temporary order and the Parenting Final Order respecting the 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule, and that, with one exception, the children have had equal parenting time with each of the parties in accordance with those court orders.
10The parties resolved the remaining financial issues on a final basis at the December 11, 2023 joint settlement/trial management conference before Bloom J., who issued the Financial Final Order in accordance with the applicable duly executed minutes of settlement. That Final Order provided for, among other things, the respondent’s payment of setoff child support, the parties’ payment of s. 7 expenses proportionate to their respective incomes, the respondent’s payment of spousal support, and the respondent’s equalization payment to the applicant.
11The applicant has entered into a “Tenancy Contract” for rental accommodations in Dubai for a one-year term from November 15, 2025 until November 15, 2026, with a one-year option to renew. She has taken possession of those rental accommodations. The applicant has also entered into an “Employment Contract Full Work” in Dubai for a two-year term from July 8, 2025 until July 8, 2027, which can be renewed or terminated by the applicant or her employer. She has commenced that employment.
12It is undisputed that the applicant has delivered notice of the proposed relocation, and that the respondent has delivered notice of his objection. The parties jointly retained Stephen Cross to prepare an applicable “Voice of the Child Report”, which he provided to the parties in November 2025.
ISSUES
13The issues for determination on this motion to change are as follows:
a. Has there been a material change in circumstances to warrant a review of the Parenting Final Order respecting the locations of the parties’ respective residences?
b. Should the court authorize the applicant’s proposed relocation of the children to Dubai, and vary the Parenting Final Order accordingly?
c. If the court authorizes the proposed relocation, should either of the Final Orders otherwise be varied?
d. If the court does not authorize the proposed relocation, should either of the Final Orders be varied?
ANALYSIS
Issue: Has there been a material change in circumstances to warrant a review of the Parenting Final Order respecting the locations of the parties’ respective residences?
Parties’ Positions
14The relevant provision of the Parenting Final Order states that the parties “shall live near each other to facilitate parenting time and decision-making responsibility…[and] [e]ach party’s residence shall be within 5 kilometres of the boundary of the Town of Oakville”. The parties jointly submit that there has been a material change in circumstances – namely, the applicant’s intention to relocate D and M to Dubai – that warrants a review of that order.
Law
15Section 17 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) sets out the applicable jurisdiction to retroactively or prospectively vary a final order. The exercise of that jurisdiction is predicated on the court being satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances. In the parenting context, such a change is one in the circumstances of the child since the making of the order sought to be varied (see: Divorce Act, s. 17(5)).
16The order sought to be varied must be given appropriate deference, and the party seeking the variation bears the burden of proving that the alleged material change in circumstances would likely have resulted in a different order being made (see: L.M.P. v L.S., 2011 SCC 64, at paras. 29-33).
Decision
17I accept the parties’ joint submission that there has been a material change in circumstances that warrants review of the Parenting Final Order respecting the locations of the parties’ respective residences. Both the applicant’s proposed move to Dubai, and the resultant consequences of it constitute a material change in circumstances that would have resulted in a different order being made.
18I will therefore proceed with a review of that Final Order.
Issue: Should the court authorize the applicant’s proposed relocation of the children to Dubai, and vary the Parenting Final Order accordingly?
Parties’ Positions
19It is undisputed that the applicant’s proposed move of the children to Dubai is a relocation, and not a change of residence.
20The applicant submits that the court should authorize the proposed relocation. She argues that the move would be in the children’s best interests because it would allow her to start a new life, and find her own happiness away from the respondent and his abusive and harassing conduct toward her. The applicant submits that she has secured both a job and rental accommodations in Dubai, and that “it is the time to achieve my ambitions in life”. The applicant’s own happiness, she argues, will be in the children’s best interests because if she is happy, then they are happy. The applicant further submits that there are very good schools in Dubai, and many activities for the children there, including swimming pools, amusement parks, water parks, gardens, soccer fields, and tennis courts.
21The respondent submits that the applicant has failed to prove that her proposed relocation of the children would be in their best interests. He argues that the applicant’s motivation for relocating to Dubai is purely to satisfy her own need to get away from illusory abuse and harassment by the respondent. The respondent further argues that the applicant has “painted a lovely picture” for the children that has left them without a proper appreciation for how their lives will be impacted by the proposed move.
