Shahid Malik

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Joseph Irving, on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and drive over 80.

The trial judge had excluded evidence (police observations and breath samples) under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of the respondent's s. 8 (unreasonable search) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The s. 8 breach arose from police coercing the respondent to the door of his home by placing a foot on the threshold and demanding his presence, thereby revoking the implied invitation to knock.

The s. 10(b) breach was a brief delay in providing rights during investigative detention.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings on both Charter breaches and the s. 24(2) analysis, affirming that the police conduct was serious and had a significant impact on the respondent's privacy interests, thus dismissing the Crown's appeal.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample analysis showing readings of 130 mg and 140 mg.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that police breached the accused's section 8 rights by unlawfully entering and remaining in the home beyond the scope of the implied invitation to knock doctrine, and breached section 10(b) by failing to inform the accused of his right to counsel without delay during an investigative detention.

The court also found a breach of section 10(b) regarding the timing of rights to counsel.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath sample evidence as the serious Charter breaches outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Both charges were acquitted.

The plaintiff sold a restaurant business to the defendant father, who negotiated the purchase and signed the agreement.

The father later stopped making payments, leaving a balance of $30,000.

The plaintiff sued the father, his son, and the son's corporation for the balance.

The court found that the father acted on his own behalf and did not have ostensible authority to bind his son or the corporation, dismissing the claims against them.

The father was ordered to pay the outstanding balance, subject to a $4,500 set-off for a leased dishwasher that the plaintiff had misrepresented as an owned asset.