His Majesty the King v. Gurvir Gill, 2025 ONSC 2337

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R v. Gill, 2025 ONSC 2337

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-00000256-00BR

DATE: 2025-04-15

B E T W E E N:

His Majesty the King

M. Otim, for the Crown

Respondent

• and -

Gurvir Gill

S. Khan, for the Applicant

Applicant

HEARD April 9, 2025

RULING ON BAIL REVIEW APPLICATION

C. Chang J.

1Mr. Gill brings this application under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, for review of the order of Justice of the Peace Dulai denying him interim release from custody (the “Bail Denial”), and an order granting him such release.

2Mr. Gill submits that the Bail Denial was clearly inappropriate, and that his proposed new release plan represents a material change in circumstances, both of which warrant the exercise of this court’s power to revisit the issue of bail, and thereupon order his interim release. Although his written submissions also assert that J.P. Dulai erred in law in denying bail, Mr. Gill abandoned that argument during oral submissions.

3The Crown opposes the application.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

4Mr. Gill has been charged was various offences under the Criminal Code, including multiple counts of each of assault (s. 266), assault causing bodily harm (s. 267(b)), assault with a weapon (s. 267(a)), weapons dangerous (s. 88), and failure to comply with a release order (s. 145(5)(a)). All of the alleged offences relate to the same complainant, with whom Mr. Gill was romantically involved.

5Following a bail hearing on January 14, 2025, J.P. Dulai denied bail. The Crown and Defence had agreed to a proposed release plan under which Mr. Gill’s father, Gurjit Singh Gill, (“Gurjit”) would be his surety with a $2,000.00 liability, and Mr. Gill would be under strict house arrest and subject to GPS monitoring.

6Under Mr. Gill’s new proposed release plan, his mother, Sukhvir Kaur Gill, (“Sukhvir”) would be added as a surety, and both sureties would each be subject to a $5,000.00 liability. The other terms of the release plan proposed to J.P. Dulai would remain the same.

ISSUES

7The issues to be determined on this application are as follows:

a. Does this court have the power to review the Bail Denial because:

i. it is clearly inappropriate, or

ii. there has been a material and relevant change in circumstances?

b. If this court has the power to review the Bail Denial, should Mr. Gill be ordered released on bail pending his trial?

ANALYSIS

Issue: Does this court have the power to review the Bail Denial?

8It is settled law that this court’s power to review an initial detention or release order is not open-ended, but, rather, is only available where the reviewing judge determines that such intervention is appropriate; i.e., where: 1) the justice who made the initial order erred in law; 2) the initial order is clearly inappropriate; or 3) new evidence shows a material and relevant change in the circumstances of the case (see: R v St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, at paras. 120-121).

9As set out above, Mr. Gill abandoned his argument that J.P. Dulai erred in law.

Was the Bail Denial Clearly Inappropriate?

Parties’ Positions

10Mr. Gill submits that the Bail Denial was clearly inappropriate because the underlying decision gave excessive weight to Gurjit’s inability to monitor and/or regulate Mr. Gill’s social media usage, and, in any event, those concerns are addressed by his new proposed release plan. He further submits that the underlying decision also disregarded the Crown’s consent to the proposed release plan.

11The Crown submits that the Bail Denial was not clearly inappropriate. It argues that the underlying decision did not give excessive weight to Gurjit’s evidence about his ability to monitor and/or regulate Mr. Gill’s use of social media, and it did not give insufficient weight to the fact that the proposed release plan was agreed to by the Crown.

Decision

12I do not accept Mr. Gill’s argument.

13Where the initial bail order is alleged to be completely inappropriate, the applicable inquiry is whether the underlying decision “gave excessive weight to one relevant factor or insufficient weight to another” (see: St-Cloud, at para. 121). A court reviewing the initial order is not permitted to interfere with it “simply because he or she would have weighed the relevant factors differently” (see: St-Cloud, at para. 121).