Law
22Section 16.9(1) of the Divorce Act provides that a person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility respecting a child of the marriage who intends to effect a relocation must provide at least 60 days’ prior notice of that intention, in the prescribed form, to anyone else who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility, or contact under a contact order. Pursuant to s. 16.91(1), a person who intends to relocate a child, and has given the requisite notice is permitted to do so if: a) the court authorizes the relocation; or b) the recipient of the s. 16.9 notice does not object in the prescribed manner within 30 days of receipt of that notice, and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
23In determining whether a relocation should be authorized, the court is required to consider the “extensive and open list of factors” set out in ss. 16(1)-(6) and 16.92 of the Divorce Act (see: Shipton v Shipton, 2024 ONCA 624, at para. 21). The “crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”, which is a highly fact-specific and discretionary inquiry (see: Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para. 152). The court must consider the best interests of the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case (see: Barendregt, at para. 123).
24In determining the best interests of the child in relocation cases, the court must consider all factors related to the child’s circumstances, including, without limitation:
a. the child’s views and preferences;
b. the history of caregiving;
c. any incidents of family violence;
d. the reasons for the relocation;
e. the impact of the relocation on the child;
f. the amount of parenting time spent with the child, and the level of the parties’ involvement in the child’s life;
g. the existence of a court order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
h. the reasonableness of the relocating party’s proposal to vary parenting time or decision-making responsibility, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence, and the applicable travel expenses; and
i. whether the parties have complied with their respective obligations under statute, a court order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance,
(see: Barendregt, at paras. 153-154).
25This list of factors is neither exhaustive nor to be used as a mathematically applied checklist, but, rather, should guide the court’s exercise of its discretion in determining whether the proposed relocation would be in the child’s best interests (see: Tass v Jackson, 2023 ONSC 6564, at para. 54).
26The court is not to consider how the outcome of the relocation application would affect the parties’ relocation plans – e.g., whether the relocating party would relocate without the child or not relocate at all (see: Divorce Act, s. 16.92(2); Barendregt, at paras. 140 and 154).
27If the parties substantially comply with a court order, arbitral award, or agreement that provides that the child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party intending to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the child’s best interests (see: Divorce Act, s. 16.93(1)).
28A proposed relocation is “more likely to be approved where the clear primary caregiver for a child seeks to relocate and more likely to be denied if there is a shared parenting arrangement” (see: Barendregt, at para. 121).
Decision
29For the reasons set out below, I am denying the applicant’s request for approval of her proposed relocation of the children to Dubai, and her request to vary the Parenting Final Order accordingly. She has failed to discharge her burden of proving that the relocation would be in either of D’s or M’s best interests. Indeed, based on the evidence before me, including that of the applicant herself, I find the proposed relocation to not be in the children’s best interests.
30I start with the Supreme Court of Canada’s dicta at para. 121 of Barendregt that a proposed relocation is “more likely to be denied if there is a shared parenting arrangement”. In the case-at-bar, there is a shared parenting arrangement, and the children have equal parenting time with each of the applicant and the respondent on a 2-2-5-5 basis. Although this is, of course, not dispositive of the relocation issue, as set out in greater detail below, the case-at-bar is a clear illustration of the above observation from para. 121 of Barendregt. On April 7, 2022, the parties agreed to temporary orders for joint decision-making responsibility and a 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule. On March 16, 2023, the parties agreed to final orders for partial joint decision-making responsibility, and a 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule. From these, I infer that both the applicant and respondent agreed that a shared parenting arrangement with equal parenting time is in D’s and M’s best interests. Authorization of the applicant’s proposed relocation of the children to Dubai would utterly disregard that agreement, and obliterate that arrangement. That shared parenting arrangement and equal parenting time schedule having been predicated on D’s and M’s best interests, the material disruption of that arrangement and schedule resultant from the proposed relocation, in my view, cannot align with those best interests.
31I turn next to the applicable burden of proof. As set out above, the parties have an equal parenting time schedule as set out in the Parenting Final Order, and it is undisputed that the parties have, with one exception, adhered to this schedule. Therefore, per s. 16.93(1) of the Divorce Act, the applicant bears the burden of proving that her proposed relocation of the children to Dubai is in their best interests. As also set out above, I find that the applicant has failed to meet that burden of proof, and that the proposed relocation is, in any event, not in either of D’s or M’s best interests. I will explain why by reviewing the Barendregt factors with reference to the applicable facts in the case-at-bar.
Children’s Views and Preferences
32As set out in Mr. Cross’s Voice of the Child Report, both D and M have expressed their strong preference to move to Dubai. However, as also set out in that report, the children’s views on the issue were not arrived at, and are not held, independently.
