Carolyn J. Horkins

The appellant hired the respondent architect to design and obtain permits for converting a rooming house into a small hotel.

The project was delayed due to additional work requested by the appellant and city requirements.

The appellant sued in Small Claims Court for renovation expenses allegedly caused by the delay, while the respondent counterclaimed for unpaid fees and extra work.

The Deputy Judge dismissed the appellant's claim and allowed the respondent's counterclaim.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's findings that the delay was justified and the extra work was compensable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his human rights application for delay.

The incidents complained of occurred between 2003 and 2012, well beyond the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision reasonable, as the applicant failed to provide a good faith reason for the delay and could not establish a series of incidents extending into the limitation period.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The sellers appealed an order directing the release of a $50,000 deposit to the purchaser after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The sellers argued the purchaser committed an anticipatory breach, relieving them of the obligation to tender.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that ongoing negotiations to extend the closing date negated any repudiation.

Because there was no accepted repudiation, the sellers were required to tender to enforce the agreement, which they failed to do.

The purchaser was therefore entitled to the return of its deposit.

The moving party Estate sought leave to appeal two final discretionary cost orders that dismissed its motion for costs against the impecunious respondent and her former lawyer personally.

The motions judge had found the respondent was unable to pay and that the lawyer, who acted pro bono for a limited time, did not act frivolously or vexatiously.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in principle and that the motions judge's decision was not plainly wrong.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order requiring them to pay an outstanding amount on a business loan.

The appellants argued defences of non est factum and unconscionability regarding the personal liability of the individual owner.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, given the clear structure of the loan document and warnings respecting personal liability.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to dismiss the mother's appeal of a trial decision that dismissed her Status Review Application and maintained a Crown wardship order.

The mother had failed to order trial transcripts or perfect her appeal due to financial constraints.

The court applied the test for dismissing an appeal for delay, emphasizing the overwhelming prejudice to the children, who had been in foster care for nearly seven years and required permanency.

Finding no merit to the appeal and no prospect of it being perfected, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant husband brought a motion seeking the release of $1M from the net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home, as well as the repayment of several small loans.

The respondent wife opposed the motion, arguing that the $1M request had already been dealt with in a prior consent order that required the husband to post a letter of credit, which he failed to do.

The court dismissed the husband's motion, finding that he could not reargue an issue settled by a temporary consent order without bringing a proper motion to vary.

The court also dismissed the balance of the relief, holding that the minor financial disputes should be determined at trial.

Costs of $12,000 were awarded to the successful respondent.

The applicant sought to set aside a 2010 Separation Agreement, alleging the respondent failed to disclose significant corporate assets and that she signed under duress.

Alternatively, she sought to set aside the support provisions.

The respondent sought to uphold the agreement but requested extensive variations to support, including retroactive termination of child support and imputation of income to the applicant.

The court dismissed the application to set aside the agreement, finding the non-disclosure was not significant in the context of the negotiations and there was no duress.

The court also dismissed most of the respondent's variation requests due to a lack of a material change in circumstances, but granted the termination of child support for the two adult children who no longer lived with the applicant.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion to vary a final custody order, seeking temporary sole custody of the parties' child and supervised access for the respondent mother.

The court relied on extensive findings of fact from a related proceeding involving the mother's other child, which detailed her history of non-compliance with court orders, false allegations against both fathers, and emotionally harmful conduct.

Finding that the mother's behaviour posed an immediate risk of emotional harm to the child, the court granted the father temporary sole custody, terminated his child support obligation, ordered supervised access for the mother, and issued a restraining order.

The applicant wife and respondent husband have been litigating their family law matter for over 12 years.

The applicant brought a motion seeking extensive disclosure from the husband and his business partner, $150,000 in interim disbursements under Rule 24(12), and payment of past support and section 7 expenses.

