Civil Litigation - Defendant

The plaintiff, Sharon Gannon, brought a wrongful dismissal action against Kinsdale Carriers Limited following the closure of its trucking business due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had advanced notice of the closure and, critically, whether she failed to mitigate her damages by refusing an offer of comparable employment.

The court found that the plaintiff had constructive notice of the impending closure and that she unreasonably rejected a comparable job offer from Zehr Transport.

Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to reasonable notice damages.

The plaintiff sought default judgment arising from allegations of sexual abuse and breach of fiduciary duty by the defendants from 1978 to 1983.

The defendants failed to participate in the litigation process, leading to an uncontested trial on liability and damages.

The court found the defendants liable for sexual battery and breach of fiduciary duty.

Damages were assessed for general and aggravated damages, future care costs, and past care costs.

The court applied the "crumbling skull" rule, reducing the damage award by 25% due to the plaintiff's pre-existing psychological conditions from prior abuse.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs and prejudgment interest.

This appeal addressed the scope of the "immediate disclosure" rule for litigation-altering agreements, specifically a Pierringer agreement, as established in *Handley Estate*.

The appellant (non-settling defendants) sought to stay the action, arguing the respondent (plaintiff) failed to immediately disclose the agreement's terms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the respondent's disclosure of the agreement's existence and essential terms, coupled with an immediate intent to seek court approval, satisfied the disclosure requirement.

The court clarified that not every term needs immediate disclosure, only those affecting the litigation landscape, and that the rationale for an abuse of process finding was not engaged where the court was informed and the disclosure was incremental within the context of seeking approval.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision to allow an appeal and order a new trial.

The parties reached a consent order regarding costs.

The trial costs order in favour of Katherine Cannon was set aside, with the issue of first trial costs to be determined by the new trial judge.

The respondents were ordered to pay the appellants $8,000 in appeal costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, with each respondent contributing $4,000 within 90 days.

The appellant sought to continue the assessment of solicitor accounts, which the application judge dismissed due to a jurisdictional issue (late requisition under the Solicitors Act).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, emphasizing that courts should facilitate account assessment and that procedural defects should not be treated as nullities, especially when parties have consented and participated for years.

The court ordered the Assessment Officer to issue a decision on the merits without delay.

The appellants failed to appear for their scheduled appeal hearing before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, despite attempts by the court and respondent's counsel to contact them.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants, previously found in contempt of an injunction and fined $1 million, brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for delay and sought an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

They also sought to introduce a new ground of appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, based on a misapplication of criminal practice directions to a civil proceeding.

The court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time, but imposed strict conditions, finding the ineffective assistance of counsel argument weak in a civil context.

The appellants, a Township and its officials, appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion seeking to dismiss a defamation and misfeasance in public office action brought by the respondents, owners of a community newspaper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the motion judge's application of the anti-SLAPP test under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, including the weighing of public interest in expression versus harm to reputation, and the assessment of available defences.

The court affirmed that the motion judge correctly applied the legal tests and that anti-SLAPP motions are not the forum for definitive determinations of complex defences.

The appellants, former litigation counsel, appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion based on a limitations defence in a solicitor negligence claim.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal, or alternatively, that commencing an action earlier was not an appropriate means to remedy it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the claim was not time-barred, emphasizing that the respondents reasonably relied on their counsel's advice regarding the underlying litigation's legal errors, thus delaying discoverability of the negligence claim.

The applicant, Vale Canada Limited and related entities, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to expedite the hearing of their appeals.

These appeals stem from a lower court decision regarding jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in a complex insurance dispute with parallel proceedings in New York.

The motion judge dismissed the request for expedition, emphasizing that judicial comity requires avoiding an "unseemly race" between jurisdictions and that the issue of forum non conveniens should be determined on its merits by the respective appeal courts, not by the speed of litigation.

The appellants, plaintiffs in the underlying action, brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking an order to compel the Regional Senior Judge to set an expedited four-week trial date.

This motion followed a previous Court of Appeal order that had set aside a partial summary judgment and directed the action to be restored to the trial list on an expedited basis.

The appellants argued that the action had not been restored as ordered.

The motion judge, assuming jurisdiction without deciding the *functus officio* argument, dismissed the motion.

The judge found that the previous order had not been breached and emphasized the inappropriateness of interfering with the trial judge's ongoing case management, who was actively preparing the case for trial.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion judge's decision to dismiss the appellant's action via reverse summary judgment, which sought to set aside a property transfer under power of sale due to alleged fraud and conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant's request, finding that despite some delay, she maintained an intention to appeal and had arguable grounds, particularly regarding the motion judge's assessment of "badges of fraud" in the context of a power of sale and the chargee's duties.