33Mr. Cross stated in his report that “[t]he children are clearly aligned with their mother’s wish to relocate to Dubai, and the children’s wishes are not held independently from their mother’s narrative and wishes”. Mr. Cross also stated during his trial testimony that “there is no doubt” that the applicant has influenced D and M by way of her repeated discussions with them about her desire to move them to Dubai, and by her conduct when she took them there for a trip in July 2025. The children were “caught up in the excitement and motivation of [the applicant] to move to Dubai”, particularly given their ages. Consistent with that lack of independence is Mr. Cross’s evidence that, minutes into his first interviews with each of D and M, both children – completely unprompted by him – expressed their understanding that they were there to talk about the proposed move to Dubai, and their strong desire to move there. Indeed, per Mr. Cross’s report, “it was apparent that each child…had come prepared to the interviews to convey reasons why a move to Dubai was important”. Mr. Cross also expressed concern about the children’s ability to “contemplate the full implications” of their stated views. Indeed, his report evinces the children’s lack of fulsome appreciation of the significant impacts that their move to Dubai will have on their relationships with the respondent and their friends, and on their current lives.
34I accept Mr. Cross’s evidence, which completely withstood cross-examination, remained consistent and unwavering throughout, and was not contradicted. Moreover, the applicant’s own evidence corroborates and reinforces Mr. Cross’s evidence that she has strongly influenced D’s and M’s views and preferences about moving to Dubai. The applicant testified about her July 2025 trip with the children to Dubai, and adduced into evidence various photographs from that trip. The applicant’s evidence, including those photographs, show that she engaged in something in the nature of a “charm offensive” aimed at gaining D’s and M’s favour and support for the proposed move to Dubai. As Mr. Cross testified, D and M “had a fantastic time in Dubai…stayed at nice hotels…went to wonderful theme parks…[and] loved Dubai”, and are undoubtedly excited and enthusiastic at the prospect of moving there. However, there is no evidence before me that the applicant has made any effort to temper that excitement or enthusiasm by, for example, providing the children with any realistic information about the consequences of moving there, including, without limitation, what they would have to give up.
35Therefore, although both D’s and M’s stated views and preferences strongly favour the applicant’s proposal to relocate them to Dubai, I am unable to give weight to those views and preferences because of the lack of independence in the children’s formation of them. The applicant’s “charm offensive” has painted for the children an incomplete, unrealistic, and inaccurate picture of a life in Dubai that intentionally shows only its positive aspects without the necessary counterfoil of its negative aspects.
36I therefore find this factor to be neutral in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs neither in favour of nor against the proposed relocation.
37Given the significant degree of overlap in the circumstances of the case-at-bar, I will address these two Barendregt factors together.
38There is very little evidence before me respecting the history of caregiving other than conflicting and uncorroborated evidence about the parties’ respective roles in this respect. However, as set out above, the parties agreed to and followed a 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule almost immediately after the original application was commenced, and have continued with it to this day. Indeed, it is undisputed that the parties and the children have followed that equal parenting time arrangement since the April 7, 2022 temporary order. Moreover, the evidence before me is clear that each of the applicant and the respondent is, and has been, an involved and active parent in D’s and M’s lives. The applicant and respondent testified about the respective roles that they have each played in the children’s lives since the Parenting Final Order – both day-to-day and overall – and I accept that evidence.
39However, the applicant alleges that the quality of the respondent’s caregiving is exceedingly inferior to the quality of hers. She claims that the respondent, among other things, feeds the children innutritious food, packs them expired food for lunch, fails to properly supervise them, and has offered to take them to a nudist camp. I do not accept the applicant’s evidence in this respect. Her evidence is, for the most part, uncorroborated, and, in my view, is otherwise more a matter of her interpretation of what she sees and hears (particularly second-hand) than an accurate reflection of the objective circumstances. Indeed, I agree with the respondent that the applicant views virtually everything about the respondent through a highly disparaging lens.
40Respecting the two Halton CAS investigations on which the applicant relies for corroboration, both arose from the same set of allegations made by the applicant against the respondent: one that she referred directly to the CAS; and the other referred by someone else on the applicant’s instigation. Those separate investigations of the same allegations resulted in completely different findings by each of the respective child protection workers. One worker, Divya Mathur, verified some child protection concerns against the respondent, and the other, Sonia Gomez, verified none. Both files were closed following the completion of their respective initial investigations.
