COURT FILE NO.: 195/10

DATE: 2012-01-24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

– and –

HUMBERTO CABRAL

Appellant

Arish Khoorshed, for the Crown, Respondent

Humberto Cabral, Appellant, Self-Represented

HEARD: January 3, 2012

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRAY J.

[1] Mr. Cabral appeals his convictions for criminal harassment, contrary to s. 264(1) of the Criminal Code, and for breach of recognizance, contrary to s. 811 of the Code. In essence, Mr. Cabral’s argument is that the convictions were unreasonable.

[2] For the reasons that follow, the convictions are set aside and acquittals are entered.

Background

[3] Mr. Cabral and the complainant, Melanie Remes, had an intimate relationship and, for a period of time, lived together in Ms. Remes’ home. A number of pieces of Mr. Cabral’s property were in her home, including a stereo, a television, and clothes.

[4] The relationship came to an end in December, 2009. Sometime during the week before Monday, December 14, 2009, Ms. Remes asked Mr. Cabral to leave her home.

[5] There was some difficulty sorting out which items of Mr. Cabral’s belongings would be removed from the home, and when, and how. Ultimately, Ms. Remes gathered up some belongings and put them at the front door, although Mr. Cabral’s television was too large and too heavy for her to carry.

[6] Mr. Cabral attended on Ms. Remes’ porch, and phoned repeatedly. Specifically, he left messages about his phone charger, which was ultimately returned to him through a neighbour.

[7] On Saturday, December 12, 2009, Mr. Cabral phoned a number of times about the television and the stereo. There were many discussions about the television. On one occasion, Mr. Cabral arrived on her porch and remained in her driveway, while telephoning her.

[8] The complainant testified that she was concerned enough that she took her 12 year old son to the basement where she felt safer.

[9] Mr. Cabral continued to call Ms. Remes. She testified that it was okay that he continue to call her “only about the TV”.

[10] Ms. Remes noticed some items missing from the front of her house. One day it was a little reindeer and then some Christmas lights.

[11] On December 15, 2009, Ms. Remes was alarmed to see Mr. Cabral again on her front porch. She called her neighbour and the police.

[12] Officer Paul Webber spoke to Mr. Cabral in his vehicle less than half a kilometre away from Ms. Remes’ home. He cautioned Mr. Cabral that Ms. Remes wanted no further contact. Any contact should be through legal counsel or Small Claims Court.

[13] When Officer Webber was asked what was meant by “contact”, his evidence was as follows:

QUESTION: All right. And did you tell Mr. Cabral anything about what contact meant?

ANSWER: It’s a standard answer that we give to everybody in regards to these types of incidents, and that includes person-to-person contact, any media contact, either telephone, internet, email, text messages, or third party contact which would be through someone known to both parties.

QUESTION: All right. And what about communication by letter?

ANSWER: I can’t recall saying, instructing anything about a letter.

[14] After these questions and answers, Officer Webber was directed to a statement he had provided. The following exchange then occurred:

QUESTION: And again, tell us what it was that you said to Mr. Cabral about any further contact with the complainant?

ANSWER: No further contact via text messages, emails, letters and communication with third parties.

[15] On Monday, December 21, 2009, Ms. Remes returned home around 5:30 p.m. to find a letter in her door. Because of the importance this letter has to the matter at issue, I have reproduced its contents as Appendix ‘A’ to these reasons.

[16] Without being exhaustive, a number of points made in the letter are as follows:

(a) Mr. Cabral is just as scared of Ms. Remes as she is of him;

(b) Mr. Cabral is sorry for leading Ms. Remes on about his age and race [Mr. Cabral had apparently told her that he was 41 years old and Italian; he was in fact 45 years old and Portuguese];

(c) things moved a little too fast; if Mr. Cabral had the time back, he would have gone along more with Ms. Remes’ suggestions and tried to understand things through her eyes;

(d) the night on the porch, Mr. Cabral “just panicked”; he was just as scared of her;

(e) by now, Ms. Remes knows Mr. Cabral’s criminal record – “I’m clean”;

(f) Ms. Remes presumably now knows that Mr. Cabral saw a psychiatrist, but there is nothing to worry about; after his accident he was labelled with a disorder called psycho-affective disorder; that disorder is really not considered a mental disorder;

