Arish Khoorshed

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control arising from a single-vehicle collision where he was found passed out partly in the driver's seat with keys accessible in the console.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the use of circumstantial evidence, misapplied the W.(D.) framework to the defence witness, and reversed the burden of proof.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly rejected the statutory presumption yet correctly proceeded to assess de facto care or control on the evidence as a whole.

Applying the deferential summary conviction appeal standard, the court found the factual inferences were reasonably open to the trial judge and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision dismissing two applications alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time following impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge wrongly attributed part of the delay to the inherent time requirements of the case rather than institutional delay.

Applying the pre-Jordan s. 11(b) framework, the court held that the trial judge did not err in assigning two months for trial preparation and in limiting the later period of institutional delay where defence availability and defence-driven applications contributed to adjournment.

Given aggregate institutional delay of about 9.5 to 10 months and minimal prejudice, the appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call reply evidence on a collateral issue regarding how he obtained an invitation to the complainant's dinner party.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the reply evidence was admissible because the issue took on new significance during the defence case.

The court also found the sentence, which included a suspended sentence and three years' probation, was not clearly unreasonable given the persistent nature of the harassment.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The accused was charged with over 80 and impaired operation of a motor vehicle on April 10, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The Crown and defence agreed that the overall delay until the end of trial would be 17 months and 4 days.

The court found that institutional delay of 13 months and 9 days exceeded the Morin guidelines by approximately 30 percent.

The court identified significant delays in Crown disclosure obligations and an unacceptable three-month gap between trial dates.

The court found actual financial and emotional prejudice to the accused in the moderate range.

Balancing all factors, the court granted the application and stayed both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement in Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met.

The Crown argued that the requirement was satisfied despite a nine-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the making of the breath demand.

The court found that the delay was reasonably necessary due to legitimate safety concerns arising from the simultaneous stop of two vehicles and the officer's need to address an unknown second party.

The court upheld the validity of the breath sample and found the accused guilty of the over 80 charge.

Herbert Adams was convicted after trial of four counts of fraud over $5,000 contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The frauds involved defrauding shareholders of Majestic Supply Company of $5.3 million and three named individuals of $381,000 combined.

Adams personally received $1,610,444 in proceeds of crime.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of five and one-half years on the primary count with concurrent two-year sentences on the remaining counts, along with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $1,610,444, a restitution order of $5.3 million, a no-contact order, and a DNA order.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle motor vehicle collision on an icy road.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and the adequacy of the right to counsel consultation under section 10(b).

The court rejected all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the odour of alcohol, the accused's admission to drinking, the circumstances of the accident, and his apology for committing a DUI.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and incredible.

On the trial on the merits, the court convicted the accused on both counts based on expert toxicological evidence establishing a blood alcohol concentration over 80 at the time of driving, corroborated by observations of impairment and the accused's own admissions.

The defendant was charged with five counts of fraud under $5,000 arising from fraudulent credit card transactions at a Telus retail store.

The Crown alleged the defendant, a sales representative, knowingly processed fraudulent transactions with the defendant's high school acquaintance.

The defendant claimed she was merely providing customer service and did not know the credit cards were fraudulent until a phone call on August 28, 2011.

The court found the defendant's written statement to the loss prevention officer was voluntary and reliable, rejected her trial testimony as fabrication, and found she had actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transactions based on incriminating text messages, the circumstances of the purchases, and her own confession.

The defendant was convicted on all counts.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test results on two grounds: first, alleging a violation of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the right to counsel; and second, arguing that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court rejected both challenges and found the defendant guilty.

Two offenders were sentenced following convictions for fraud over $5,000 under s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a scheme that defrauded victims of $100,000 through a purported land development investment.

The court considered aggravating factors including the significant planning of the fraud, the vulnerability of the victims, and the serious financial and emotional harm caused.

While the Crown sought penitentiary terms of three to four years, the court concluded that the case fell below the range of large‑scale fraud and that conditional sentences could adequately satisfy denunciation and deterrence.

Both offenders were sentenced to conditional sentences of two years less a day with strict house arrest conditions, followed by probation.

The court also imposed fines in lieu of forfeiture and a joint and several restitution order of $100,000 in favour of the victims.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a peace bond following an acquittal on a charge of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge imposed the peace bond without giving notice that such an order was being contemplated and without allowing the accused to make submissions or call evidence on whether it should be imposed.