14In my view, J.P. Dulai did not give excessive weight to Gurjit’s evidence respecting his ability to monitor and/or regulate Mr. Gill’s use of social media, or give insufficient weight to the fact that the Crown had agreed to the proposed release plan.

15The oral reasons given for the Bail Denial make it clear that Gurjit’s ability to monitor and/or regulate Mr. Gill’s social media use was one factor taken into account in determining that the proposed release plan was insufficient. In those oral reasons, J.P. Dulai stated that, based on the evidence overall, it was clear that the efficacy of the proposed plan was based on little if anything more than Gurjit’s “faith in his son’s ability to follow an order”. He also noted that there was no evidence to support such faith, and Gurjit provided no details about how he “would even monitor or supervise” Mr. Gill. J.P. Dulai was also not satisfied on the evidence that the proposed electronic monitoring (i.e., the home’s security cameras, and the GPS monitoring) would be sufficient.

16Indeed, J.P. Dulai found that Gurjit’s proposed supervision of Mr. Gill, and therefore the proposed release plan, was deficient due to its failure to meet the “higher level of supervision [required] to address the risks posed” respecting the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code. He noted in particular that Mr. Gill is alleged to have committed the current offences before the court while he was on interim judicial release on previous charges, the conditions of which included “a residential condition with a surety at the same address”.

17I also do not agree that J.P. Dulai gave insufficient weight to the fact that the Crown had agreed to the proposed release plan.

18It is settled legal doctrine that judicial officers are not “rubber stamps”. This includes justices of the peace (see: Lauzon v Ontario (Justices of the Peace Review Council), 2023 ONCA 425, at para. 65). Indeed, in the context of bail hearings, the belief that the parties’ consent governs the result is fundamentally wrong (see: R v Singh, 2018 ONSC 5336, at para. 24). The court retains the duty to balance the applicable factors. This, in my view, is sufficient to dispose of Mr. Gill’s argument.

19In addition, a review of the oral reasons for the Bail Denial shows that J.P. Dulai was alive to his duty to consider all of the evidence, including the consent proposed release plan, and to properly balance the relevant factors accordingly.

20I therefore find that the Bail Denial is not clearly inappropriate, and, as a result, this court has no power to review on this basis.

Has There Been a Material and Relevant Change in Circumstances?

Parties’ Positions

21Mr. Gill submits that the proposed addition of Sukhvir as an additional surety, and the proposed $5,000.00 amount for each surety’s liability constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances. He argues that these proposed additions to his originally proposed release plan would specifically address the concerns expressed by J.P. Dulai in denying bail. Specifically, he submits, Sukhvir would ensure that he would not use social media at all, including by her dealing with any social media communications required to maintain Mr. Gill’s haircutting business.

22The Crown submits that there has been no material and relevant change in circumstances. It submits that Sukhvir was available but not proffered to act as a surety at the original bail hearing, and, in any event, her addition fails to address the insufficiency in the originally proposed release plan.

Decision

23Where it is alleged that there has been a material change in circumstances, the assessment of whether the proffered new evidence establishes a material and relevant change in circumstances will depend on the considerations that underpinned the initial detention or release order (see: R v Whyte, 2014 ONCA 268, at paras. 25-26). In determining whether there has been a material and relevant change in circumstances, the court may consider new evidence that satisfies the criteria for admissibility set out in Palmer v The Queen, 1979 CanLII 8 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, applied flexibly (see: St-Cloud, at para. 129).

24Both parties appear to have improperly conflated the analysis applicable to determining the admissibility of new evidence on a bail review application with that applicable to determining whether there has been a material and relevant change in circumstances. The proper approach would have been to first address whether the evidence proffered by Mr. Gill is admissible in accordance with St-Cloud, and then whether, based on the admissible evidence, there has been a material and relevant change in circumstances. Instead, the parties either presumed the admissibility of all of the proffered evidence (in the case of Mr. Gill), or argued that there has been no applicable change in circumstances because one or more of the admissibility factors has not been met (in the case of the Crown).