(g) Ms. Remes knows Mr. Cabral best, but so does “somebody else”; the reason Mr. Cabral did not tell that person about Ms. Remes was because the one Mr. Cabral loved was Ms. Remes;

(h) Mr. Cabral hopes that Ms. Remes can call him so that they can talk in a public place, since the police stopped all contact;

(i) Mr. Cabral also has a pair of pants that belongs to his $300 suit, and “I was hoping we would be civilized about this”;

(j) Mr. Cabral is rough around the edges, and he needs to get his act together;

(k) one thing is for sure, “you can’t accuse me of being boring”;

(l) “Like I said, it takes two to love, if you can’t, I guess it’ll be my loss.”;

(m) Mr. Cabral provided his telephone number “in case you deleted”, “like I said before I’m not allowed to contact you”:

(n) “What you say, we write up an agreement for the TV”; Mr. Cabral would pick up the stereo; upon his return to Ontario, Ms. Remes would give him the TV, with no charge, and would look at it as if she had been renting it.

[17] Ms. Remes testified that she took the letter to the police station. She was concerned about the reference to a psychiatric diagnosis, as she thought that in a stressful situation, Mr. Cabral might not behave rationally. She thought Mr. Cabral had no regard for authority.

[18] Mr. Cabral was subject to a recognizance issued under s. 810 of the Criminal Code. As a condition of the recognizance, he was required to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

[19] The Reasons for Judgment of Baldwin J., for convicting the appellant, are quite brief. In their entirety, they are as follows:

This is a W.D. analysis case, and I have done that. I accept as accurate, reliable and true the Crown’s witnesses.

Very briefly, the parties appeared to have met each other online, had a very brief relationship, whereby the accused who had been living with his mother in Brampton, moved into the victim’s house, where she lived alone with a 12 year old son. A few days before December 15th, 2009, she told him to get out of her house. The allegations before the court are of criminal harassment, repeated phone calls, and contact between December 15th when the victim ended the relationship and December 21st.

It is not necessary for me to go through each and every phone call. I am not going to do it. What is important for me to set out is that I accept Constable Webber’s evidence that on December 15th, 2009, he specifically warned Mr. Cabral to have no contact directly or indirectly with Melanie Remes. Despite that, Mr. Cabral kept calling, and very significantly wrote Exhibit Number 3, a long seven page letter, wherein his first name even appears, Humberto, even though he says he is not sure he wrote it, and left it on the victim’s front door. That was December 21st. In that letter there is disturbing content referencing for the first time that he suffers from a mental illness, reference to a criminal record, lies about information he’s given her regarding his profile in terms of his age and background, and references in the letter to knowing that she is scared of him. That’s enough. All I have to find beyond a reasonable doubt is she had reason to fear for her safety. I am satisfied both objectively and subjectively that that test has been met.

I should say, Mr. Cabral, that your evidence, sir, I could go on and on about this, but I won’t, suffice it to say it was consistent with someone who suffers from schizoaffective disorder, was disorganized, inconsistent, and at times outright delusional. There are no police conspiracies, murders and suicides involved in this straightforward case, sir. Findings of guilt, both counts.

Submissions

[20] Mr. Cabral, being self-represented on the appeal, made no submissions that were of material assistance to me.

[21] Mr. Cabral made reference to a number of allegations that were not in evidence at the trial. He sought to file new evidence on the appeal. He asserted that Robert Brooks, a lawyer who was appointed pursuant to s. 486.3 of the Code to cross-examine the complainant, was incompetent.

[22] In the final analysis, I assume Mr. Cabral’s main argument is that the convictions were unreasonable, as contemplated under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Code, which, by virtue of s. 822(1) of the Code, applies to summary conviction appeals.

[23] Counsel for the Crown argues that Mr. Cabral has not satisfied the tests for the admission of fresh evidence. Counsel also submits that there is no basis for any complaint regarding the competence of Mr. Brooks, who was appointed by the Court for a limited purpose.

[24] Mr. Khoorshed submits that there is no basis to find that the verdicts are unreasonable. He submits that there was ample evidence to support the verdicts.

[25] Mr. Khoorshed submits that in determining whether a verdict is unreasonable, the Court is not to simply substitute its own view for that of the court of first instance. Rather, the appellate court must assess whether a properly instructed trier of fact could reasonably convict the accused on the totality of the evidence.