The appeal court held that imposing a peace bond without affording the accused an opportunity to be heard breached principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The court also found there was no evidentiary basis for the peace bond, as the trial judge relied on speculation and irrelevant considerations rather than evidence establishing a risk of future breach of the peace.

The peace bond was quashed.

The accused was charged with four counts of fraud over $5000 relating to his operation of Majestic Supply Company Inc. and Suncastle Developments Incorporated.

The Crown alleged that the accused made false representations to investors regarding the development and exclusivity of a revolutionary water-based ink and other printing technologies, and that he deliberately thwarted the Ontario Securities Act to avoid filing a prospectus.

The court found the accused's testimony to be untruthful and accepted the evidence of the investors and other witnesses.

The court concluded that the accused made false representations to entice investments and that his deliberate breaches of the Securities Act constituted 'other fraudulent means'.

The accused was found guilty on all four counts.

The applicant sought to strike her guilty pleas to assault, uttering a death threat, and breach of recognizance, alleging the pleas were not fully informed, voluntary, or unequivocal.

The applicant claimed she was not properly advised of the consequences of her pleas and that she maintained her innocence.

The court found the guilty pleas were valid, noting the applicant had appeared multiple times before the court, participated in a thorough judicial pre-trial, had full disclosure, and was assisted by section 486 counsel.

The court rejected allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and found the applicant's subsequent change of position was motivated by concerns about implications in concurrent family court proceedings.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for refusing to provide a breath sample and breach of probation.

The sole ground pursued on appeal was that the trial judge improperly amended the Information before any evidence was heard.

The appeal court accepted that such an amendment would normally require consent or supporting evidence but found that defence counsel effectively consented to the amendment during the trial discussion.

Alternatively, the court held that even if the amendment was premature, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice resulted because the amendment merely corrected the wording to reflect the proper roadside demand offence.

The curative proviso under the Criminal Code therefore applied and the convictions were upheld.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct—specifically, prior charges for possession of stolen property that were withdrawn—in a trial involving charges of theft and possession of stolen construction equipment valued over $5,000.

The accused opposed admission of this evidence.

The court applied the principled approach established in R. v. Handy and determined that the evidence was admissible for the narrow purpose of rebutting an anticipated defence of ignorance or wilful blindness, on the basis that an accused previously charged with similar offences would be expected to exercise heightened scrutiny regarding the legitimacy of equipment in his possession.

The court found the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of prejudice, particularly given that this was a judge-alone trial where moral and reasoning prejudice were significantly reduced.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

At trial, the judge found serious breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter and excluded evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the appellant's property and residence.

However, the trial judge convicted the appellant based on an in-dock identification by a civilian eyewitness.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself on the inherent frailties of eyewitness identification, particularly in-dock identification without a prior identification procedure.

Given the lack of corroborative evidence and the unreliability of the identification, the conviction was quashed and an acquittal was entered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute between separated partners, where the assault consisted of the accused spitting at the complainant in the presence of their child.

The trial judge imposed an absolute discharge after considering six days of pre-sentence custody and the minor nature of the assault.

On appeal, the Crown argued the sentence failed to properly reflect denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the presence of a child and the accused’s prior criminal record.

The court held that appellate intervention in sentencing is limited and found no error in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

The discharge fell within the acceptable range given the minor nature of the assault, the provocation involved, the pre-sentence custody, and the passage of time since the offence.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual exploitation involving a 17‑year‑old relative who lived with him, and received a custodial sentence with probation and ancillary orders.

On summary conviction appeal, he challenged the conviction on multiple grounds including misapprehension of evidence, improper credibility analysis, misuse of prior incidents as grooming evidence, and erroneous reliance on his police statement as a confession.

The court held that the trial judge misapprehended and inadequately analyzed the accused’s statement to police, treating it as a confession to criminal conduct without identifying the conduct admitted or explaining the reasoning.

Because the statement played a central role in rejecting the accused’s testimony and assessing credibility, the error could not be cured under the proviso.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a guilty plea, arguing the plea was involuntary and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The court found the guilty plea was voluntary because the appellant understood jail was not a possible sentence regardless of the plea.

However, defence counsel failed to review all Crown disclosure, including videotape evidence showing the appellant in a police station washroom, which could have raised potential Charter s. 8 privacy issues.

The court held that failing to review the disclosure before advising the appellant constituted conduct falling below the standard expected of defence counsel.

Because proper review and advice could reasonably have affected the outcome, the court found a miscarriage of justice and set aside the guilty plea.