The court also clarified that a writ of possession requires a pre-existing order for possession, which the purchaser lacked.

The plaintiffs, Paul J. Hannivan and Pamela J. Hannivan, sued the defendant, Muhammad Wasi, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) after Wasi repudiated the deal, alleging the Hannivans failed to provide a proper survey.

The Hannivans moved for summary judgment on their claim for damages and on Wasi's counterclaim for the return of his deposit.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the Hannivans, finding that the survey issue was not essential to the transaction and did not entitle Wasi to repudiate the agreement.

The plaintiffs, a group of mortgage lenders, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking full arrears at a 25% annual interest rate and default administration fees after the defendants breached a settlement agreement.

The settlement had reduced the interest rate, but the defendants' opposition to a property sale approval motion triggered a clause voiding the release.

The defendants sought relief from forfeiture or argued the rates violated the federal Interest Act.

The court granted relief from forfeiture, finding the breach caused minimal prejudice to the lenders compared to the substantial forfeiture sought, and ordered an accounting of any remaining settlement amounts.

The court also found the 25% interest rate and default fees were not unenforceable under the Interest Act due to prior Supreme Court and Court of Appeal rulings on time-triggered rate increases and consensual resolutions.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion for an interlocutory injunction by Product Pro Industrial Supplies Inc. against Sheam Yee Wang and KTS Consulting (the "Wang Defendants").

Product Pro sought costs on a partial indemnity scale, or alternatively, substantial indemnity.

The court found that while Product Pro did not achieve all requested relief, it was substantially successful, warranting costs.

The court rejected the Wang Defendants' arguments against costs, including allegations of fraud and improper conduct by Product Pro's principal, finding these did not disqualify Product Pro from receiving costs.

The court fixed costs at $26,869.20 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid by the Wang Defendants within 30 days.

The wife and her boyfriend brought a motion to remove the husband's lawyer due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The boyfriend had a brief consultation with the lawyer for his own matrimonial matter, and the husband's answer in the current litigation alleged an affair between the wife and boyfriend and extravagant spending.

The moving parties claimed the lawyer breached duties of confidence, loyalty, and candour, and faced a potential conflict in cross-examining the boyfriend as a witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no confidential information was disclosed, the relationship between the wife and boyfriend was not confidential, and the two matrimonial litigations were not sufficiently related to create a presumption of conflict.

The court also found no breach of a limited duty of loyalty or candour, and no impediment to cross-examination.

This is a costs ruling in a family law matter involving a motion to change and a motion to strike pleadings.

The respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis in the amount of $44,321.62.

The court found that the applicant acted in bad faith through deliberate concealment of financial disclosure, misrepresentation of income, and obstructive litigation conduct spanning over two years.

The court awarded costs on a full recovery basis in the amount of $34,889.50, payable immediately and enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office as child support.

The appellant appealed an order of a Master requiring the appellant to post security for costs.

The Master had found that impecuniosity had not been established, that the appellant’s case did not demonstrate a high likelihood of success, and that no hardship would result even if impecuniosity could not be shown.

Applying the standard of review for appeals from a Master, the court found no palpable or overriding error and no error of law in the Master’s reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed and the security for costs order remained in effect.

The plaintiffs in a medical negligence action brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking a determination before trial of whether the defendant could summons plaintiffs’ counsel to testify and produce documents related to communications with the plaintiff.

The defendant argued the evidence was relevant to the issue of discoverability in relation to a limitations defence.

The court held that the motion did not raise a question of law in a pleading and therefore was not properly brought under Rule 21.

Issues concerning witness summonses, privilege, waiver, and the admissibility of documents are evidentiary matters best decided by the trial judge.

Discoverability is a fact-based analysis and does not constitute a pure question of law suitable for pre‑trial determination under Rule 21.

The plaintiff alleged that he and another individual formed a partnership with a third person to develop a nightclub and microbrewery venture, and that the defendants diverted the opportunity by securing a lease and operating the business themselves.

The plaintiff also claimed standing as assignee of the co‑venturer’s alleged cause of action through security agreements relating to unrelated debts.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a partner in the venture, noting his absence from key negotiations and documentation such as the letter of intent to lease.

The court further held that the co‑venturer’s refusal or inability to provide financing effectively constituted withdrawal from the partnership, permitting the remaining participant to proceed independently.

As a result, neither the co‑venturer nor the plaintiff as alleged assignee had a viable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or diversion of opportunity.