[26] Based on that test, Mr. Khoorshed submits that there was ample evidence upon which a trier of fact could reasonably have convicted Mr. Cabral. Thus, the appeal should be dismissed.

Analysis

[27] I reject Mr. Cabral’s attempt to rely on facts that are not contained in the record. Mr. Cabral has not met the tests for the admission of fresh evidence as discussed in R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759.

[28] I also reject any criticism of Mr. Brooks. Mr. Brooks was appointed by the Court solely for the purpose of cross-examining the complainant. I have reviewed the transcript of Mr. Brooks’ cross-examination and there are no grounds to conclude that his performance was substandard. Indeed, if I may say so, the cross-examination was quite well done.

[29] While Mr. Cabral was convicted of two offences, it is not disputed by the Crown that the conviction under s. 811 of the Code will stand or fall on whether the charge under s. 264(1) is made out. Thus, I will focus on the charge under s. 264(1).

[30] Subsections 264(1) and (2) provide as follows:

264.(1) No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.

(2) The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of:

(a) repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to them;

(b) repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or anyone known to them;

(c) besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or anyone known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or

(d) engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their family.

[31] The essential elements of the offence were set out by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Sillipp (1997), 1997 ABCA 346, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 384 [cited with approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Krushel (2000), 142 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.)], at para. 18, as follows:

In the result, a proper charge to a jury in a criminal harassment case must include reference to the following ingredients of the crime, all of which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt;

1. It must be established that the accused has engaged in the conduct set out in s. 264(2)(a), (b), (c) or (d) of the Criminal Code;

2. It must be established that the complainant was harassed;

3. It must be established that the accused who engaged in such conduct knew that the complainant was harassed or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant was harassed;

4. It must be established that the conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety or the safety of anyone known to her; and

5. It must be established that the complainant’s fear was, in all of the circumstances, reasonable.

[32] The mens rea requirement was discussed by Berger J.A., for the Court, at paras. 32-39. At para. 33, he stated: “The mens reas of the offence is the intention to engage in the prohibited conduct with the knowledge that the complainant is thereby harassed.” It is not necessary that the accused intend that his conduct harass the complainant. It is sufficient that the accused engage in the conduct prohibited by s. 264(2), and have the knowledge that such conduct will harass the complainant or be reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant is harassed.

[33] In R. v. Van Leeuwen, 2012 ONSC 132, [2012] O.J. No. 103 (Ont. S.C.J.), Durno J. considered the appropriate criteria to be assessed in considering an appeal under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Code. At para. 18, he stated:

In R. v. Willock (2006), 210 C.C.C. (3d) 60, the Court of Appeal examined the criteria to be applied in assessing unreasonable verdict grounds of appeal:

[22] Section 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code mandates appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence said to justify the conviction. The review is a limited one. An appellate court must determine whether a properly instructed trier of fact, acting judicially, that is reasonably, could have convicted the accused on the totality of the evidence. In performing this task, the appellate court must view the entirety of the evidence through “the lens of judicial experience”: see R. v. Biniaris 2000 SCC 15, (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at para. 40 (S.C.C.).

[23] In exercising its power to review the reasonableness of the verdict, the appellate court cannot simply substitute its view as to the appropriate verdict. ...

[24] Where the verdict is reached by judge alone, the reasons of the trial judge can provide valuable insight into the reasonableness of the verdict. However, errors in the reasons are not a pre-condition to a finding that a verdict is unreasonable, and errors do not compel a finding that the verdict is unreasonable: R. v. Biniaris, supra, at para. 37. [emphasis added]

[34] The leading case on unreasonable verdicts is R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] S.C.J. No. 16, and it is instructive to examine the analysis of Arbour J., who delivered the unanimous reasons of the Court.

