Arish Khoorshed

The Crown sought to have a certified drug recognition expert (evaluating officer) testify regarding their opinion on whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by a drug, without requiring the officer to meet the formal expert qualification criteria established in R. v. Mohan and R. v. J.-L.J. The accused argued that while the evaluating officer could testify about the evaluation tests and procedures conducted, any opinion on impairment would require formal expert qualification unless it was solely for the purpose of making a demand under section 254(3.4) of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled that a certified drug recognition expert accredited by the International Association of Chiefs of Police may provide expert opinion evidence regarding drug impairment without a Mohan voir dire, as Parliament intended through the enactment of the relevant legislation and regulations.

The court also permitted the accused to call expert evidence challenging the scientific validity of the evaluation tests without requiring constitutional notice.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a stay of sexual assault charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to an alleged 63‑month delay between the laying of charges and the scheduled retrial.

Applying the framework from Morin v. The Queen, the court assessed the length of delay, reasons for delay, waiver, and prejudice to the accused.

The court determined that approximately nineteen and three‑quarter months constituted institutional or Crown delay, which fell within acceptable administrative guidelines.

The court further found that most other delay was attributable to defence actions or inherent case requirements, and that the accused demonstrated only minimal prejudice.

Balancing all factors, the court concluded that the applicant’s right to be tried within a reasonable time had not been infringed.

The accused were tried for fraud over $5,000 arising from a $100,000 loan obtained from private lenders under representations that the funds would be invested in a New Jersey land subdivision project through a corporation.

Evidence showed the investors relied on representations that both accused were partners or officers of the company and that the funds would be invested as described.

The court found the money was not invested as represented and that the accused misrepresented their roles and diverted funds from the corporate account without the investors’ knowledge.

The court rejected the defence of intoxication raised by one accused and found the investors suffered economic deprivation exceeding $5,000.

Both accused were convicted of fraud under s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on breath test results obtained using an Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath tests by cross-examining the qualified technician extensively regarding deviations from manufacturer protocols, including failure to visually monitor the instrument during diagnostic checks, uncertainty regarding simulator identification, and temperature recording discrepancies.

The defence sought to rebut the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(c) by establishing the instrument was operated improperly.

The court found that without expert toxicological evidence to establish the significance of the alleged procedural deviations, a reasonable doubt could not be raised regarding proper operation of the instrument.

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,100 fine and one-year driving prohibition.

The Crown appealed a sentence for impaired driving where the sentencing judge refused to allow the Crown to file a Notice of Increased Penalty for a repeat offender.

The sentencing judge had unilaterally gathered transcripts from other cases to conclude the Crown's practice was inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by reviewing the reasonableness of the prosecutorial discretion and by impermissibly gathering evidence.

Applying the appellate framework, the court found no abuse of process or Charter violation in the Crown's decision to file the notice, and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days' incarceration.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of assault arising from two altercations outside a warehouse.

The appeal court found the trial judge made material factual findings unsupported by the evidence, including concluding the incident was a planned attack despite both parties agreeing no evidence supported that conclusion.

The court also held the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate, failing to address conflicting evidence, the issue of consent, and key credibility determinations.

The reasons were so deficient that meaningful appellate review was impossible and the reasoning process leading to conviction could not be understood.

The court held the errors created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice and rendered all convictions unsafe.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the police investigation, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a blended voir dire on the Charter issues and found that the arresting officer failed to properly formulate the requisite reasonable suspicion under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code for the roadside screening device demand, and further failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds under section 254(3) for the breath demand at the police station.

The court found that the officer's testimony regarding what the "F" reading on the approved screening device meant was entirely absent, and the officer admitted he had no grounds to arrest the accused until obtaining that reading.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a single-vehicle collision on the QEW highway.

The trial addressed two key issues: whether the lab technician had lawful authorization to take a blood sample, and whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The court found that the accused's job description, stored electronically, constituted valid written authorization under the Criminal Code.

The blood sample analysis revealed a BAC of 258 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with a stay entered on the impaired driving count at the Crown's request.

The offender was convicted of theft over $5,000 and fraud over $5,000 for using a Power of Attorney to place unauthorized mortgages on his 86-year-old mother's properties, resulting in her eviction and homelessness.

The court considered numerous aggravating factors, including the offender's extensive criminal record of 69 prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty, his lack of remorse, and additional uncharged frauds against his mother and his lawyer.

Finding the offender to be a psychopath incapable of rehabilitation, the court imposed the maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for theft, to be served consecutively to his current sentence, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for fraud.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of recognizance following the end of his relationship with the complainant.

After being warned by police to have no contact with the complainant, the appellant left a letter at her door.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding the letter's contents disturbing and sufficient to cause the complainant to fear for her safety.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found the verdict unreasonable, holding that the trial judge failed to properly analyze the mens rea requirement and that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude the appellant knew or was reckless as to whether the letter would harass the complainant.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.