Joanna Weiss

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to consent to a Community Treatment Plan and upholding the issuance of a Community Treatment Order.

The court first determined that although the CTO had expired, the appeal was only partially moot and should be heard on the merits.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found no error in the Board's dismissal of preliminary motions regarding the procedural requirements of the CTO.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, as she was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred in applying the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal principles from Starson v. Swayze and reasonably concluded the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decision.

The respondent physician brought a motion to dismiss the appellant patient's appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision on the basis of mootness and delay.

The Board had upheld a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant had since been discharged but was later readmitted and found incapable by a different physician.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appeal was not moot because a successful appeal would establish a prior capable wish that could protect the appellant from unwanted treatment.

The court also found no inordinate or inexcusable delay.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a physician's finding of incapacity to consent to treatment and confirming the renewal of a community treatment order.

The appellant argued the order was procedurally invalid because not all parties signed the treatment plan within 72 hours of the physician's examination.

The court held that the Mental Health Act does not require other participants to execute the plan within 72 hours of the physician's examination.

The court also found the Board's decisions regarding the appellant's incapacity and the likelihood of substantial mental deterioration were reasonable.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the appeal was moot due to the CTO's expiration, but the court found an ongoing dispute because the CTO had been renewed.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant would likely suffer substantial deterioration without the CTO and that she lacked the capacity to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions due to her schizoaffective disorder.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its capacity finding and that the criteria for the order were not met, specifically alleging a failure to provide prompt rights advice.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the correctness standard to questions of law and reasonableness to mixed fact and law, ultimately finding no error in the Board's determinations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, who has a long history of schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider her preference for homeopathic treatments and her views on the traditional medical model.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding ample evidence that the appellant's mental illness prevented her from recognizing her condition and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board concluded that although the appellant understood the information relevant to treatment decisions, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant argued that the Board misapprehended evidence, lacked proof of treatment benefits, and failed to properly address risks and benefits of the medication.

The court held that the Board’s findings were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the appellant’s persistent denial of mental illness and inability to appreciate the purpose and consequences of treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a psychiatrist’s finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic and related medications.

The appeal concerned the statutory test for incapacity under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act and whether the Board’s findings were reasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held the Board reasonably concluded that the patient could not understand relevant treatment information or appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment due to a mental disorder.

The Board was entitled to rely on the psychiatrist’s evidence and aspects of the patient’s testimony demonstrating lack of insight into the illness.

No basis existed for judicial interference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment for a mental disorder under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment due to delusional beliefs preventing appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication.

The court held that the Board’s finding of incapacity with respect to anti‑psychotic medication and related side‑effect medication was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the evidentiary record contained insufficient information regarding benzodiazepines and cholinergic medication.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the matter remitted to the Board for a rehearing on those medications before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.