[35] In Biniaris, the Court re-examined, in some depth, the test set out by the Court in R. v. Yebes, [1987] S.C.J. No. 51. In Yebes, McIntyre J., for the Court, set out the appropriate test, at para. 25, as follows:

The function of the Court of Appeal, under s. 613(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, goes beyond merely finding that there is evidence to support a conviction. The Court must determine on the whole of the evidence whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered. While the Court of Appeal must not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, in order to apply the test the Court must re-examine and to some extent reweigh and consider the effect of the evidence. [emphasis added]

[36] In Biniaris, after setting out the Yebes test at para. 36, Arbour J. continued as follows:

That formulation of the test imports both an objective assessment, and to some extent, a subjective one. It requires the appeal court to determine what verdict a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could judicially have arrived at, and, in doing so, to review, analyze and, within the limits of appellate disadvantage, weigh the evidence. This latter process is usually understood as referring to a subjective exercise, requiring the appeal court to examine the weight of the evidence, rather than its bare sufficiency. The test is therefore mixed and it is more helpful to articulate what the application of that test entails, than to characterize it as either an objective or a subjective test.

[37] While both Yebes and Biniaris involved appeals from jury verdicts, Arbour J. also discussed the application of the test on appeals from decisions of judges alone. At para. 37, she stated:

The Yebes test is expressed in terms of a verdict reached by a jury. It is, however, equally applicable to the judgment of a judge sitting at trial without a jury. The review for unreasonableness on appeal is different, however, and somewhat easier when the judgment under attack is that of a single judge, at least when reasons for judgment of some substance are provided. In those cases, the reviewing appellate court may be able to identify a flaw in the evaluation of the evidence, or in the analysis, that will serve to explain the unreasonable conclusion reached, and justify the reversal.

After reviewing some authorities, she continued, in the same paragraph:

These examples demonstrate that in trials by judge alone, the court of appeal often can and should identify the defects in the analysis that led the trier of fact to an unreasonable conclusion. The court of appeal will therefore be justified to intervene and set aside a verdict as unreasonable when the reasons of the trial judge reveal that he or she was not alive to an applicable legal principle, or entered a verdict inconsistent with the factual conclusions reached. These discernable defects are themselves akin to a separate error of law, and therefore easily sustain the conclusion that the unreasonable verdict which rests upon them also raises a question of law.

[emphasis added]

[38] Arbour J.’s conclusion was as follows, at para. 42:

It follows from the above that the test in Yebes continues to be the binding test that appellate courts must apply in determining whether the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. To the extent that it has a subjective component, it is the subjective assessment of an assessor with judicial training and experience that must be brought to bear on the exercise of reviewing the evidence upon which an allegedly unreasonable conviction rests. That, in turn, requires the reviewing judge to import his or her knowledge of the law and the expertise of the courts, gained through the judicial process over the years, not simply his or her own personal experience and insight. It also requires that the reviewing court articulate as explicitly and as precisely as possible the grounds for its intervention. I wish to stress the importance of explicitness in the articulation of the reasons that support a finding that a verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. Particularly since this amounts to a question of law that may give rise to an appeal, either as of right or by leave, the judicial process requires clarity and transparency as well as accessibility to the legal reasoning of the Court of Appeal.

[39] Some further refinement of the test has been articulated by the Supreme Court in R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] S.C.J. No. 5, and in R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] S.C.J. No. 40, but the test set out in Yebes remains the basic test: see the reasons of Charron J. in Sinclair, at para. 67.

[40] In assessing the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the verdict, I will start with the reasons of the trial judge.

[41] I have already noted earlier that the reasons of the trial judge are very brief. I will assume, without deciding, that they meet the minimum standards articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, and R.v . M.(R.E.), 2008 SCC 51, [2008] S.C.J. No. 52.

[42] The trial judge noted that, in the information, it is alleged that there was harassing conduct by Mr. Cabral between December 15, 2009 and December 21, 2009.

[43] The complainant had ended the relationship sometime shortly before December 15, 2009. It was on December 15, 2009, after she had seen Mr. Cabral on her porch, that the complainant asked the police to tell Mr. Cabral that she wanted no further contact with him, and the police, on that day, advised Mr. Cabral accordingly. Before December 15th, the complainant and Mr. Cabral had had many communications, primarily over Mr. Cabral’s removal of his belongings from the complainant’s home. There was much discussion about the TV, which was large and heavy, and indeed Ms. Remes had acknowledged that there could continue to be discussion between the parties at least as it related to the TV.

