Arish Khoorshed

During a trial for second degree murder, the Crown brought a motion to admit a bloodstain pattern analysis expert report as an exhibit to go to the jury.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing it would be prejudicial and redundant.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect, concluding that the report should not be filed as an exhibit because it only captured the expert's examination-in-chief, contained unaddressed photographs, and risked over-emphasizing the expert's opinion.

However, the court permitted the glossary from the report to be admitted.

The Crown brought a motion to determine the admissibility of crime scene and autopsy photographs in a second degree murder trial.

The defence objected to several photographs on the basis of relevance, redundancy, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the test of whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court admitted most of the photographs, finding them probative of the deceased's position, the extent of her injuries, and the amount of blood, but required the Crown to edit certain photographs to protect the deceased's dignity and minimize prejudice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce hearsay statements made by the deceased to a co-worker shortly before her death.

The deceased allegedly stated her intention to end her relationship with the accused.

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth under both the 'present intentions/state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach to hearsay, finding them relevant to motive and self-defence, and sufficiently reliable.

The accused was charged with two counts: (1) failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code, and (2) breaching a probation order by failing to provide a breath sample when requested by a police officer.

The accused refused to provide a roadside breath sample, stating he wished to consult with counsel first and believed he could provide the sample at the police station.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, holding that the accused cannot rely on a mistaken belief regarding the right to counsel before complying with a roadside breath demand, and that such a stated intention constitutes an unequivocal refusal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge found that while the police officer breached the accused's section 10(a) Charter rights by failing to promptly inform him that the nature of his detention had changed from a speeding investigation to an impaired driving investigation, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and did not breach section 8 rights.

The trial judge excluded statements made by the accused at the roadside but admitted the breath test results under section 24(2) analysis.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The appellant appealed an NCR verdict on charges including criminal harassment and breach of probation, arguing principally that the actus reus of criminal harassment had not been proven.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the blended procedure used at trial, although unusual in light of the Swain principle, caused no prejudice because the trial judge substantially segregated the actus reus analysis from mental disorder evidence.

Applying the established elements of criminal harassment under s. 264, the court found repeated and persistent communications directed to a correctional officer, subjective fear on the complainant's part, and objective reasonableness of that fear in the full context.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80'.

At trial, the evidence showed a 33-minute unexplained gap between the conclusion of the appellant's call to duty counsel and the taking of his first breath sample.

The trial judge held this gap did not defeat the 'as soon as practicable' requirement under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Superior Court found that because there was no evidence or judicial findings explaining the 33-minute delay—which constituted one-third of the total time from the traffic stop to the first sample—the Crown failed to prove the police acted reasonably and promptly.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge made several errors, including shifting the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application, misapprehending evidence regarding the officer's grounds for the demand, misapplying the W.(D.) test for credibility, relying on hearsay, and failing to prove he operated a vehicle within the preceding three hours.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors, properly assessed credibility, and reasonably concluded that the officer had the requisite grounds to make the demand.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, as well as her sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant deliberately used her vehicle to strike a victim who had sued her in Small Claims Court.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions to allow an amendment to the information, deny an adjournment, refuse evidence of a prior mistrial, and handle a memory-refreshing objection.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part because the trial judge exceeded the Crown's sentencing position without providing an opportunity for further submissions and improperly treated a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The sentence for failing to remain was varied to a concurrent sentence of time served plus one day.

The Crown brought a s. 521 bail review application to vacate a release order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The Justice of the Peace had released the accused without a bail hearing because the original signed information was not physically present in court, despite a signed warrant being before the court.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace erred in principle and acted in excess of jurisdiction, as the existence of a signed warrant compels the conclusion that a signed information exists.

The release order was vacated.

Conducting a new bail hearing, the court released the accused on a $5,000 recognizance with a surety and conditions, noting the complainant had recanted.

The offender was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm and three counts of breach of probation after attacking his cellmate in a correctional centre over a dispute about food.