41I am unable to accept the applicable findings of Ms. Mathur in verifying some of the subject concerns. Firstly, Ms. Mathur’s investigation relied on unbalanced input from the applicant and the respondent. She met with the applicant in-person, and spoke with her on the telephone at least four times, but never met with the respondent in-person, and only spoke to him on the telephone once. She also met with the children at the applicant’s home and in her presence, but never attended at the respondent’s residence, or met with the children while in the respondent’s care. Indeed, Ms. Mathur admitted that she obtained most of her information from the applicant. Ms. Mathur also admitted that the respondent had raised with her a concern that he was not being heard during her investigation, but, based on the evidence before me, she failed to adequately address that concern. Secondly, Ms. Mathur contradicted herself about her first meeting with the children. She initially testified that she met with the children privately, but later admitted that the applicant was with them. Thereafter, Ms. Mathur testified that she couldn’t specifically recall whether she met with the children privately, but that doing so was “standard”.
42It is undisputed that both D and M have spent equal time in each of the applicant’s and the respondent’s care for the last four years, and, based on the evidence before me, both parties are, and have been, active and involved in the children’s lives. Were the children to relocate to Dubai, the parenting status quo known to them for at least the last four years would be eradicated. The sheer geographic distance between Ontario and Dubai would eliminate any semblance of the applicable caregiving and parenting time routines, both current and historical.
43I therefore find both these factors to be negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, they weigh against the proposed relocation.
Any Incidents of Family Violence
44The issue of family violence is fiercely disputed by the parties.
45The applicant submits that the respondent abused and harassed her throughout the parties’ marriage, and after they separated. The applicant also argues that the respondent’s contumelious and other behaviour is demonstrative of his immoral character, and that immorality means that he cannot properly parent D and M. Based on her evidence, she appears to want to improperly relitigate the issues in the original application, all of which were resolved on consent by way of the two Final Orders. Moreover, the vast majority of the applicant’s evidence and submissions relate to the respondent’s alleged mistreatment of her during the marriage and at the time of its breakdown, and his alleged infidelity. That evidence fails to persuade me of the existence of any incidents of family violence relevant to the inquiry before me.
46Although the respondent admits that the tone and content of his communications with the applicant around the time of separation were inappropriate, he submits that they were not driven by malice or any intention to intimidate or harass. Rather, he argues, his words were uncharacteristic of him, and the result of “very high” emotions and him “breaking down”. He otherwise denies that he committed any acts of violence, physical or otherwise, against the applicant.
47I accept the respondent’s submissions. He has admitted to his “faults” during his marriage to the applicant, including the way he conducted himself at the end of that relationship. Indeed, I find concerning some of the language used in his messages to the applicant around the time of separation. However, I accept the respondent’s evidence that his use of language in those messages was uncharacteristic of him, that he regrets his use of that language, and that he has since taken steps to learn from those actions, and to improve himself. He appeared genuine in that testimony, and there is no evidence before me that persuades me otherwise. Moreover, the applicant’s evidence of the respondent’s violence against her is either uncorroborated or contradicted. For example, the applicant’s evidence respecting the December 2014 incident is contradictory as to whether the respondent hit or pushed her, and between what she testified happened and what she told the police at the time. The applicant also contradicted herself about whether the respondent ever physically assaulted her.
48The applicant also submits that the respondent has committed acts of family violence against the children, particularly D. She alleges that the respondent has made false and demeaning comments about her to the children, has made false and demeaning comments about D to D, and has repeatedly violently slapped D. These allegations were the subject of the Halton CAS investigations outlined above.
49I do not accept these submissions.
50I do not accept Ms. Mathur’s findings that the respondent put D at risk of physical and emotional harm. As set out above, there are problems with Ms. Mathur’s evidence, and Ms. Gomez’s investigation into the same child protection allegations resulted in none of the applicable concerns being verified. I also do not accept the applicant’s allegations that the respondent has repeatedly violently slapped D. The respondent has admitted to physically disciplining D once, but accepted a CAS worker’s caution about that incident, and has not since engaged in any similar discipline of either child.
51I also do not accept the applicant’s allegation that the respondent has exposed D and M to emotional harm by improperly involving them in parental conflict, and making demeaning comments about her to the children. Based on the evidence before me, it is the applicant who has engaged in such conduct. As with the Dubai “charm offensive”, the evidence from both Halton CAS workers satisfies me that it is the applicant who has influenced D and M in adopting her narrative and wishes, and has used them to actualize her desires to vilify the respondent.
52I therefore find this factor to be neutral in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs neither in favour of nor against the proposed relocation.