[44] As she was required to do, having regard to the time frame specifically set out in the information, the trial judge focused on the period between December 15, 2009, being the date that Officer Webber told Mr. Cabral to have no contact with the complainant, and December 21, 2009, the date he left the letter at her home. The trial judge stated:

What is important for me to set out is that I accept Constable Webber’s evidence that on December 15th, 2009, he specifically warned Mr. Cabral to have no contact directly or indirectly with Melanie Remes. Despite that, Mr. Cabral kept calling, and very significantly wrote Exhibit Number 3, a long seven page letter, wherein his first name even appears, Humberto, even though he says he is not sure he wrote it, and left it on the victim’s front door. That was December 21st.

[45] While the trial judge states that after Constable Webber’s warning, Mr. Cabral “kept calling”, with respect there is simply no evidence that after the warning there was any contact at all except by way of the letter left at Ms. Remes’ home. The case must stand or fall, therefore, on whether the letter, itself, constitutes evidence on which a trier of fact could reasonably convict Mr. Cabral of criminal harassment. While communications and/or actions occurring before can be considered as part of a pattern, the delivery of the letter itself, being the only conduct that occurred after the warning, must constitute harassing conduct.

[46] The trial judge’s analysis of the letter is as follows:

In that letter there is disturbing content referencing for the first time that he suffers from a mental illness, reference to a criminal record, lies about information he’s given her regarding his profile in terms of his age and background, and references in the letter to knowing that she is scared of him. That’s enough. All I have to find beyond a reasonable doubt is she had reason to fear for her safety. I am satisfied both objectively and subjectively that that test has been met.

[47] With respect, I think the trial judge has misunderstood the content of the letter. While she calls the letter “disturbing”, I do not think that label can reasonably be attached to it. Mr. Cabral did not say in the letter that he suffers from a mental illness. Rather, he said that after an accident he was labelled with a disorder called psycho affective disorder, which he said is not really considered a mental disorder. He did not say he has a criminal record. Indeed, he said “I’m clean”. In terms of his age and background, he acknowledged that he was somewhat older than he had told the complainant, and he was Portuguese rather than Italian, but the complainant was aware of this before receiving the letter, and he made a somewhat joking reference to this by saying “look at it this way – you once told me that my body looked good for 41, I guess, I look great for 45 now. Just kiddin.” The reference to the complainant being scared of Mr. Cabral was in the context of his statement that “all I know is that you have me just as scared of you as you are of me.”

[48] Since the communication is in writing, the Court is not bound to accept the characterization of the communication placed on it by the trial judge. The appellate court can examine the document and place its own interpretation on it: see R. v. Jeffers, 2012 ONCA 1.

[49] A more reasonable interpretation of the letter is that it constitutes an acknowledgement by Mr. Cabral that he is to have no contact with Ms. Remes, and an invitation to her to contact him if she wishes to do so. Included is an invitation to keep his television set, for which he would make no charge if she were to use it, and a suggestion that they write up an agreement, and that she return it to him upon his return to Ontario. The rest of the letter consists of a somewhat wistful review of some aspects of the parties’ relationship, and regret that the relationship will not continue.

[50] After reciting her interpretation of the letter, the trial judge concluded by stating: “That’s enough. All I have to find beyond a reasonable doubt is she had reason to fear for her safety. I am satisfied both objectively and subjectively that that test has been met.”

[51] With respect, that simple finding made by the trial judge was not enough. She had to make a finding as to the mens rea of the offence.

[52] The offence of criminal harassment is not established, in my view, once it is shown that any communication whatsoever has occurred and/or that the complainant is afraid or otherwise harassed. Section 264(2)(b) and (c) require repeated communication and/or watching or besetting. While activities that occurred before Officer Webber’s warning can be considered as part of a pattern, it must still be shown that the accused knows that the specific communication relied on in this case will constitute harassment, or that he is reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant is harassed by the communication.

[53] The reasons of the trial judge do not disclose any analysis of whether Mr. Cabral knew that the letter would result in harassment of Ms. Remes, or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether she was harassed. If the trial judge’s reasons can be taken as making implied findings in this respect, they are unreasonable. Assuming the complainant was frightened and concerned by the text of the letter and the fact that it was written, in my view it was unreasonable to conclude (assuming that it was what the trial judge concluded) that Mr. Cabral knew or was reckless or wilfully blind to the knowledge that the complainant would be harassed.