The victim suffered fractured ribs, cuts requiring stitches, and bruising.

The court found the custodial setting to be an aggravating factor, as the victim was defenceless in a confined space.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for the assault, less 2.5 months of pre-sentence credit, and concurrent 6-month sentences for the breaches, followed by three years of probation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the respondent driving at excessive speeds, because the surrounding circumstances (light traffic, dry road, no interference with other vehicles) did not establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in law by stating that speed alone cannot found a conviction for dangerous driving.

The appellate court reviewed relevant case law, confirming that while excessive speed can constitute dangerous driving, a contextual analysis of all surrounding circumstances is required.

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown had not proven dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's mother did not adopt portions of her police statement regarding the complainant's sexual knowledge, in using an absence of evidence to corroborate the complainant, and in failing to analyze inconsistencies cumulatively.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or credibility assessment.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired care or control and over 80 care or control of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found no realistic risk of danger, accepting the respondent's "alternate plan" to sleep in his vehicle after his initial plan to stay at a friend's house fell through.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to articulate a path of reasoning demonstrating appreciation of all relevant circumstances regarding the risk of danger, as required by R. v. Boudreault.

The trial judge's conclusion that it was "very unlikely" the respondent would have driven was deemed conclusory without sufficient analysis of factors such as the high blood alcohol level, the failed sleep-over plan, lack of corroboration for a morning plan, and the individual's isolation.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

A young adult offender pled guilty to dangerous driving arising from a prearranged street racing incident that resulted in the deaths of two of his friends.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of four months, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with a two-year probation order, finding that specific deterrence and rehabilitation were the paramount sentencing objectives for a first-time young offender.

The court considered the offender's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and strong family support, balanced against the serious and planned nature of the dangerous driving conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make an arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer only had a 'suspicion' of impairment.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court reviewed the trial judge's findings, which relied on the severe unexplained collision, the appellant's disorientation, unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, and admission of consumption.

The court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officer possessed both a subjective belief and objective grounds for impairment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with theft over $5,000, fraud over $5,000, and criminal breach of trust arising from her misappropriation of $4,000 belonging to her elderly father, for whom she held a Power of Attorney.

She was found guilty of theft under $5,000, fraud under $5,000, and criminal breach of trust.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of six months, while defence counsel sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months probation, finding that neither a conditional discharge nor a conditional sentence was appropriate given the aggravating factor of breach of fiduciary duty, the defendant's lack of remorse, and the principles of sentencing under the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000, fraud over $5,000, and criminal breach of trust arising from her use of her father's funds while holding a power of attorney.

The accused used $4,000 of her father's money to pay personal bills while he was in long-term care, causing him to default on facility payments.

The accused claimed colour of right based on a clause in the power of attorney authorizing loans to relatives and her father's prior loans to her.

The court found that the circumstances were materially different from prior loans, as the father was now in care, the funds were insufficient to cover his care costs, and his default on obligations created risk.

The court rejected the colour of right defence and found the accused guilty of theft under $5,000, fraud under $5,000, and criminal breach of trust.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm against Raymond King, his step-father.

The Crown sought six months imprisonment while defence counsel sought a suspended sentence or conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of nine months in the community followed by two years probation, with strict conditions including home confinement, no contact with the victim, and mandatory counselling for anger management and substance abuse.

The court applied Gladue principles recognizing the defendant's Aboriginal heritage and difficult background while balancing the serious nature of the assault and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a former intimate partner on July 3, 2014, in Burlington.

The assault involved non-consensual oral sex after the complainant explicitly said no and the relationship was over.

The offender and complainant were both cognitively impaired individuals who had been in a three-year intimate relationship and were discussing reconciliation.

The Crown sought 9-12 months custody, while the defence sought a six-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years probation, finding that separation from society was not necessary given the unique circumstances, including the prior intimate relationship, the complainant's pre-offence sexting, the offender's significant disabilities and exemplary character, and the isolated nature of the offence.