25The four-part test for admissibility in Palmer, as modified by St-Cloud for bail review applications, is conjunctive: a failure to meet any one criterion is fatal to the proposed evidence’s admissibility.

26In the case-at-bar, I find that the evidence respecting Mr. Gill’s new proposed release plan – i.e., the evidence respecting the proposed addition of Sukhvir as a surety, and the proposed increased liability amount – is inadmissible. Applying the more flexible approach mandated by in St-Cloud, that new evidence fails to meet the fourth criterion: having regard to all relevant circumstances, it could have affected the balancing exercise engaged in respecting the original bail decision.

27As set out above, Mr. Gill’s original bail request failed because of the insufficiency of the proposed release plan; specifically, Gurjit’s inability to properly monitor and supervise Mr. Gill. The new evidence respecting the proposed addition of Sukhvir and the proposed increased financial liability presents similar concerns.

28In my view, Sukhvir’s evidence demonstrates that she – like Gurjit – fails to appreciate the seriousness of Mr. Gill’s circumstances, or the seriousness of the offences for which he stands charged. Like Gurjit, Sukhvir’s knowledge of Mr. Gill’s whereabouts and conduct from day-to-day stands at a very pronounced distance from his actual whereabouts and conduct. Indeed, Sukhvir’s evidence is that she learned of many of Mr. Gill’s charges for the first time during her cross-examination at this bail review hearing. Moreover, again like Gurjit, Sukhvir’s ability to monitor and supervise Mr. Gill is based on little more than her faith in Mr. Gill’s ability to follow court orders. Indeed, I find Sukhvir would be less suitable as Mr. Gill’s surety than would Gurjit. She is already Mr. Gill’s surety under a June 21, 2022 release order of Justice of the Peace Aleong, and it is that release order that he is charged with having breached numerous times. Put another way, the consequences of Sukhvir’s and Gurjit’s misplaced faith in Mr. Gill’s ability to follow court orders are not hypothetical, but, rather, have played out in real time over the last few years.

29Furthermore, I do not see how, in the circumstances, an increase in the sureties’ financial liability would have addressed these significant concerns.

30I therefore find that the evidence of Sukhvir’s proposed addition as Mr. Gill’s surety and proposed increased surety liability would not have affected the applicable balancing exercise in the Bail Denial. That evidence is therefore inadmissible.

31Even had I found the proffered evidence to be admissible, I would have found there not to have been a material and relevant change in circumstances. In my view, that evidence fails to establish such change referrable to the considerations that underpinned the Bail Denial.

32As set out above, the Bail Denial was based on the insufficiency of the proposed release plan to provide for the proper supervision of Mr. Gill; particularly given the fact that he stands charged with repeatedly breaching a previous interim judicial release order. In my view, the evidence respecting the proposed addition of Sukhvir as a surety and increased liability amount fails to address this insufficiency. In fact, given that Sukhvir was Mr. Gill’s surety when he is alleged to have committed those breaches, the concerns expressed by J.P. Dulai are magnified.

33To be clear, I have little doubt that Gurjit and Sukhvir honestly believe that they would be appropriate sureties for Mr. Gill. However, I agree with the Crown that they clearly appear to lack sufficient insight into Mr. Gill’s comings and goings, the seriousness of his circumstances, the potential jeopardy that he is in, the nature of a surety’s obligations, or the way to properly discharge those obligations. They appear to naively place all of their trust in Mr. Gill’s ability to follow court orders. This is simply not sufficient.

34I therefore find that there has been no material and relevant change in circumstances, and, as a result, this court has no power to review on this basis.

Issue: If this court has the power to review the Bail Denial, should Mr. Gill be ordered released on bail pending his trial?

35As set out above, Mr. Gill has failed to persuade me that either the Bail Denial was clearly inappropriate, or there has been a material and relevant change in circumstances to warrant this court’s exercise of the review power under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code. Given this, I am not required, and decline, to conduct a de novo s. 515(1) analysis.

DISPOSITION

36Mr. Gill’s application is therefore dismissed.

C. Chang J.