[54] In the few days after Ms. Remes and Mr. Cabral broke up, there were many communications between them. Most of them were over the removal of Mr. Cabral’s belongings, and it is clear that the communications were almost entirely consensual. Indeed Ms. Remes testified that Mr. Cabral could continue to call “about the TV”. On December 15th, Officer Webber told Mr. Cabral not to have further contact. On December 21st, almost a week later, the letter was delivered. There was no other contact. There has been none since.

[55] In assessing the reasonableness of the verdict, it is necessary to ask the following question: could a properly instructed trier of fact, acting reasonably, have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Cabral knew that Ms. Remes would be harassed by the letter, or was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether she would be harassed? The answer to that question is no.

[56] The letter is a respectful, temperate communication, in which Mr. Cabral attempts, wistfully and with some humour, to review aspects of the parties’ relationship, and expresses regret that it has ended. The letter ends with an invitation for Ms. Remes to call him if she wishes, and an invitation to keep his television set until his return to Ontario. On this record, it is not possible to conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the Crown has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Cabral knew that Ms. Remes would be harassed by such a letter, or that he was reckless or wilfully blind as to whether she would be harassed.

[57] For the foregoing reasons, the conviction for criminal harassment was unreasonable. Since the conviction for breach of recognizance stands or falls on the criminal harassment charge, the conviction for that offence was also unreasonable.

Disposition

[58] The convictions of Mr. Cabral are set aside, and acquittals are substituted.

GRAY J.

Released: January 24, 2012

APPENDIX ‘A’

Hey – How are you

I don’t know where to begin this letter = all I know is that you have me just as scared of you, as you are of me. I’ve said right from the beginning, that I came to your life to love you – I am sorry for leading you on about my age and race, But, look at it this way you’ once told me, that my body looked good for 41, I guess, I look great for 45 now:

[symbol for smiley face], just kiddin.

I have to change that on my profile

I wanted to tell you before But, I was already hooked on you. I think things just started moving a little to fast, and I was getting confused. If I had my time back, I would go along more, with your suggestions, and try to understand things as you see, through your eyes. I would’ve met your family, have more of an open mind towards your friends. I’m missing yours already, Hows Buddy doing? That night at your porche – I just panicked – I was just as scared of you. I think by now you know my criminal record status, “I’m clean”

You probably know that I saw a psychiatrist too But theres really nothing to worry there, neither, that was after my accdent, on the hiway, they labelled me with a disorder called (pschyso Effective Disorder) they really give me that, cause, they could’nt find anything wrong with me, so they decided to give me that, and stupid me, I signed for it – and it seems like that’s always hunting me now. Even that Disorder still not really consider a Mental Disorder – What can I say!

You know me Best!, so does somebody else. But, I wont mention her Name.

I think the reason, that I did’nt tell her about you, It was’nt that, I loved her, I think, (she was going to be the one to take the pain away). But “the one I was loving was you”, and it is a loyall and strong feeling – you said you where looking to be loved, and love, I think that’s what you meant, By saying, you had feelings for me, and if that’s true, they don’t just go away no matter how mad people can get.

I’m hoping that you can call me, so we can talk in a public place since the Police stopped all contact. They also tryed to mislead me with their advice, towards my things. By the way, I also got a pair of pants (Black) there that belong to my $300 suit, I was hoping we would be civilized about this.

“In this World, theirs the ones that love us, and theirs the one we love, and if we’re lucky enough, we love one another”. By Umberto if you love somebody else, I can’t help you, and its not meant to be. Love is only beautifull when both people feel it.

I know I’m rough around the edges – and I need to get my act together – and maybe I need someone like you.

I guess with everything that’s happened – one thing is for sure, you can’t accus me of “Being boring”. [symbol for wink] wink.

So, like I said it takes 2 to love, if you can’t, I guess It’ll be my loss.

Here is my# in case you deleted – 416-666-0231 like I said before I’m not allowed to contact you What you say, we write up an agreement for the T.V

I’ll pick up the stereo, (Will write one again for the TV. that when and if I comeback to Ontario. You give me my tv., with no charges – will look at it, as you renting it. like I said – I have to go to her now – so she can take the pain away – hope to hear from you

COURT FILE NO.: 195/10

DATE: 2012-01-24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

HUMBERTO CABRAL

Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRAY J.

Released: January 24, 2012