Reasons for Relocation
53The applicant’s stated reasons for her proposed relocation of the children to Dubai have been consistent and unwavering, and all relate to her desire to start a new life. Indeed, as set out in the Voice of the Child Report, the applicant told Mr. Cross, “I want to start my life; it’s about me, not about the parenting schedule”. However, the strength of her connection to Dubai is far from robust, and, in any event, I fail to see how her stated reasons for relocating the children are in their best interests.
54Before separating in 2022, the applicant and respondent lived together in Dubai for less than three years before immigrating to Canada, where they lived together for more than 12 years, and started a family. Although the applicant initially testified that she never wanted to live in Canada, she contradicted herself by subsequently testifying that the parties’ decision to move to Canada was mutual and genuine. In addition, the applicant’s evidence is that, other than one friend, she has no familial or social support network in Dubai. She testified that her elderly mother plans to move to Dubai if the proposed relocation is authorized, but there is no evidence before me about such a move other than the applicant’s uncorroborated testimony about it.
55Moreover, there is neither evidence nor argument before me that the applicant’s job in Dubai provides her with any unique and/or special career opportunities. Although a party’s “determination to remain financially viable and able to provide for her child is a compelling reason connected to relocation” (see: Shipton, at para. 68; Porter v Bryan, 2017 ONCA 677, at para. 17), there is no evidence before me in the case-at-bar that the applicant’s financial viability is, in any way, tied to Dubai. Indeed, based on her own evidence, the applicant is not required to be in Dubai for her current employment, as she is able (as she did in December 2025) to do her work remotely. Moreover, there is no evidence before me that the applicant must be in Dubai to pursue her preferred career as a full-time social media influencer, or that relocating to Dubai will provide her with any improved career prospects in this field.
56The strength of D’s and M’s connections to Dubai is even more problematic. Those connections are limited to one family vacation in 2021, and one vacation with the applicant in 2025. Both D and M were born in Oakville, and have lived there all of their lives there. There is neither evidence nor argument before me that the reasons for the proposed relocation to Dubai include the improvement of the children’s academic, extracurricular, or social lives, or that the delivery of any relevant social and/or other services to them would be better in Dubai than in Oakville. Indeed, the respondent testified that his close friends in Dubai have all recommended against moving there, especially with a family.
57Moreover, all of the above must be viewed in the context of the applicant’s admissions at trial, which, in my view, disclose the true reasons underlying the applicant’s proposed relocation of the children to Dubai. Among those admissions were the following: D and M would be better off without the respondent in their lives; the applicant’s goal is to end the children’s relationships with the respondent; the proposed relocation would help her to achieve that goal; after relocation, the respondent’s only communication with the children will be by email through her; and she will unilaterally decide what, if any, information she passes on to either the respondent or the children.
58The applicant clearly sees no value in either D or M having any sort of relationship with the respondent, and relocating them to Dubai will permit her to execute her plan to end the children’s relationships with their father. That is the applicant’s true plan for the children.
59I therefore find this factor to be strongly negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs heavily against the proposed relocation.
Impact of Relocation on the Children
60As set out above, D and M have had equal parenting time with each of the applicant and the respondent for at least the last four years, and enjoy close and fulfilling relationships with both parents. Both children also otherwise lead happy and fulfilling lives. Both children are active and engaged in their community, are doing very well in school and extracurricular activities, and have strong and positive relationships with their respective friend groups.
61As also set out above, there is no evidence before me that relocating the children to Dubai will enhance or otherwise improve their lives, whether from an educational, social, healthcare, or other perspective. However, were the children to be relocated to Dubai, their lives will be fundamentally disrupted, and irrevocably altered. I accept that D and M will likely be able to acclimate to new schools, cultures, extracurricular and social activities, friends, and other aspects of living in Dubai. However, their relationships with their father – one of the most important in their respective and collective lives – would be in serious jeopardy. As set out above, the sheer geographical distance between Oakville and Dubai alone will fundamentally diminish the nature and quality of those relationships.
62Moreover, this is not simply a case of geographic distance adversely impacting a child’s relationship with the non-relocating parent (see: Reeves v Brand, 2018 ONCA 263, at para. 17; Tass, at paras. 89-90). Given the applicant’s true motivations for relocating the children to Dubai, in my view, the eradication of D’s and M’s relationships with the respondent following that relocation is a foregone conclusion.
63I therefore find this factor to be strongly negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs heavily against the proposed relocation.