The respondent husband brought a cross-motion seeking disclosure, termination of child support for their 24-year-old daughter, and a variation of a 2008 temporary spousal support order to impute income to the applicant.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion in its entirety, finding she failed to meet the test for interim disbursements and that the disclosure requests were either already satisfied or unsupported by evidence.

The court granted the husband's request to terminate child support as the child was no longer living with either parent and was employed.

The court also ordered the applicant to provide disclosure.

However, the court declined to vary the temporary spousal support order on the eve of trial, directing the parties to proceed to trial in 2018.

The applicant father sought partition and sale of the matrimonial home, while the respondent mother opposed, citing the child's well-being and her financial situation, and also brought a motion to strike parts of the father's affidavit.

The court granted the father's motion for partition and sale, finding that the mother had not demonstrated prejudice to her rights or the child's needs sufficient to deny the prima facie right to sale.

The mother's motion to strike evidence was dismissed.

The applicant wife sought to set aside a marriage contract and requested interim spousal support of $50,000 per month, alleging duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and inadequate financial disclosure.

The respondent husband opposed the motion, arguing the contract was valid and that the applicant's refusal to produce her former counsel's file warranted an adverse inference.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding the contract's validity under the two-stage Miglin test.

The court upheld the contractual spousal support of $12,000 per month and ordered the applicant to pay costs to the respondent.

The respondent mother brought a motion to strike the applicant father's pleadings for failure to comply with multiple court orders regarding financial disclosure and support.

The father brought a cross-motion to vary the interim support orders and eliminate his arrears, claiming he was unemployed and could not afford to pay.

The court found the father had not met the heavy onus to show a substantial change in circumstances to vary the temporary orders.

Due to the father's egregious and ongoing failure to provide financial disclosure, the court struck his application pursuant to Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, allowing him only to file a reply limited to the issue of access.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing her human rights complaints against her former employer.

The Tribunal had dismissed the applications as an abuse of process after the applicant and her counsel unilaterally refused to attend the scheduled hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review, finding no evidence of bias or institutional bias.

The Court held that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the applications for abuse of process was reasonable and justified given the applicant's deliberate failure to attend the hearing.

The applicant, represented by her husband, sought the recusal of the presiding judge from a Divisional Court panel hearing a judicial review application.

The applicant alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based primarily on comments made by the judge at the conclusion of the hearing, suggesting that the applicant would be better served by independent counsel.

The judge, with the concurrence of the other panel members, dismissed the recusal request, finding that the comments were made out of concern for the applicant's best interests and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in context.

The applicant brought a motion to change a court-ordered schedule for questioning and a settlement conference, citing commitments to a national project and a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had not provided sufficient specific details for her commitments, had previously managed her project and litigation simultaneously, and that the application was time-sensitive due to the respondent's unemployment and the applicant's history of delaying proceedings.

The court emphasized the importance of adhering to court-ordered timetables to ensure the just and timely resolution of cases under the Family Law Rules.

The respondent husband brought a motion for interim costs of $125,000 under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules to defend against the applicant wife's claim for an annulment and to advance his own claim to enforce their marriage agreement.

The applicant, who has a very high net worth, conceded the merit of the respondent's case and the reasonableness of the fees, but argued he could fund his own litigation.

The court found the respondent was unemployed, had significant debts, and could not afford his legal fees.

The motion was granted, and the applicant was ordered to pay $125,000 as an advance on costs, plus $10,000 for the costs of the motion.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.

The father appealed a trial judge's order making his child a Crown ward and denying him the right of access, instead granting the child the right to hold access.

The father argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his plan of care and erred in the access determination.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The trial judge's conclusions that the father's plan of care was not viable and that granting the father access would impair the child's future adoption prospects were fully supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision ordering him to pay costs personally, despite not being a party to the underlying zoning appeal.

The Board had found him to be the 'real litigant' behind a residents' association.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in principle by failing to articulate and apply the proper legal test for determining whether a non-party is a 'real litigant' using a 'straw man' to shield themselves from costs.

The costs order against the appellant was set aside.