M. John Ewart

The plaintiff mortgage brokerage brought a motion for summary judgment against the corporate defendant and its CEO for unpaid brokerage fees.

The CEO had fraudulently misrepresented to the plaintiff that the real estate agents on the sale of the property had agreed to reduce their commission by 50%, inducing the plaintiff to discharge its mortgage and defer its fees.

The court found the CEO personally liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and ordered both defendants to pay the full $350,000 fee plus substantial indemnity costs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were public interest litigants.

Finding that the plaintiffs' unsubstantiated claims impugned the professional integrity of the defendant and its employees, the court awarded the defendant costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $65,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that a municipal by-law imposing permit fees for the importation of fill material constituted an indirect tax and was therefore ultra vires under s. 142 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the evidentiary record filed by the municipality was insufficient to determine whether a nexus existed between the fee charged and the cost of the regulatory scheme.

Without evidence demonstrating the methodology, cost analysis, or calculations supporting the fee structure, the court could not determine whether the charge was a valid regulatory fee or an impermissible tax.

Invoking the fact‑finding powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court ordered the municipality to file further supplemental materials addressing the nexus between the fees and administrative costs.

The motion was not finally determined and further evidence was required before adjudicating the legality of the by‑law.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that a municipal fill by-law did not apply to their property containing an abandoned gravel pit and aerodrome.

The court held that the summary judgment process was appropriate and that it could grant judgment adverse to the moving party where the evidentiary record permitted determination of the legal issues.

Interpreting the Municipal Act, 2001 and the Aggregate Resources Act, the court found that the abandoned pit did not fall within statutory exemptions applicable to licensed or operating pits and that the municipal by-law regulating the dumping of fill therefore applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the by-law was constitutionally inapplicable to the aerodrome under interjurisdictional immunity, relying on appellate authority confirming that municipal fill by-laws aimed at environmental protection do not trench on the core of federal aeronautics power.

Partial summary judgment was effectively granted in favour of the municipality on the legal issues raised by the motion.