Administrative Law

The appellant, S.B., appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (the Board) that upheld a physician's finding of his incapacity to manage property due to Huntington's disease.

The Board applied a two-part test under the Substitute Decisions Act, finding S.B. could understand financial information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his financial decisions.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the appeal on a standard of palpable and overriding error for mixed questions of fact and law.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Board correctly applied the capacity test by considering S.B.'s lack of insight into his condition's impact on his finances, coupled with his history of poor financial management and vulnerability to exploitation.

The court also rejected the argument that a pre-existing Power of Attorney nullified the capacity assessment, as this issue was not raised at the initial Board hearing.

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (the "Board") confirming the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment.

Subsequent to the Board's decision, the appellant regained capacity, leading both parties to seek to admit new evidence.

The court admitted the new evidence but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding it moot as the live controversy regarding the appellant's capacity had disappeared.

In the alternative, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's original decision, which had correctly applied the legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

A federal inmate brought an application for habeas corpus challenging his reclassification from medium to maximum security and transfer to another institution.

The applicant argued that correctional authorities breached procedural fairness by withholding information relied upon in the transfer decision and that the decision was unreasonable.

The court reviewed the disclosure process under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the principles set out in Mission Institution v. Khela.

After reviewing a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld information and the reliability of confidential sources, the court found that the correctional authorities lawfully invoked s. 27(3) and disclosed sufficient summaries to allow the applicant to meet the case against him.

The court further held that the transfer decision fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by the evidentiary record.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action seeking damages arising from the alleged mishandling of his application for a professional engineering licence by the provincial regulator.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the regulator did not owe a private law duty of care to an individual applicant in the circumstances, given the statutory framework and the public‑interest mandate of the regulatory body.

The governing statute also contained a good‑faith immunity provision indicating legislative intent not to impose such liability.

In any event, the record disclosed no evidence of bad faith in the processing of the licensing application.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act and a finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant argued both procedural and substantive errors, including alleged failures in timely delivery of statutory notices and errors in assessing the criteria for involuntary admission and treatment capacity.

The court applied the standards of correctness for legal questions and reasonableness for factual and mixed questions, emphasizing deference to the specialized tribunal.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded the statutory criteria for involuntary admission were met due to the likelihood of serious bodily harm to others and that the appellant lacked capacity because she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an earlier decision granting regulatory relief, the court addressed the appropriate costs award in a compliance application brought by a professional regulatory college against an individual practitioner.

The respondent argued for reduced costs based on partial success, the importance of legal issues under recently enacted legislation, and financial hardship.

The court held that the applicant had effectively obtained the relief sought and that the respondent’s circumstances did not justify reducing the presumptive costs award.

The court emphasized that inability to pay is rarely relevant absent clear evidence of permanent inability to satisfy costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis payable by the respondent.

The applicant, a federal inmate convicted of second degree murder, sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid requiring his transfer from medium to minimum security.

He argued that maintaining his medium security classification despite favourable psychological reports and recommendations from his case management team constituted an unlawful deprivation of liberty.

The court held that refusal to grant a less restrictive security classification does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty where the inmate has never previously enjoyed the lower classification.

In any event, the court found the warden’s decision reasonable, given concerns about the inmate’s continued denial of responsibility and its relevance to risk assessment under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board concluded that although the appellant understood the information relevant to treatment decisions, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant argued that the Board misapprehended evidence, lacked proof of treatment benefits, and failed to properly address risks and benefits of the medication.

The court held that the Board’s findings were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the appellant’s persistent denial of mental illness and inability to appreciate the purpose and consequences of treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The applicant municipality sought a determination regarding the nature of an appeal under s. 15.3(4) of the Building Code Act, 1992 from a property standards committee decision, specifically whether the appeal proceeds as a hearing de novo or as an appeal limited to the record.

The court considered conflicting authorities of the Superior Court addressing the issue.

Preferring earlier precedent, the court held that such appeals are hearings de novo, permitting the parties to introduce new and oral evidence, including evidence arising after the committee hearing.

The court emphasized that under s. 15.3(6) the court possesses the same powers and functions as the committee, including receiving evidence and determining issues on the merits.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to consolidate, or alternatively to have heard sequentially, their appeal of a property standards order under the Building Code Act, 1992 and a separate civil action against the municipality, neighbours, a supplier, and an engineering firm.

The plaintiffs argued that both proceedings arose from the same factual circumstances regarding retaining walls and responsibility for remediation work.

The court held that the appeal was narrowly limited to determining whether the property complied with applicable standards and whether the ordered repairs were required, while the civil action involved broader questions of liability and damages.

Consolidation or a stay would undermine the purpose of the property standards regime by delaying enforcement.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that a municipal fill by-law did not apply to their property containing an abandoned gravel pit and aerodrome.

The court held that the summary judgment process was appropriate and that it could grant judgment adverse to the moving party where the evidentiary record permitted determination of the legal issues.