Court Order, Arbitral Award, or Agreement that Specifies Geographic Area in which Children to Reside
64As set out above, the Parenting Final Order requires that the parties’ respective residences be close to each other, and otherwise within five kilometres of the Town of Oakville. I infer that, in consenting to this order, the parties were in agreement that D’s and M’s best interests were best served by: 1) both parties’ respective residences being “near each other”; and 2) the parties and the children living in or close to the Town of Oakville.
65I therefore find this factor to be negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs against the proposed relocation.
Reasonableness of Relocating Party’s Proposal to Vary Parenting Time or Decision-Making Responsibility, Taking into Consideration, Among Other Things, Location of New Place of Residence, and Applicable Travel Expenses
66In her amended response to motion to change, the applicant seeks primary residence of the children with parenting time for the respondent during “Christmas Break” in Dubai or Ontario (neither frequency nor duration is specified), seven weeks of summer vacation in Canada, bi-weekly video calls (no duration is specified), and “[a]t such other times as agreed by the parties in writing”. She also proposes that she “pay for the costs of the children’s travel to and from Dubai for holidays”. The applicant seeks no change to decision-making responsibility.
67I need not make any findings about the reasonableness of these proposals because, in my view, they are all disingenuous. As admitted by the applicant on cross-examination, her true plan is to end D’s and M’s relationships with the respondent, and her proposed relocation to Dubai is part of executing that plan.
68I therefore find this factor to be strongly negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs heavily against the proposed relocation.
Whether Parties Have Complied with Respective Obligations Under Statute, Court Order, Arbitral Award, or Agreement, and Likelihood of Future Compliance
69As set out above, the parties have, for the most part, complied with both Final Orders, particularly respecting the 2-2-5-5 equal parenting time schedule. That said, the applicant alleges that the respondent has breached the Financial Final Order respecting the payment of support and the equalization payment, and other temporary orders in the original application. However, there is no evidence before me that corroborates her testimony in this respect.
70What is corroborated is the respondent’s evidence that the applicant has, on at least one occasion, breached the Parenting Final Order by withholding D and M during their parenting time with the respondent in July 2024. In addition, the applicant has admitted to breaching the Parenting Final Order by unilaterally making decisions respecting the children in areas where she is required to consult with the respondent, or where the decision-making responsibility is joint. Moreover, given her plan to end the children’s relationships with the respondent by, among other things, relocating them to Dubai, I have little doubt that the applicant will disregard any applicable parenting orders if that relocation is authorized.
71I therefore find this factor to be negative in the Barendregt analysis. In my view, it weighs against the proposed relocation.
Conclusion on Relocation
72For the reasons set out above, the applicant’s request for approval of her proposed relocation of D and M to Dubai must be denied. Having regard to, in particular, the current shared parenting regime with partial joint decision-making responsibility and equal parenting time, the nature and quality of the children’s relationships with the respondent, the applicant’s complete disregard for the value of those relationships and her plan to end them, and the catastrophic impact that the proposed relocation will have on those relationships, not only has the applicant failed to discharge the applicable burden of proof, the proposed relocation is not in the children’s best interests.
Issue: If the court authorizes the proposed relocation, should either of the Final Orders otherwise be varied?
73Given my determination that the applicant’s request for authorization of her proposed relocation of the children to Dubai must be denied, I need not consider this issue. I will therefore proceed to address the final issue before me as set out below.
Issue: If the court does not authorize the proposed relocation, should either of the Final Orders be varied?
74The applicant has not advised whether she will still move to Dubai if her requested authorization to relocate the children is denied. Both parties have made claims for variation of the Final Orders, and the respondent submits that those claims should be adjudicated whether or not the applicant moves to Dubai without the children.
75In my view, there is insufficient evidence before me to properly adjudicate either party’s claims respecting parenting time, decision-making responsibility, or child support. I am therefore unable to determine whether there has been a material change in circumstances to warrant a review of those aspects of the Final Orders, and, if so, whether and how those orders should be varied. As such, I will require further submissions (and, possibly, further evidence) before I can determine the remaining issues on this motion to change.
DISPOSITION
76I therefore make the following orders
a. the applicant’s request for authorization of her proposed relocation of D and M to Dubai is denied;
b. the applicant’s request to vary the Parenting Final Order respecting the locations of the parties’ respective residences is denied; and
c. the parties are to jointly schedule a “To Be Spoken To” attendance before me, at which we will discuss next steps, including canvassing of the remaining issues on this motion to change, and scheduling a further hearing for my receipt of further evidence and/or submissions.
C. Chang J.
Released: April 28, 2026