Interpreting the Municipal Act, 2001 and the Aggregate Resources Act, the court found that the abandoned pit did not fall within statutory exemptions applicable to licensed or operating pits and that the municipal by-law regulating the dumping of fill therefore applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the by-law was constitutionally inapplicable to the aerodrome under interjurisdictional immunity, relying on appellate authority confirming that municipal fill by-laws aimed at environmental protection do not trench on the core of federal aeronautics power.

Partial summary judgment was effectively granted in favour of the municipality on the legal issues raised by the motion.

A private elector brought a motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at city council meetings pending an application challenging the validity of the councillor’s election on residency grounds.

The court applied the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald and found that although there was a serious question to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

The court also held that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the councillor to continue performing his duties, particularly given the public interest in municipal governance.

The requested injunction would effectively grant the ultimate relief sought prior to adjudication on the merits.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a six-year sentence, applied for habeas corpus challenging a transfer from minimum to medium security.

He alleged the transfer decision was procedurally unfair under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act because confidential source information was withheld and insufficient particulars were disclosed.

The court held that correctional authorities may withhold information where disclosure would jeopardize safety, security, or investigations, provided a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld material is supplied to the reviewing court.

The court was satisfied that the sealed affidavit justified nondisclosure and that the applicant had received an adequate summary of the information against him.

The court also found the transfer decision reasonable and declined to interfere with institutional placement decisions.

The applicant sought an order requiring consumer reporting agencies to remove debts older than two years from his credit report, arguing that once the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 expires, such debts cannot be legally enforced and should not be reported.

The court considered whether the limitation period governing civil proceedings should apply to the time frame for reporting debts under the Consumer Reporting Act.

The court held that the statutes serve distinct purposes: the Limitations Act governs the enforcement of legal claims, while the Consumer Reporting Act regulates consumer credit reporting.

Because neither statute incorporates the other, the two‑year limitation period does not restrict the reporting of debts under the Consumer Reporting Act.

The applicant’s Charter argument also failed because the actions complained of involved private entities rather than governmental action.

A vexatious litigant sought leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Executive Committee of a professional regulatory college refusing to reinstate his licence.

The court held that no statutory right of appeal exists from such a decision under the governing legislation, rendering the proposed proceeding an abuse of process.

The applicant’s extensive history of abusive litigation conduct, unpaid costs orders, and misleading statements to courts was also considered in assessing whether leave should be granted.

The court found there were no reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding and that allowing it would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Leave to commence the proceeding was refused and further filing restrictions in the Toronto Region were imposed.

The applicant sought an interim and interlocutory injunction restraining a municipal councillor from attending or voting at meetings of a city council.

The motion arose in the context of a dispute involving the councillor’s participation in municipal governance.

The court declined to grant the requested equitable relief.

The motion for injunctive relief was dismissed, with directions for the parties to provide written submissions on costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding her incapable of making decisions regarding admission to a care facility.

She argued the Board erred in law and fact, including by allegedly applying a best interests test rather than the statutory capacity test.

The court reviewed the Board’s decision under a reasonableness standard and applied the governing principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding capacity to consent.

The court found the Board properly articulated and applied the legal test and that its conclusion that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of leaving the care facility was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

An agricultural industry association sought a stay of a provincial regulation restricting the use of neonicotinoid‑treated seeds pending further compliance time, arguing farmers would suffer economic harm due to regulatory timing requirements.

The province opposed and brought a cross‑motion to strike the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that injunctive relief against the Crown is highly restricted and unavailable absent circumstances such as deliberate flouting of the law, which were not present.

Even if relief were available, the applicant failed to meet the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interlocutory stay because the alleged harm was speculative and compensable in damages and the balance of convenience favoured environmental protection.

The court also held the application improperly sought to rewrite or delay the operation of a regulation rather than determine legal rights and therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review after a justice of the peace quashed a certificate of offence for a Highway Traffic Act charge on the court’s own motion during an early resolution proceeding.

The issue was whether the justice of the peace committed a jurisdictional error by quashing the certificate without a motion from the defendant.

The court held that under s. 36 of the Provincial Offences Act, objections to defects on the face of a certificate must be raised by the defendant through a motion to quash, and that the justice of the peace had no authority to initiate such a motion where the defendant was present.

The decision to quash the certificate was therefore a clear error of law and contrary to established precedent.

Orders of certiorari and mandamus were granted, restoring the proceeding and directing that a new early resolution meeting be scheduled.

A federal inmate brought a habeas corpus application challenging a decision by prison authorities to reclassify and involuntarily transfer him from medium security to maximum security.

The inmate argued that correctional authorities improperly withheld information relied upon in the transfer decision under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The court reviewed sealed materials and compared them with the summaries provided to the inmate.

It found that important information was not disclosed in gist form and that the reliability of sources had not been adequately addressed as required by governing jurisprudence.

The court held that these failures rendered the decision procedurally unfair and unlawful.